African nations struggle to hold digital firms accountable for how their platforms are being used in Russia’s war effort.
An investigation into Russia’s war in Ukraine reveals that Western digital tools are being employed to lure Africans and other foreigners into a secret, decentralized military recruitment drive that increasingly relies on manpower sourced outside Russia.
Research conducted by iLAB, the technical investigations unit of Code for Africa and its partners, identified 289 digital assets used to entice men from African and other Global South nations through deceptive ads, fake endorsements, and promises of lucrative benefits.
These assets included websites, counterfeit domains, and social media profiles that originated in Russia and Belarus but were hosted on Western servers. Researchers label the operation a major organized criminal enterprise, a shadowy network of actors and franchisees.
Moreover, as the researchers note, the war is being promoted ‘using tools from the countries that oppose it’—namely Western tech firms. Their off‑the‑shelf products are being hijacked and repurposed by criminal networks.
Media reports indicate that over 3,000 Africans from Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, and Kenya have been recruited into the Russian armed forces, with about one‑fifth of those identified already killed.
In South Africa, the issue gained prominence after radio presenter Nonkululeko Mantula and four others were accused of allegedly recruiting men to fight for Russia. In February, the South African foreign ministry started repatriating 17 citizens who had been tricked into traveling to Russia and compelled to fight on the front lines against Ukraine.
iLab’s investigation revealed that many African nationals were lured after responding to seemingly ordinary recruitment ads for construction work, visa help, or film roles. The sites, which share common IP addresses, are built on disposable webpages used in a ‘burn and replace’ tactic.
Investigators traced a decentralized recruitment campaign comprising up to 33 operations built around four core brands, some falsely claiming to represent the Russian state. Shared IP addresses point to centralized control, leading researchers to view the recruiters as a mix of Russian firms and freelancers worldwide.
iLab contends that platforms such as Meta, TikTok, and Google—through which the recruitment ads are placed—could do more to curb the criminals. Some sites falsely claim endorsement by Western media using fabricated mastheads, then promote themselves on social media, violating the platforms’ own policies.
Meta has detected and removed content from certain campaigns, yet the material often reappears quickly. Investigators note that criminals employ AI to rapidly launch new sites and conceal their identities with fake or synthetic personas on platforms like Facebook. They suggest that platforms could uncover the perpetrators by examining billing and account information.
‘Our goal in exposing these mechanics,’ says Justin Arenstein, head of Code for Africa, ‘is to compel technology firms to act and push regulators to monitor these abuses more tightly. These abuses are not solely the responsibility of advanced nations; every country has laws against fraud, human trafficking, and organized crime or criminal conspiracy.’
Tina Power, Managing Director of South Africa‑based public interest law firm Power Law Africa, agrees that ‘enhanced transparency, stronger accountability mechanisms, and regulators ready to enforce them are precisely what is required.’
However, she warns that holding platforms accountable is currently hampered by jurisdictional and enforcement procedural issues. She adds that while these challenges are not insurmountable, they must not be ignored and should be tackled alongside the substantive effort.
Kenya has achieved some success in countering in‑person recruitment for the Russian military. Earlier this year, Festus Arasa Omwamba, head of the rogue firm Global Face Human Resources, was charged with recruiting 22 Kenyans ‘for the purpose of exploitation by means of deception.’ The victims were rescued from a building just outside Nairobi before they could be sent to Russia.
However, attempting to hold digital platforms accountable—most of which are based outside Africa—may pose a greater challenge.
Encouragingly, Power observes that domestic litigation and law‑reform initiatives are beginning to assemble the needed tools and mechanisms, complementing regional efforts by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to craft guidelines for states on information integrity and platform accountability.
Perhaps the biggest challenge lies in how quickly criminal networks adapt their tactics, contrasted with the relatively slow pace of regulation and, arguably, the limited political will among leaders in target countries to confront these campaigns. This is particularly true in nations where geopolitical sensitivities play a role.
Tech platforms have resisted tightening rules, fearing accusations of censorship. Yet enabling human trafficking to recruit Africans and other nationals for a foreign war—violating some host‑country laws—could cause repercussions that extend far beyond the boardroom.
