The Populist Surge in Europe: A Strategic Windfall for the Kremlin

Russian President Vladimir Putin experienced a productive week. It began with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, providing an opportunity to engage with global leaders such as Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi. It concluded with the arrival of Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff in Moscow, signaling US President Donald Trump’s ongoing determination to negotiate a resolution on Ukraine. However, the most gratifying development for the Kremlin emerged from Europe.

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) achieved a resounding victory in the Saxony-Anhalt state election, raising the prospect of a pro-Russia party governing a core European Union member state. For Putin, whose ties to Germany stem from his tenure as a KGB officer in Dresden, this outcome is deeply satisfying.

The AfD could secure power at the federal level when voters head to the polls in 2029. Currently, the far-right party is riding a wave of momentum, fueled by dissatisfaction with Chancellor Friedrich Merz and its promises to restrict immigration, curtail LGBTQ rights, and reverse the transition to renewable energy. Its appeal is particularly robust in former East Germany, where it already topped the 2024 provincial elections in Thuringia.

Nationally, the AfD polls six to seven percentage points ahead of the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Unless the CDU rebounds against the odds, the populist hardliners will secure the largest caucus in the next Bundestag. If this occurs, mainstream parties may struggle to maintain the widely discussed firewall (Brandmauer) that keeps the AfD—which includes neo-Nazis—out of power. Despite being a small province with limited national impact, Saxony-Anhalt could serve as a testing ground for a far-right-led coalition.

Russia could act as the binding agent for such a partnership. The AfD is courting potential support from the left, specifically the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a splinter from the Die Linke party, which inherits the legacy of East Germany’s communists. Much like the far right, Wagenknecht advocates for reducing military aid to Ukraine, pursuing peace negotiations with Russia, and lifting EU sanctions. Their views on migration and gender issues also align, resonating with Putin’s criticism of Europe’s progressive trajectory. Consequently, if the AfD and BSW (or a similar left-wing force) gain power in Berlin, they will likely adopt policies reminiscent of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. However, Germany’s pivotal role in European politics, economy, and security amplifies the stakes.

Although Germany currently dominates headlines, France remains the primary concern. While Merz and the CDU operate on a longer timeline, President Emmanuel Macron is nearing the end of his tenure. Marine Le Pen could very well be the victor in the 2027 presidential election, and current polling suggests she could defeat a mainstream candidate.

A nationalist and Eurosceptic leader in the Élysée Palace would undoubtedly complicate Europe’s pursuit of a unified foreign policy, with Russia at the forefront of such challenges. Unlike the AfD, Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) supports some level of military aid for Ukraine, though not at its current scale. However, they advocate for negotiations and criticize the EU for what they perceive as a misguided effort to defeat Russia. Under Le Pen, EU enlargement—whether to the Western Balkans, Ukraine, or Moldova—would be frozen. Admitting new members is already complicated by the French constitution, which requires a supermajority in both legislative chambers or a national referendum. If Europe turns away aspiring nations, Russia will win by default rather than by design.

This highlights a crucial point. It is tempting to attribute the rise of illiberal parties and politicians to Moscow’s machinations, much like many US Democrats blamed Russian interference for Trump’s 2016 victory. While it is undeniable that populists and nativists share views aligned with the Kremlin, their popularity among voters stems from their ability to exploit genuine economic grievances and cultural anxieties.

Russia’s influence campaigns typically amplify social divisions and feed resentment to disrupt the established order from within. Ultimately, the choice and the responsibility it entails rest squarely with the voters in any given democracy, whether in France, Germany, the US, Greece (where a Russia-friendly coalition of the far right and far left won power in 2015), or elsewhere.

It is also important to recognize that the policies and views of hardliners often evolve once they assume power. This was the case with Giorgia Meloni in Italy, who became a staunch supporter of Ukraine and Western unity by the time her Brothers of Italy party won in 2022. Similarly, the RN has shifted toward the center on many issues, including EU integration and Russia policy, under Le Pen and her deputy Jordan Bardella.

Thus far, the AfD has been the exception. It maintains its extreme positions, and all things considered, this strategy has worked for it. However, in the long run, the party may need to shift toward the center to attract disillusioned CDU voters, particularly outside its East German stronghold, and persuade others to dismantle the Brandmauer. Radicalism might eventually run its course.

Saxony-Anhalt is the region from which Catherine the Great’s family originated. Putin, an amateur historian, might recall this. Having his ideological allies run the region is not quite the conquest worthy of Catherine. Yet, it represents a point of pride for Moscow, which is already pressuring Germany through reckless acts of sabotage, such as the drone attack thwarted at Leipzig airport. The populist revolt across Europe need not lead to radical change in the direction Russia desires. Nonetheless, it will generate enough internal disruption within the EU to hobble its intermittent efforts to assume a greater geopolitical role.

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