Multi-Domain Threats Compel a Strategic Overhaul of Air and Missile Defense

Air-and-missile defense (AMD) systems have demonstrated impressive capabilities in recent conflicts, successfully intercepting cruise missiles and neutralizing drone swarms at high rates. However, the rapid depletion of interceptor stockpiles and the loss of THAAD/TPY-2 radar systems have compelled the United States to urgently secure its assets in the Middle East.

Replenishing existing reserves presents a significant hurdle, and preparing for future operational requirements is an even greater challenge. Addressing both immediate and long-term needs demands rapid adaptation to evolving adversary tactics, according to Rob Mitrevski, President of Golden Dome Strategy and Integration at L3Harris.

“Iran showcased a formidable ability to deploy and launch a wide array of multi-domain threats, encompassing various classes of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles,” Mitrevski noted. “The concurrent launch of these assets, targeted to strike within compressed timeframes, created a unique challenge. It forced defenders to balance defeating low-cost threats with low-cost defensive measures while also engaging high-cost, advanced threats with correspondingly capable effectors.”

Establishing a forward roadmap for AMD requires addressing three primary concerns: cost, effectiveness, and industrial base capacity. Navigating these complexities will necessitate a coordinated effort between the Pentagon and defense industry to ensure AMD systems remain up to the task.

Cost Vs. Value

Fundamentally, AMD is expensive. Radars, launchers, and interceptors require substantial financial investment and time to produce, yet they are often deployed to neutralize relatively inexpensive threats—particularly as low-cost drones proliferate in massive swarms.

However, the purchase price is not the sole determinant of value; the asset being defended also factors into the equation, stated Tom Karako, Director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

“The value of the defended asset is paramount,” Karako explained. “Nevertheless, the cost perspective remains valid, and the high price of interceptors cannot be dismissed simply because the protected asset is more expensive. What is the true cost of defending the homeland? Does that justify spending a trillion dollars annually on missile defense simply because the homeland holds immense value? No, the affordability question remains. Furthermore, can a nation afford to be a global superpower and project power across the globe if interceptor costs are unsustainable? These costs are meaningful and represent just one of many fiscal factors.”

The proliferation of unmanned aerial system (UAS) swarms—primarily Iran’s Shahed, which costs tens of thousands of dollars per unit—is rapidly shifting the calculus of interception. While traditional interceptors effectively defeat drone swarms, the cost imbalance is untenable. Karako pointed out that more affordable counter-drone systems exist and are effective, but a shift in the demand signal is necessary to prioritize and implement them.

“The overused narrative that you shouldn’t shoot down a $40,000 drone with a $4,000,000 missile misses the practical solution,” Karako argued. “Instead of relying on expensive interceptors, procure and deploy the affordable UAS countermeasures that are already fielded and operational. Turn up the volume on those systems. The discourse on counter-UAS is strong, but let’s back it up with actual procurement.”

AMD Systems Are Effective, But Must Adapt

Overall, AMD systems performed admirably during the conflict in Iran. However, the variety of threats deployed highlighted that traditional engagement doctrines—simply detecting and striking a target—must rapidly evolve to counter low-flying, highly maneuverable drone swarms, as well as high-speed threats like hypersonics and predictable ballistic missiles.

“Iran’s retaliatory actions provided real-world validation of their capabilities,” Mitrevski stated. “Regardless of the specific conflict’s outcome, the scenario of a multi-domain, concurrent attack utilizing diverse weapons against a variety of targets is the operational reality we must learn to address in our defense strategies.”

The United States has proven its AMD prowess for decades, epitomized by the Patriot system intercepting Scuds during the first Persian Gulf War. However, as threats evolve rapidly, modern systems must simultaneously engage multiple attack vectors. Achieving this requires the Pentagon and industry to accelerate the development and deployment of necessary capabilities.  

“This problem was entirely foreseeable,” Karako remarked. “A common complaint is the lack of awareness regarding air defense below the Patriot system. Categories such as short-range air defense and counter-UAS have been reinvigorated since 2017, yet funding has been anemic in recent years. Now, the alarm bells are ringing.”

Industrial Base Capacity

Inconsistent demand signals for AMD systems and components have historically constrained production. Manufacturing items like solid-rocket motors for interceptors involves complex processes, and constructing a THAAD/TPY-2 radar requires an extended, multi-billion-dollar effort. These factors have contributed to dwindling stockpiles and underscore the urgent need for a rapid expansion of industrial base capacity. Given the necessity to replenish munitions expended in Iran alongside the administration’s defense spending priorities, the appropriate demand signals are now in place to stimulate production and investment.

“When reviewing the National Defense Strategy, executive orders, the reconciliation budget, acquisition reform initiatives, and other policy directives together, there are clear demand signals,” Mitrevski noted. “These include the Department of War’s priorities to defend the homeland with next-generation air and missile defense and to supercharge the defense industrial base.”  

Alignment between industry and the Pentagon on AMD requirements is critical, ensuring the consistency of demand signals needed to scale production. Developing technologies that not only meet operational needs but can also be manufactured at scale is essential, as the conflict in Iran has demonstrated that the future of AMD will likely involve defending against overwhelming swarms of attackers.

Ultimately, both the problem and the solution are well understood. Now, the industrial base and the Pentagon must invest the necessary resources to rapidly refill stockpiles and prepare for future threats.

“We needed to execute a munitions ramp before we vaporized a couple trillion dollars of interceptors,” Karako stated. “Now, the need is even more dire.”

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