ANC’s Decline Reaches Tipping Point in 2026 Local Elections

When the ANC’s anticipated collapse became evident in South Africa’s 2026 local government elections, the party remained the largest political force but its share of the popular vote fell sharply to 32.5 %. This result confines the ANC largely to rural areas and forces it to rely on coalition partners in the major urban metros and cities.

The ANC has now become a predominantly Black African party, having lost significant minority support. Disaffection among key segments of the Black middle class and large portions of the Black rural and working classes manifested through defections and abstentions.

This situation leaves the ANC dependent on other parties for governance in urban centers, while confronting a confident and emboldened white community that is surprised by how quickly Black political power has been diluted only a few decades after apartheid. The seeds of this implosion were sown over three successive nine‑year leadership periods.

Nine developing years (1999–2008)

Under President Thabo Mbeki, the first nine‑year term exhibited weaknesses—most notably the HIV/AIDS epidemic—but also delivered solid gains. GDP growth averaged 5.4 %, unemployment stood at 25 %, and substantial savings were set aside for infrastructure expansion. In the 2006 local elections the ANC captured 65.7 % of the vote, its highest share of minority support ever. This era also fostered a left‑wing impatience with the pace of redistribution of those growth benefits.

Nine devastating years (2009–2018)

These advantages were squandered during President Jacob Zuma’s nine‑year tenure, both economically and electorally. The period, masquerading as “radical economic transformation,” was in fact state capture. The Madlanga Commission exposed the perversion of South Africa’s criminal justice system, the Nugent Commission revealed rampant theft in revenue services, and the Zondo Commission dramatized how state‑owned enterprises became cash cows for the corrupt at the expense of essential services such as water, energy, and roads. Only the most loyally incompetent officials were entrenched in the bureaucracy. The economic cost of state capture has been estimated at up to 500 billion rand (≈ $30 bn).

The scandal propelled President Cyril Ramaphosa to the fore on a wave of “Ramaphoria,” with many hoping he would midwife a renewal. His mandate was unprecedented, and his popularity survived the setbacks of the COVID‑19 lockdown. However, the devastation of the Zuma years inexorably gave way to a subsequent period of hesitation and indecision, leaving observers to wonder whether Ramaphosa’s generation might instead become the ANC’s undertakers.

Nine dithering years (2018–present)

“Dithering” encapsulates hesitation, indecision, and uncertainty. Even when moral clarity exists, there is a lack of moral courage to decide or act. Conflicting priorities create a trade‑off between tenuously preserving the ANC’s base with a modicum of unity and seeking national approval and support. If Zuma operated through crimes of commission, Ramaphosa has operated by omission—actions he chose not to take.

For instance, while Zuma should have been imprisoned, Ramaphosa’s transfer (rather than dismissal) of Zuma’s former intelligence chief to head the Correctional Services resulted in Zuma’s release on medical grounds. Even after courts recommitted Zuma to prison, a general remission order meant he served only two additional hours of a 15‑month sentence. This leniency allowed Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) to capture nearly 15 % of the national vote in 2024 and close to 10 % in 2026.

Second, the ANC entered the 2026 election carrying skeletons of malfeasance—state‑enterprise corruption, COVID‑19 fraud, misappropriated tenders, and mismanaged intelligence funds—with many of those complicit either tolerated or elevated. In today’s political clichés, “innocent until proven guilty” consistently outweighed “step aside,” institutionalizing impunity.

Third, the ANC understood the parlous state of its local governance and public sentiment about basic services before the 2026 election but failed to act with the necessary urgency. Rather than rescuing ANC governance and restoring trust, the party effectively issued a death sentence on its own campaign: the president praised Democratic Alliance (DA) governance, while the chairperson proclaimed that ANC councillors could sing but not govern.

Under Ramaphosa’s watch, these omissions were accompanied by devastating economic data, with youth unemployment soaring to 63 %. ANC electoral support fell steadily from 57.5 % (2019) to 47.5 % (2021) to 40.2 % (2024) and finally to 32.5 % (2026). The party was further cannibalized by insurgencies from Zuma’s MKP, Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

From renewal to survival?

As in 2024, a besieged leadership will likely focus on recriminations, dismissive denialism (“we’re still the biggest party”), and backroom horse‑trading to salvage what was lost at the ballot. These preoccupations must give way to a strategic discussion on how to survive, renew, and re‑emerge. This is the only sequence that can avert the existential poly‑crisis confronting the ANC—encompassing electoral, organisational, ideological, and moral dilemmas. The choices it makes in the immediate quest to survive will be hellish.

In 2024 the ANC allied itself with the DA, allowing the DA to become palatable, showcase performative governance, and harness white business resources to decimate the ANC’s base. The question is whether the ANC will repeat this pattern or reach out to its left‑leaning allies, risking a reunion with forces implicated in state capture that could further exacerbate its moral crisis. Opposition, except where there is no alternative, is not an option because the ANC needs a governing foothold from which to make amends and regain public trust. Yet it must find the dexterity and finesse to walk this tightrope.

Organizationally, the ANC appears bereft of strategic talent and relies on blunt instruments to keep faith with its base. Calls for this leadership to resign are temptingly correct, but an abrupt implosion could become an explosion that betrays 114 years of mostly capable leadership and dooms the ANC to an ignominious death without the option of revival.

Would Ramaphosa’s leadership team have the honest courage to admit failure, remain in place for stable continuity until 2027, and graft a transitional team above them now to guide the ANC through the imperative of change, renewal, and the regaining of popular trust by the 2029 election? The answer remains uncertain.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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