Renewed Tigray Fighting Sparks Fears of Regional War Across the Horn of Africa

Fighting has reignited in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, with Tigrayan forces launching a major offensive on September 23. Clashes have also spread to the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions.

The escalation jeopardizes the fragile peace established by the 2022 Pretoria agreement, which had ended the previous Tigray war between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Yet the central question extends beyond Tigray: could this conflict intersect with the wars and rivalries already destabilizing the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea?

Martin Plaut, a British journalist and Horn of Africa expert, warns the conflict could spread beyond Ethiopia’s borders.

“If a conflict were to spill over, it is quite possible that a conflict involving Eritrea and Ethiopia could then draw in Sudanese forces, dragging the entire region into war,” he told DW in an exclusive interview.

Why northern Ethiopia is seeing growing violence once again

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Jalale Getachew Birru, a senior East Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), stressed that the conflict cannot be viewed in isolation. ACLED is an independent organization that monitors and analyzes political violence and armed conflict worldwide.

“The Ethiopian case is not isolated to the Horn of Africa. It involves neighboring countries and is being reflected across the region,” Birru told DW.

Her assessment points to a broader regional dynamic: Ethiopia’s conflict is unfolding alongside shifting alliances and competing interests in neighboring Sudan and Somalia. ACLED’s analysis places the renewed Tigray conflict within a wider pattern of instability across the Horn of Africa.

The risk stems not from a single regional alliance, but from the fact that several conflicts are already geographically and politically connected, Birru noted.

African Union urges restraint

The African Union (AU) has also expressed deep concern about the possibility of further destabilization.

In a statement on September 23, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf warned that new political and military alliances risk reversing progress made since 2020.

The AU called for an immediate end to actions that could escalate tensions, renewed direct talks under the Pretoria agreement, and restraint by Ethiopia’s neighbors. It also tasked former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the AU’s high representative for the Horn of Africa, with supporting diplomatic efforts.

The AU’s intervention reflects concerns that the crisis could have wider regional implications, including the possibility of interacting with conflicts beyond Ethiopia’s borders.

Old enemies, new alliances

The TPLF recently joined six other Ethiopian armed groups in an alliance seeking to oust Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government. Among them is the Amhara Fano movement, which fought against the TPLF during the previous war.

The alliance is not a unified military force, and its members have differing political objectives and territorial interests. Nevertheless, its formation could force the Ethiopian government to fight on several fronts simultaneously.

The fighting in Afar, a northeastern Ethiopian region bordering Eritrea and Djibouti, is particularly significant. The region contains the main transport corridor linking landlocked Ethiopia to Djibouti, through which much of Ethiopia’s international trade passes. Sustained fighting there could threaten a vital economic lifeline.

And beyond Afar lies Eritrea.

Eritrea’s potential role

During the 2020–2022 Tigray war, Eritrean troops fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces against the TPLF. Since then, relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have deteriorated, and Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access have added to Eritrea’s security concerns.

“The war could certainly escalate, and Eritrea could become involved,” Plaut said.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups opposed to the government, while Asmara has denied such allegations. The extent of any direct Eritrean involvement remains difficult to verify independently.

Sudan: Where conflicts could collide

Sudan has been at war since 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The conflict has drawn in regional powers and created one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises.

Plaut argues that Ethiopia and Eritrea are already indirectly involved on opposing sides.

“The Ethiopians are on the side of the RSF and Hemedti,” he said, referring to its commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. “There is strong evidence that a base in western Ethiopia is supplying and training RSF fighters,” Plaut added. DW has not independently verified that claim.

Explainer: How did Ethiopia’s Tigray war start?

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has faced allegations of supporting the RSF, which it denies. Plaut identifies Eritrea, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces.

“So both Eritrea and Ethiopia are already playing a role, indirectly, in the war,” he said.

If Ethiopia and Eritrea were to enter direct hostilities, Sudan’s rival forces could exploit the new situation, Plaut said. Fighting could pressure Sudan’s eastern frontier and alter supply routes and military calculations.

Plaut warns of a chain reaction: “Because the UAE backs the RSF and the Saudis back the Eritreans and the Sudanese Armed Forces, this could multiply and one conflict could lead into another.”

“So the whole thing becomes a generalized conflict in the region,” he said.

Red Sea connection

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping choke points, connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Eritrea and Djibouti lie on its western side, Yemen on the eastern side. The war in Yemen has already shown how insecurity around the Red Sea can disrupt international shipping and draw in outside powers.

Eritrea’s location and its control of the port of Assab give it strategic importance far beyond Tigray. Any major deterioration in Ethiopia-Eritrea relations could affect the wider security architecture of the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have developed extensive political, economic, and security interests across the Horn of Africa. Their interests overlap in some areas but diverge in others, particularly over Sudan.

Danger is escalation, not inevitability

None of this means a regional war is inevitable. There is no evidence of a single military alliance stretching from Tigray to the Gulf. Ethiopia’s armed groups have competing interests, Eritrea may avoid direct intervention, and Sudan’s warring parties have their own priorities.

But conflicts do not need a common command structure to become interconnected.

Ethiopia’s broken Tigray peace deal opens old wounds

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The Tigray war killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions. The Pretoria agreement stopped the large-scale fighting, but many of the political and territorial disputes underlying the conflict remained unresolved.

Today, Tigray is again at war while Ethiopia faces several armed movements, Eritrea is a potential military actor, and Sudan is already engulfed in civil war.

Plaut warns that the humanitarian consequences could again be severe.

“There’s certainly a danger of this becoming an extremely bloody conflict,” he told DW. “After all, 600,000 people died in the last one in Tigray.”

But he does not predict that the previous death toll will necessarily be exceeded. “Let’s hope that it doesn’t go in that direction,” he said.

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