Pro‑Palestine demonstrations have erupted in multiple Moroccan cities, with protesters calling for an end to the normalization of relations with Israel while Rabat deepens its engagement with Tel Aviv.
The most recent wave of protests occurred on September 27, concluding a three‑day campaign organized by the Moroccan Front for Supporting Palestine and Opposing Normalisation.
These protests came after a September 16 announcement that Morocco and Israel would upgrade their diplomatic missions to full embassies and exchange ambassadors.
On September 25, the Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes reported that it had coordinated 76 events across 45 cities under the banner “Friday for Al‑Aqsa and Against Normalisation.”
Moroccan outlets reported protests in Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakech, Tangier, Fès, Agadir, Oujda, Tétouan, Kénitra and Sale. The committee’s figure of 76 events remains unverified by any independent national count.
In Rabat, demonstrators assembled outside the parliament building, whereas a protest in Marrakech turned into a march along several major thoroughfares, as reported by Lakome. Moroccan media also noted that authorities imposed restrictions and made arrests in a number of locations.
Restrictions and arrests
The protests encountered restrictions in several cities.
In Tangier, local authorities prohibited a planned demonstration for September 27. According to Achkayen, security forces broke up the crowd, detaining over twelve individuals, based on the outlet’s sources.
Lakome added that authorities barred protests in M’diq and that police encircled a gathering in Agadir to stop it from turning into a march.
The Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes subsequently denounced the bans, restrictions and arrests.
This reaction highlights another facet of the dispute: street‑level opposition to Israel ties persists even as the government pursues deeper official relations.
A relationship under public pressure
Morocco re‑established diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2020 under the US‑brokered Abraham Accords, concurrent with Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
On September 16, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and his Israeli counterpart Gideon Saar met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz.
The three parties confirmed intentions to upgrade the Moroccan and Israeli missions to full embassies and to exchange ambassadors.
Morocco and Israel also agreed to negotiate investment‑protection and double‑taxation treaties, expand direct air links, and arrange high‑level reciprocal visits.
This step goes beyond merely maintaining the diplomatic ties established in 2020; it launches a broader program of institutional, economic and transport cooperation between the two states.
For critics of the rapprochement, the embassy agreement marks another advance in a policy they have opposed since 2020.
Public opinion and state policy
Morocco has kept diplomatic relations with Israel while simultaneously voicing public support for the Palestinian cause and the aspiration for a Palestinian state.
However, critics of normalization argue that the two stances are incompatible, especially given Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza, which they describe as genocidal.
“What has changed is the political context: normalization is being consolidated while the war in Gaza has provoked unprecedented public anger and stark images of Palestinian suffering,” said Kathya K Berrada, senior programmes manager at the Arab Center for Research, speaking to Al Jazeera.
“What we are witnessing in Morocco is a widening gap between official diplomacy and public opinion,” remarked Moroccan activist Mouna Rahiani, referencing the latest Arab Opinion Index, which showed that 89 percent of respondents opposed Moroccan recognition of Israel, while only six percent were in favor.
“While the state pursues deeper, more formal ties with Israel, Moroccans continue to take to the streets insisting that Palestine cannot be divorced from our political and moral responsibilities,” she added.
The September agreement has intensified an existing tension: street‑level opposition to normalization persists even as the government pushes for closer institutional links with Israel.
Berrada stressed that there is an important distinction between official policy and popular opinion, noting that reliable public data on Moroccan support for or opposition to normalization remain lacking.
Western Sahara adds another layer
The timing is also relevant to Morocco’s Western Sahara policy. The UN Security Council is set to review the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in October; the current mandate extends through October 31, 2026.
The September 16 trilateral statement was issued amid U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Israel’s backing of Morocco’s stance on the territory.
For Rabat, the Israel relationship forms part of a broader foreign‑policy framework in which ties with Washington and international backing for its Western Sahara position remain crucial.
Nevertheless, opponents of normalization argue that this strategic calculus does not address their objection to stronger ties with Israel, especially as the Palestinian question stays highly prominent.
Ahmed, a Moroccan sociologist who requested anonymity, said the September 16 step represents a continuation of the December 10, 2020 trilateral accord, but urged that Morocco pursue a comprehensive, rather than selective, relationship with Israel.
The election changes the political backdrop
The protests erupted just days after Morocco’s parliamentary elections on September 23.
The final tally awarded the Authenticity and Modernity Party 97 of the 395 seats, followed by the National Rally of Independents with 66, the Istiqlal Party with 65, and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) with 54.
The PJD had secured only 13 seats in the 2021 election. Voter turnout stood at 38.08 percent, down from 50.86 percent in 2021 and 42.27 percent in 2016, according to Morocco’s Ministry of Interior.
The PJD was in government when Morocco restored ties with Israel in 2020; then‑Prime Minister Saadeddine el‑Othmani signed the Morocco‑U.S.‑Israel joint declaration that December.
The PJD has long held that opposition to normalization is a core party principle. After reaffirming its rejection of normalization and any ties with Israel, el‑Othmani defended the 2020 decision as a matter of state policy.
On September 17, after the announcement of the planned diplomatic upgrade, the PJD’s general secretariat restated its opposition to normalization and to any relations or agreements with Israel.
Following the election, the PJD’s national council voted unanimously to stay in parliamentary opposition and to stay out of the forthcoming government.
The PJD’s stance illustrates the limits of gauging opposition to normalization through party politics alone: the party opposed the policy while in office, yet its prime minister signed the 2020 declaration.
Although the PJD’s expanded parliamentary presence in 2026 offers the issue a louder platform, it does not, by itself, shift Morocco’s foreign‑policy direction.
There is no evidence that the Palestine issue or opposition to normalization determined the vote outcome, and the PJD’s seat gains do not prove that its stance on Israel directly fueled its improved showing.
From the streets to politics?
The September protests demonstrate that groups opposed to normalization can still mobilize across a broad geographical area, although their influence on government policy remains uncertain.
“There is a crucial distinction between state policy and popular opinion. Normalization is an official state decision, yet reliable public data to gauge popular support for it remain scarce,” Berrada observed.
Consequently, it would be difficult to assert that either a majority or a minority of Moroccans endorse the policy.
This distinction matters when evaluating the protests’ significance. While demonstrations reveal the strength and persistence of organized opposition, they do not, on their own, reflect the views of the broader populace or guarantee a shift in government policy.
The PJD now commands a larger parliamentary presence than after the 2021 election, yet it remains in opposition. It can articulate its opposition to normalization in parliament, but will not join the government.
At the same time, the September 16 agreement continues to fit within Morocco’s broader foreign‑policy framework that involves the United States, Israel and Western Sahara. The Security Council’s review of MINURSO in October will offer another diplomatic forum where Morocco’s stance on the territory will be examined.
For the moment, the protests show that opposition to normalization retains the capacity for sustained mobilization, even as the government proceeds to deepen its ties with Israel. Whether this public opposition will evolve into lasting political pressure remains uncertain.