Inside Russia’s Clandestine Anti-Kremlin Sabotage Network

“You will receive a file—from me or a colleague—containing the proposed target. It will include the individual’s photo, personal data, details, date of birth, age, and a description. Information about their vehicle, if applicable, will also be provided. When approaching the target, do not carry a phone,” he instructed his volunteers.

Foma claims to have once been part of the Russian elite, granting him access to a unique network of contacts and a steady stream of insider information.

He demonstrated to Mamon, on his laptop, how he mapped military targets.

“This displays a database… showing the locations of storage warehouses and military units. It reveals where generals reside, as well as where the pilots of strategic bombers shelling Ukraine live.”

“To dismantle the system, you must first understand how it operates. Only then can you identify and strike its weak points.”

He stated that his network comprises approximately “three dozen” individuals spread across Russia, Ukraine, and other parts of Europe. Those based outside Russia provide logistical support, including monitoring targets’ digital footprints.

Foma emphasized that while the GUR suggests targets for surveillance, he and his team independently verify whether these individuals should be classified as military criminals.

“As a rule… we also verify the data [on that person]… Only then do we decide whether to proceed,” he said.

He maintained that his team’s actions were justified.

“I want those who commit terrible acts on behalf of Putin and Russia in Ukraine to understand they will be held accountable. I want them to live in fear.”

Foma stressed that he only relayed intelligence to Ukrainian authorities and that his network did not carry out assassinations directly.

Regarding the December 2025 assassination of Gen Sarvarov, he later texted Mamon: “Tracking him required considerable effort. He alternated between living with his mistress and his colleague, concealed his movements, and constantly changed his schedule.”

However, Foma did not share any advance plans with Mamon or the BBC.

Ivan, by contrast, remained tight-lipped about his involvement, even after the fact.

Foma conducted his own investigation into Ivan.

After consulting with military intelligence contacts in both Ukraine and Russia, he concluded that Ivan was likely involved in a plot to strike Russia’s largest military drone factory at Yelabuga last June. One person was reported killed in the incident., external

Ivan emphasized that the objective is always to avoid harming civilians.

The operations have clearly posed significant risks to Ivan as well.

“The most serious incident occurred when my car was stopped for inspection while I was carrying handmade explosives. The risk was extremely high—however, as you can see, I was not detected,” he said.

To reduce the risk of exposure, “there is no clear structure” to the operation, he explained, adding that he had never met and did not know the identities of others working alongside him.

Foma enforces the same rule for his operatives.

“As soon as you start gathering people into groups, in general chats… leaving a digital footprint, there is a high probability the entire group will be quickly detained or neutralized,” he said.

Ivan noted that few people in Russia remain suitable for this type of work.

“Most ideologically motivated individuals have either fled the country or are already imprisoned,” he said.

Consequently, many Russians involved in sabotage on home soil are either unaware—for instance, lorry drivers who do not know their cargoes have been compromised—or are individuals who have been paid, according to the BBC.

Ivan, however, says he is motivated by ideology; he was formerly a member of the political opposition. As such, his movements would be expected to be closely monitored by Russian authorities.

Therefore, it was surprising that he managed to leave and return to Russia frequently.

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