How Democratic Control of Congress May Influence Trump’s Middle East Strategy

• Democratic wins in both chambers grant Congress greater authority to challenge Trump’s Iran policy, though presidential power remains significant.
• Analysts suggest the president may authorize new strikes before January, while others see potential for diplomatic engagement and regional stability.

In London, following the midterm elections in which Democrats secured control of both legislative chambers, President Donald Trump adopted a conciliatory tone, telling Fox News that the Democrats had done a good job and that he was willing to work with them on many issues. Later that day, during a separate interview with another television station, he asserted, “I have the ultimate power. It’s called veto.”

Prior to the elections, polling indicated that Trump’s popularity had fallen to a historic low, largely due to the unpopular Iran war and its effect on gasoline prices, which appear to have driven many voters toward the Democratic Party. “I think part of that was Iran,” Trump said, “but at the same time, people recognized the significance of what I have accomplished with Iran.”

Vice President JD Vance, in a social media post on Wednesday, suggested that Trump’s actions regarding Iran may have cost Republicans control of Congress for six years. “The reason we lost is the war,” he wrote. “If you wish to argue it was worth it—losing the Senate for the next six years—then do so. Argue it was a worthwhile sacrifice. Agree or disagree, that is at least honest. Everyone knows why we lost.”

Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the loss of both the Senate and the House will affect Trump’s Middle East policy during the remaining two years of his presidency.

Brian Katulis, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, doubts that Trump will face substantial constraints before the end of his term in 2028. “For the time being, business will continue as usual,” he told Arab News. “The executive branch has accumulated considerable power over successive administrations, both Republican and Democratic, relative to Congress on national security and war‑making authority. “There will likely be little change during the lame‑duck period until January, when the new Congress is sworn in.”

British‑Lebanese journalist Mohamed Chebaro, with over 25 years of experience covering the region’s conflicts and diplomacy, agreed that “the new balance of power in Congress will not impede Trump’s actions.” He cautioned that “the situation will remain highly volatile and open to all possibilities” in the near term. “If he deems a strike on Iran necessary, he will authorize it. Congress may protest, but the US presidential system, despite its checks and balances, will not significantly restrain him.”

Chebaro added, “Trump without a compliant Congress could be even more dangerous; reason plays no role in his ‘art of the deal.’ If he believes he cannot extend his mandate or secure his regime’s continuity through a strong Republican successor, he may plunge the United States deeper into the Middle East and leave the fallout for his successor to manage.”

Starting in January, Democrats will be able to block Republican legislation but will find it difficult to advance their own bills. Media reports indicate that they plan to use their initial 100 days in control of Congress to introduce a wave of legislation aimed at reversing many of Trump’s policies. A top priority is a proposal requiring the president to either terminate the Iran war or obtain congressional authorization to continue it, effectively achieving the same result. While some populist measures might garner enough bipartisan support, most are unlikely to become law without Republican backing.

Although Democrats now control the 100‑seat Senate with 56 seats (including two independents) against the Republicans’ 44, achieving the 60‑vote threshold required to pass legislation is challenging. Overcoming the higher hurdle of securing two‑thirds support in both chambers to override a presidential veto is even more difficult. Nonetheless, Democrats could halt military action in Iran by leveraging their control of the purse. “Democrats now have the authority to stop the war through fiscal control,” said Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “They not only have a public mandate but also an order from the American people. If they fail or do not act, the fury that propelled Trump’s defeat will be directed at Democrats, who will be portrayed as complicit in an illegal war. It was not Democratic vision that secured Trump’s defeat, but public outrage over the cost‑of‑living crisis caused by the Iran war. War proponents will intensify efforts to compel Trump to restart hostilities before January, recognizing this as their final opportunity amid the impending Democratic Congress.”

Burcu Ozcelik, senior research fellow for Middle East, North Africa and Turkiye Security at the Royal United Services Institute, considers this scenario plausible. “From January, Trump will be constrained by a Democratic majority,” she told Arab News. “This opens the possibility of renewed strikes against Iran within the next two months, perhaps even within two weeks.” The key question, she noted, is how Trump will shape his legacy regarding Iran: “Will he intensify a hard‑line campaign to reinforce the claim that his Iran war was essential to prevent Tehran from attaining a breakout nuclear capability? Or will he pursue a diplomatic breakthrough he can claim as his own success, despite Gulf states, Turkiye, and Pakistan shouldering most of the effort?” She suggested a middle path: “Trump may authorize precise strikes on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic‑missile infrastructure, enough to degrade its capabilities yet below the threshold that could provoke a severe Iranian retaliation against Gulf allies. The risk is that Tehran has warned any strike will trigger a harsher, disproportionate response. Whether Trump heeds this warning or proceeds with another gamble that endangers Gulf partners remains the critical unknown.”

The Democrats are now targeting Trump’s Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth. Hakeem Jeffries, the Democratic House leader and prospective first Black Speaker, has announced his party’s intent to “run Pete Hegseth out of town.” A Republican congressman has introduced a resolution to impeach Hegseth, arguing that “engaging in hostilities in Iran for more than 90 days without congressional authorization violates the law and must be held accountable,” Massie said in September. The resolution failed, as did an earlier one in March that sought to compel Trump to withdraw U.S. forces from “unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” However, surviving Republicans may become more receptive to bipartisan action on the Iran conflict. Massie wrote on X on Wednesday, “I wonder how many of my colleagues would like a chance to go back and change their vote on my Iran War Powers Resolution?”

James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, believes Trump and his inner circle are unlikely to seek collaboration with Democrats. “I likened this to President Bill Clinton’s defeat in the 1994 midterms, when Republicans reclaimed both chambers,” he said. “Clinton realistically recognized that to achieve any legislative success he needed to work with Republicans, and they succeeded in passing bills and accommodating Republican preferences on several issues. Trump, however, has shown no indication of prioritizing governance over conflict, and I fear he will view this as a challenge rather than an opportunity to govern, instead using it to provoke. I would not be surprised if Stephen Miller, Trump’s deputy chief of staff for policy, is currently in the White House devising ways to act without congressional approval.”

Prior to the midterms, Trump repeatedly hinted that hostilities with Iran would resume after the elections. “He was restrained by the midterms but is no longer,” Zogby said. “We are now in a legacy scenario; does he think a return to conflict will benefit him? Iran remains unresolved, and the question is whether another attack—or a series of attacks—can achieve its objectives, given that previous attempts have failed.”

An alternative approach would be for the United States, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Pakistan, and Turkey to convene and explore a mutually acceptable solution to enhance Gulf security and stability. Yet, as Zogby noted, “the only thing predictable about Donald Trump is his unpredictability.” The manner in which Iran responds to the election outcome is also uncertain. “In Tehran there is a palpable sense of vindication following the midterms,” Ozcelik observed. “Will Iranian negotiators now gain greater flexibility to pursue a deal with Trump through regional intermediaries, acknowledging their strengthened position, or will they double down and demand immediate concessions—sanctions relief, asset unfreezing—before agreeing to a new memorandum of understanding 2.0? The outcome remains unclear. What is certain, however, is that Trump can no longer sidestep Iran; the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis and the Houthi‑Saudi confrontation remain unresolved.”

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