Sentora Securing Half of Aave V4 Revenue Under New Operational Separation

Aave DAO would own the contracts for a proposed Ethereum lending market, but Sentora would make the day-to-day decisions that shape its credit risk.

In a governance proposal posted September 28, the DeFi risk manager seeks to operate an isolated Aave V4 Hub and its lending Spokes through revocable roles. This arrangement places an immediate risk‑response responsibility on Sentora while leaving the DAO with ownership of the contracts, a review pathway for new markets, and the power to withdraw those roles.

Under the plan, Sentora would select its own collateral, design interest‑rate curves, set liquidation parameters, and configure oracles. Aave’s existing risk service providers would no longer be tasked with monitoring the instance, recommending changes, or responding to incidents.

The proposal remains an ARFC for community discussion, with next steps requiring a Snapshot vote followed by an on‑chain Aave Improvement Proposal before any approval is granted.

Who Can Act and When

Aave V4 separates the Hub that holds liquidity from the Spokes where loans are originated against collateral. Sentora proposes a single Ethereum Hub for its Spokes, with no credit lines connecting to or from other Aave DAO Hubs, and its own Spokes may continue drawing from suppliers located within Sentora’s Hub.

The structure limits borrowable assets to RLUSD, PYUSD, and OUSD, explicitly excluding USDC and USDT.

Within the plan, the DAO’s Governance Short Executor would maintain administrative control over the Hub, Spokes, and Access Manager roles. The DAO would retain authority for contract upgrades and role assignments, while Sentora would hold no contractual ownership of funds.

Instead, Sentora would receive operational roles to manage market activities, and the DAO would possess the power to revoke those grants via an on‑chain governance proposal.

These operational actions carry distinct latency profiles:

1. Action: Pause or freeze a reserve, halt an asset or Spoke
   Actor: Sentora’s operational address
   Timing: Immediately through a restrictive role
2. Action: Revoke Sentora’s roles
   Actor: Through governance proposal
   Timing: Immediate
3. Action: Reduce a collateral factor or tighten a cap
   Actor: Sentora’s operational address
   Timing: After a 48‑hour on‑chain delay
4. Action: Increase risk, or modify a rate model or liquidation configuration
   Actor: Sentora’s operational address
   Timing: After a 48‑hour on‑chain delay
5. Action: Add a new Hub or introduce additional collateral asset
   Actor: Sentora proposes; an appointed Aave DAO service provider may object
   Timing: Two‑week forum review before scheduling or deployment
6. Action: Implement a defined objective or upgrade protocol
   Actor: The proposal requires a binding Snapshot vote

The 48‑hour pause applies specifically to risk increments and any function whose direction is ambiguous—such as rate models and liquidation configurations. No upper limit is set on the magnitude of such increases, nor is any cooldown period mandated between successive adjustments.

Importantly, the delayed visibility does not grant the DAO the ability to cancel a single action once the pause has begun. Revoking Sentora’s roles, however, necessitates a separate on‑chain governance proposal and permanently removes those authority confers.

For introducing a new Hub or alternative collateral, Sentora must submit an analytical breakdown and observe a two‑week review window. Any objection raised by designated Aave DAO service providers halts deployment and forwards the matter to a binding Snapshot vote.

The proposal also clarifies that no service provider is scoped or compensated to evaluate submitted analyses. Moreover, the isolated Hub is excluded from those providers’ ongoing monitoring, recurring recommendations, and incident‑response obligations. While service providers may proactively raise concerns, a passive review window provides no mechanism for establishing that anyone examined the change.

Any concern expressed independently would require the proposer to explicitly note that a review has occurred—something the current text does not mandate. Consequently, the veneer of collective oversight hinges entirely on proactive detection rather than systematic scrutiny.

What’s Moving crypto. Why it matters.

Get CryptoSlate’s essential stories and what to watch next.

Aave crypto lending proposal would let emergency tools freeze markets – but not unfreeze them

Sentora CEO Anthony DeMartino argued in a November 2025 essay that robust risk management demands measurable controls and continuous monitoring. The new proposal assigns that operational role to Sentora while preserving the founders’ right to voice dissent without being compelled to maintain active market oversight.

Who Absorbs a Shortfall？

If a liquidation exhausts a borrower’s collateral while principal debt persists, the Spoke reports the resulting deficit to the Hub from which the borrowed asset originates. That Hub records the shortfall against that specific asset, and TokenLogic’s V4 Umbrella framework indicates that suppliers providing that Hub‑backed asset would carry the financial loss.

Separately, a dedicated ledger identifies the originating Spoke, and the architectural rule prohibits cross‑Hub credit flows for this instance—so no external hub can be drawn down directly to cover the loan. Notably, the structural separation protects only Borrower  Its Own Spokes within Sentora’s Hub; it offers no shield for counterparties inside Sentora’s broader network.

The commercial framework also stipulates that 50 percent of the protocol’s revenue splits equally between Sentora and the DAO, encompassing both reserve‑factor earnings and liquidation fees.

A separate improvement proposal from Aave outlines deficit offsets and staked coverage for Core WETH, Core USDC, and Core USDT, yet it deliberately omits reference to Sentora’s isolated Hub. The comprehensive Aave plan contains no mention of Sentora’s Hub, and therefore no commitment to offset deficits or provide first‑loss guarantees for that isolated instance.

Future iterations might address this omission, but a lender cannot infer protective safeguards solely from DAO contract ownership or fee allocations. As written, the governing documents leave the liability of failed market outcomes unspecified beyond the general provisions noted above.

Sentora’s marketing position emphasizes that USDe and PST anchor the initial RLUSD yield‑loan pool, with subsequent additions possible for PRIME and mWIN.

In contrast, the detailed specification lists all four TLAs, and the blue‑chip definition cites RLUSD backed KBTK collateral, though the formal table enumerates RLUSD, PYUSD, and OUSD alone.

The oracle configuration for OUSD remains undetermined until launch, and the precise selection of underlying asset prices will further clarify the risk exposure carried by any supplier positioned behind the DRMDA contract keys.

From the DAO’s perspective, the pivotal question preceding any Snapshot or Improvement Proposal is whether to authorize these operational prerogatives while retaining no independent oversight entity and lacking an explicit first‑loss buffer for the isolated Hub.

Equally critical for prospective participants lies the definitive list of allowable asset types, oracle selections, and any codified deficit‑coverage mechanisms that would ultimately determine how risk is distributed across the supply chain.

Source link