Venezuelan Airstrike on ELN Camp Signals Historic Shift in Border Policy

Colombia’s largest remaining rebel group faces potential displacement from its long-standing Venezuelan sanctuary following the first major offensive by Venezuelan security forces against the National Liberation Army (ELN). The operation marks a significant rupture in the decades-long relationship between Chavista administrations and Colombian insurgent organizations.

Under mounting pressure from the United States, the government of Delcy Rodríguez deployed drones to strike an ELN encampment in Apure state, near the Colombian border, on October 30. According to the New York Times, the operation was conducted with U.S. assistance. The attack killed at least 19 individuals, including Venezuelans, Colombians, and Mexicans. Visual evidence shared on social media suggests the targeted facility housed a drug processing laboratory.

The Venezuelan government has not issued an official statement regarding the strike. On November 2, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello stated that authorities were taking precautions in response to recent violence in Colombia. Washington has likewise remained publicly silent, though Secretary of State Marco Rubio revealed during a September visit to Colombia that the U.S. had discussed potential operations against the ELN in Venezuela with the Rodríguez administration.

“Imagine a criminal gang operating from territory across the border, entering your country, committing crimes, murders, and attacks, and then returning to hide in another country. That is not sustainable. We have to address this situation,” Rubio told reporters following meetings with Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella.

A Break With the Past?

The Venezuelan government’s ties to Colombian guerrilla groups date back to Hugo Chávez’s presidency in the 2000s, when Caracas opened its doors to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), then the country’s largest guerrilla army, prior to the 2016 peace accord.

The ELN subsequently filled the criminal vacuum left by the FARC’s demobilization, steadily expanding control across the porous 2,219-kilometer border and penetrating several Venezuelan states, reaching as far as the eastern frontier with Guyana. This expansion was facilitated by alliances with Venezuelan officials and military personnel, enabling the ELN to establish criminal governance structures, recruit thousands of Venezuelans, and control lucrative cocaine trafficking and illegal mining operations from which both parties profited.

In Apure state, bordering Colombia’s Arauca department, a historic ELN stronghold, the group consolidated one of its primary operational hubs, managing cocaine processing and trafficking networks supplying multiple countries.

The protection the ELN long enjoyed was called into question following the capture of then-President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces in January and the subsequent political transition under Rodríguez, who assumed the interim presidency amid pressure from Washington.

How Difficult Would It Be to Defeat the ELN in Venezuela?

The strike comes as the ELN faces intensifying military pressure in Colombia. While its strategic border position may be threatened for the first time, the group is unlikely to relinquish territorial control without resistance.

During Maduro’s final years, the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) reported seizing ELN insignia and destroying alleged clandestine camps, yet never executed a decisive operation against the group. Throughout 2026, security forces largely abstained from territorial disputes between the ELN and FARC dissidents over mining areas in southern Venezuela, limiting interventions to preventing further violence outbreaks.

In a sustained confrontation, Venezuelan security forces would face significant disadvantages. Under Chavismo, the military has suffered erosion of professional capabilities and tactical training, while corruption has permeated its ranks. Conversely, ELN fighters are well-trained and disciplined, having successfully confronted the FARC dissidents’ 10th Front in 2021, a feat the Venezuelan army failed to achieve.

Delcy Rodríguez and Support From the United States and Colombia

Against this backdrop, Washington’s influence on Venezuela’s security decisions and its renewed alliance with Colombia could prove decisive in coordinated operations against the guerrilla group in both nations.

In Colombia, President De la Espriella has pursued an aggressive campaign against insurgent groups, emerging as one of the United States’ primary regional allies in combating organized crime. He has even offered Colombia as an operational base for the Shield of the Americas initiative.

One of his administration’s first security actions was an airstrike against the ELN in the Catatumbo border region, where the group has battled the FARC dissidents’ 33rd Front for control of coca cultivation since 2025. The situation deteriorated following attacks in Norte de Santander in late October, prompting partial border militarization.

Designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in 1997, the ELN was among the first Latin American criminal groups to receive the designation. With Washington now influencing security operations in both countries, prospects for a coordinated campaign capable of weakening the organization have increased.

However, U.S. cooperation with Venezuelan security forces has remained limited throughout 2026. The primary joint operation occurred in June, resulting in the death of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, alias “Niño Guerrero,” leader of Tren de Aragua. While Washington hailed the operation as a success, it did not extend to other criminal groups involved in illegal mining in Bolívar state, despite U.S. interests in the region’s gold production.

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