Will the Houthi attacks activate the Mecca Pact?

Yemenese Houthi rebels have seized the Mocha port, threatening control over the strategic Bab al‑Mandeb strait corridor. They have also launched several strikes on Saudi cities, injuring roughly seventy civilians, including women and children.

The sustained assaults on Saudi energy, civil, and defence infrastructure, together with Iran‑backed maritime chokepoint actions by Houthis, have raised urgent questions about the operationalisation of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.

If the pact is activated, what form could Pakistani and Turkish intervention take?

The issue demands essential background. The United States, Yemen’s principal security partner, has long called on Gulf states to assume primary defence responsibilities, with American support remaining significant but limited. Since the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Israel over Iran, Washington has struggled to deliver comprehensive protection for its regional allies and has frequently failed to safeguard its own bases in the Gulf.

Consequently, Gulf nations have undertaken a new defence architecture. In September 2025 Saudi Arabia and Pakistan concluded their inaugural mutual defence agreement, which expanded in August to encompass Turkey and was renamed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. The trio set up a joint secretariat headquartered in Riyadh, with Pakistan initially chairing the body for a three‑year term.

The agreement remains nascent; it does not publicly detail triggers or response scenarios, nor has its institutional framework—including rules of engagement, decision‑making procedures, collective defence mandates, and deterrence mechanisms—been fully codified.

To illustrate potential mechanics, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared that unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia or spillover violence from the Yemen conflict would bring the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement into effect, stressing that “there should be no doubt in this.”

Minister Asif refrained from providing concrete design specifications, while Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, explained earlier that the pact operates much like NATO: a member state that comes under attack must expressly request and specify the kind of assistance it requires.

In that model, if Riyadh were to demand direct military intervention from Islamabad beyond material and intelligence aid, the latter would be obliged to act after prior consultation. However, the scale and nature of any response would still depend on negotiated terms.

To date, no real‑world test case exists because neither Riyadh nor its partners have invoked the mechanism.

Meanwhile, diplomatic envoys are active: Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud are engaging with Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi. Islamabad has publicly urged Tehran to curb Houthi militancy and to respect agreements such as the Mecca Pact.

If diplomatic avenues fail and Houthi offensives against Saudi territory persist, Turkey and Pakistan are likely to ramp up aerospace and technology assistance they already provide. Islamabad houses a jet squadron of approximately sixteen JF‑17 Thunder multirole aircraft, various defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, a full‑scale Pakistani operation inside Yemen appears improbable given Pakistan’s reluctance to join a broader conflict escalated in the Afghan war; domestic sensitivities regarding sectarian balance, economic stability, and social order weigh heavily on policy decisions.

The probable trajectory calls for heightened joint diplomatic pressure on Iran, continued bolstering of Saudi defences, and advocacy for a multinational naval coalition to safeguard the Bab al‑Mandeb.

The evolving security framework instantiated by accords such as the Mecca Pact will require several years to crystallise; until those mechanisms mature, bilateral defence ties with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will dominate regional security planning.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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