Saudi Arabia’s Chinese-made DF-3A ballistic missiles on display at a military parade on April 29, 2014.
Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia
Reports from The Wall Street Journal, citing social media footage and statements from both Yemeni government and Houthi officials, suggest that Saudi Arabia has launched a Chinese-made ballistic missile into Yemen. If confirmed, this deployment would mark the first time the kingdom has utilized its ballistic missiles in an active conflict. Amidst recent escalations in clashes with the Houthis, experts speculate that Riyadh’s decision to deploy such weaponry serves as a direct warning to the group’s primary patron, Iran.
Cellphone videos shared on social media by Yemeni citizens appear to show debris and fuselage parts of a Chinese-made Dongfeng-15, clearly displaying its “DF-15A” designation. Because the DF-15A warhead is designed to separate during flight, the precise landing location and the intended target of the strike remain unclear.
Although Saudi Arabia was not previously known to possess DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles, this acquisition would align with the kingdom’s historical defense strategies. Since the 1980s, Saudi Arabia has relied on China for ballistic missile technology, particularly after Western allies declined to sell such systems. This initial acquisition of liquid-fueled DF-3A intermediate-range ballistic missiles occurred during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War, as both nations sought to establish deterrent capabilities against each other’s urban centers. While Riyadh publicly showcased its DF-3A missiles in 2014, the kingdom, unlike Iran, has historically maintained extreme discretion regarding the scale and scope of its ballistic missile program.
The DF-3A possesses an approximate range of 1,860 miles, though its accuracy is limited, a characteristic consistent with its original design for carrying nuclear warheads. In 2007, Saudi Arabia reportedly acquired the more precise yet shorter-range DF-21, capable of striking targets up to 1,000 miles away. In contrast, the DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) allegedly used by Riyadh in Yemen has a more modest operational range of roughly 370 miles.
The precise motivations behind Saudi Arabia’s decision to deploy ballistic missiles in Yemen at this specific juncture remain speculative, though several strategic factors likely played a role. The kingdom operates a highly advanced, Western-equipped air force featuring sophisticated F-15SA and Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets. These aircraft are armed with long-range standoff cruise missiles, such as the Storm Shadow and AGM-84H SLAM-ER, which have ranges of 150 to 170 miles. The Saudi Air Force is believed to have utilized these precision-guided munitions in July to target the runway at Sanaa International Airport, aiming to disrupt Houthi attempts to establish an air bridge with Iran. Standoff weaponry of this nature allows fighter jets to strike high-value targets from a safe distance, well beyond the reach of hostile air defenses.
Consequently, questions remain as to why Riyadh opted for ground-based surface-to-surface missiles rather than relying on its superior air capabilities. The recent escalation of conflict in Yemen and the broader region may have compelled Saudi Arabia to signal a heightened willingness to project force. Since the July airport strike, the Houthis have intensified their missile and drone campaigns against the kingdom, imposed blockades on Saudi shipping in the Red Sea, and advanced along Yemen’s western coast against the internationally recognized government forces. Additionally, Saudi Arabia faced a dangerous multi-front threat when its East-West oil pipeline was targeted by drones launched from northern Iraq on September 11, placing the kingdom in a strategic pincer.
Most recently, Saudi Arabia announced the interception of a Houthi drone south of Mecca on Tuesday evening, marking the second time since 2017 that the group has targeted the Islamic holy city. In response, the Houthis have denied responsibility, claiming instead that they shot down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet over Yemen’s Marib Governorate and forced additional Saudi F-15s and Eurofighters to retreat while searching for the wreckage.
While it is logical that Riyadh might deploy short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) following the loss of a fighter jet or in response to attacks on Mecca, footage of the DF-15A missile debris actually surfaced prior to these specific incidents. Nevertheless, broader regional escalations—such as the Houthi advance along Yemen’s western coast and the drone attack on the East-West pipeline—may have convinced Riyadh of the necessity to signal its firm resolve against such provocations. According to Reuters, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directed the Houthi coastal offensive and oversaw subsequent attacks against the kingdom.
Utilizing ballistic missiles serves as a highly effective mechanism for Riyadh to communicate its discontent directly to Tehran, bypassing the Houthi intermediaries.
Earlier in the conflict, Saudi Arabia’s air force, alongside those of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain, conducted covert retaliatory strikes against Iranian attacks. Unlike these smaller Gulf nations, Iran possesses significant strategic depth. Consequently, while Gulf air forces are limited to targeting coastal regions of Iran to avoid sophisticated air defenses, Iranian SRBMs and inexpensive Shahed drones can readily reach any territory across the Gulf states. Kuwait has particularly struggled with this vulnerability in recent months.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s vast landmass provided a significant strategic advantage in missile exchanges with its western neighbor, which then possessed a larger inventory of Soviet-made Scud missiles. When Tehran acquired Scud missiles for retaliation, they only needed to travel approximately 90 miles from the Iranian border to strike Baghdad. Conversely, Tehran was initially out of range of conventional Iraqi Scuds, which required a 290-mile flight path to reach the Iranian capital. Baghdad eventually developed the modified Al-Husayn Scud variant to extend the range necessary to target Tehran, deploying them in the final months of the war. Although the Al-Husayn variants carried smaller payloads than standard Scuds, they served as highly effective terror weapons, prompting widespread evacuations in Tehran.
Today, the launch of DF-15A missiles into Yemen may represent Riyadh’s method of signaling its readiness to strike deeper within Iranian territory than ever before should Tehran continue to threaten Saudi security and economic stability through proxy militia attacks from both its southern and northern borders. While the DF-15A is limited to reaching Iran’s coastal regions, Saudi Arabia’s DF-3A and DF-21 missiles possess the capability to strike significantly deeper into Iranian territory. Deploying such advanced systems would represent a severe escalation, potentially providing Tehran with a propaganda victory if civilian casualties occur—an almost certain outcome if these missiles are aimed at population centers. Under such circumstances, Iran could respond with escalated proxy or direct attacks, inflicting extensive and lasting damage on critical Saudi infrastructure, urban centers, and energy facilities.
The stakes in this regional confrontation have never been higher.