Abu Dhabi Negotiations: Russia’s Strategic Calculation, Not a Path to Peace

As the Russia-Ukraine war settles into a prolonged war of attrition, Russian, Ukrainian, and American representatives convened a new round of U.S.-mediated trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates, on November 10. The discussions are set to resume on November 11.

These negotiations follow a successful humanitarian operation in Oleshky, a southern Ukrainian town under Russian occupation since 2022.

Oleshky faced a severe food crisis beginning in December 2025 that intensified dramatically over the summer. Under years of Russian occupation, the town’s population fell from 25,000 to roughly 2,000, leaving those who remained at risk of starvation. In response, Ukrainian and Russian intelligence services agreed to a localized ceasefire during the summer to allow residents who wished to leave to evacuate to either Ukraine or Russia.

The humanitarian operation proceeded remarkably smoothly. Both sides observed the ceasefire, hundreds of people were evacuated—primarily to Ukraine—and Ukrainian and Russian human rights officials, Dmytro Lubinets and Yana Lantratova, coordinated the mission with notable cooperation and mutual respect.

Whether this successful mission can lay the groundwork for, or at least contribute to, progress in the U.S.-brokered Abu Dhabi peace talks remains doubtful. Several factors indicate that meaningful progress is unlikely.

One immediate indicator is that the Oleshky mission’s success stemmed not from Moscow’s desire for peace, but from its willingness to flatter Donald Trump’s vanity against the backdrop of his hostility toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Trump has long expressed a desire to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Despite his claims of having ended numerous wars around the world, he is unlikely to win the award. It now appears the Trump family is aiming to secure the Nobel Peace Prize for Melania Trump instead.

The Oleshky humanitarian mission appears to illustrate this dynamic. Days before the ceasefire, the White House announced that Melania Trump—in her “formal role as Exclusive Intermediary”—had initiated discussions on the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire agreement. This narrative sidelined both the Vatican’s efforts to secure the Oleshky truce and the prior summer discussions between Ukrainian and Russian intelligence services on a temporary armistice. Moscow readily endorsed Washington’s portrayal of Melania Trump’s pivotal role, and Kyiv was compelled to align with that version as well.

Both Moscow and Kyiv are courting Donald Trump’s favor, and while both governments have played along with the White House’s depiction of the U.S. first lady as a “peacemaker,” Moscow likely calculated that the success of the Oleshky humanitarian mission would benefit Russia more than Ukraine. Putin appears to reason that Moscow’s apparent willingness to cooperate could deepen Trump’s estrangement from Zelenskyy and reinforce the misconception that Ukraine, rather than Russia, is blocking the end of the war. For Putin, winning Trump over would mean continuing aggression against Ukraine under more favorable conditions—not making peace with Ukraine.

A further factor casting doubt on the Abu Dhabi talks is Moscow’s appointment of Vladimir Medinsky, Putin’s aide, to lead the Russian delegation in the UAE. Medinsky headed Russia’s negotiating teams in Istanbul in 2022 and 2025, and his selection for Abu Dhabi suggests that Russia’s position on Ukraine has not changed since those earlier talks. For Moscow, the only acceptable outcome remains Ukraine’s surrender, which Kyiv rejected in 2022 and 2025 and continues to reject today.

Nonetheless, Putin believes Russia holds a stronger negotiating position than Ukraine, a conviction rooted in both faulty and accurate assumptions.

On one hand, Putin errs in assuming that relentless Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure—including energy and water supplies—can erode Ukrainian resilience enough to compel surrender or provoke rebellion against the government. Ukraine is fighting an existential war in which capitulation means death, torture, and ethnic cleansing, as seen in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. Ukrainians have no alternative but to resist Russian aggression.

On the other hand, Moscow correctly assesses trends across the West, where support for Ukraine faces multiple challenges. Although European nations continue financing weapons deliveries for Ukraine’s defense, much of the armament Ukraine requires comes from the United States. The joint U.S.-Israeli war against Iran has depleted some American stockpiles, and U.S. capacity to replenish them is limited, creating a significant gap in Ukraine’s offensive and defensive capabilities, particularly in air defense. The Democratic Party’s victory in the U.S. midterm elections is unlikely to alter this situation, despite the party’s greater favorability toward Ukraine than the Republicans; the shortage of weapons the U.S. can supply to Ukraine through its partners is a material constraint, not merely a political one.

Furthermore, the ongoing military and economic assistance Ukraine receives from Europe and other allies hinges not only on political consensus among those nations but also on their individual stances. France will hold a presidential election in the first half of 2027, potentially followed by snap parliamentary elections. The right-wing nationalist National Rally has a strong chance of securing both the presidency and the premiership. Its informal leader, Marine Le Pen, who plans to run for president next spring, has already stated that France can no longer provide financial assistance to Ukraine, implying she would cut off that aid if elected. Although France is the EU’s second-largest economy, it ranks only fifth among bilateral EU donors to Ukraine. Still, as an influential European power, a French withdrawal from funding Ukraine could trigger a domino effect among other EU states and intensify economic and political pressure on governments that continue to support Kyiv.

Marine Le Pen, whose party received Russian financial support in 2014 and who met Putin personally in Moscow in 2017, is likely Russia’s best prospect for 2027 in terms of undermining Ukraine’s defense. But this is not Russia’s only wager. In Germany, the right-wing nationalist Alternative for Germany is rising in the polls and is the EU’s largest openly pro-Putin and pro-Trump party. Meanwhile, Donald Trump—despite Republican losses in the 2026 U.S. midterm elections—remains one of Russia’s key strategic bets in the context of the war.

Russia’s participation in the Abu Dhabi trilateral negotiations should not be interpreted as readiness for peace with Ukraine. It is not. Moscow hopes Western support for Ukraine will fade, and believes it possesses the resources to wait for that hypothetical moment.

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