Frank Kendall, former U.S. Air Force Secretary and human rights lawyer, weighs in on the feasibility and implications of banning autonomous weapons in an excerpt from his upcoming book, “Lethal Autonomy: The Future of Warfare Whether We Like It Or Not.” Published by Knox Press, the book is now available for preorder.
Kendall acknowledges his support for robust, enforceable arms‑control measures, but emphasizes that the current reality of lethal autonomy raises daunting obstacles to effective regulation. “Given that lethal autonomy is essentially with us now, as many examples show, I don’t see how an effective arms‑control regime is possible,” he writes.
He argues that defining what to ban is fraught with ambiguity. The line between acceptable, defensive systems and those deemed prohibited is unclear, especially when an autonomous air‑defence platform can also target civilian aircraft. “Killing is killing,” Kendall notes, underscoring the difficulty of separating uses. Distinguishing degrees of autonomy also proves problematic, as the continuum of capabilities—target detection, intent inference, and engagement planning—offers no sharp boundary between permissible and impermissible technology.
One controversial proposal is to ban all unmanned weapons platforms. While this would eliminate existing lethal drones, it would not address the risk posed by autonomous capabilities that can be incorporated into man‑ned or remotely‑controlled vehicles. Kendall cautions that such a ban would also impact widely used munitions like cruise missiles, a scenario he regards as unlikely to gain acceptance from major powers.
Kendall highlights the enforcement challenge: the difference between full lethal autonomy and human‑controlled systems often hinges on a single “trigger”—a switch, typically digital, that authorises an engagement. An adversary could easily embed an autonomous switch within the system, rendering traditional bans ineffective. Robust design transparency and intrusive inspection regimes would be required to detect such concealment, but these measures are deemed impractical on a global scale.
Rather than prohibiting lethal autonomy, Kendall advocates for a pragmatic focus on accountability. He proposes extending existing legal frameworks—law of armed conflict, rules of war—to cover autonomous weapons, ensuring that designers, testers, operators, and decision‑makers share responsibility for compliance. “The minimum is the standard we employ today, and there is no reason to relax it,” he asserts.
He suggests a formal “good‑faith” certification process, akin to aviation airworthiness, where a designated authority verifies compliance before deployment. In cases of egregious violations—such as intentional mass killings—direct accountability would mirror current legal practice.
Despite the ethical concerns, Kendall predicts that the proliferation of lethal autonomy will accelerate. He cites U.S. military and DARPA programs and the rapid advancement of AI‑driven pattern recognition as indicators that this technology cannot be halted. “If one can get past the objections to lethal autonomy, it opens up a fascinating range of options, including tactical behaviors that would certainly not be doctrinal for manned systems,” he notes.
In closing, Kendall observes that the Ukraine conflict illustrates the strategic value of expendable unmanned systems for tasks traditionally carried out by infantrymen—exposing the enemy and facilitating attacks—highlighting the increasing necessity of autonomous platforms in modern warfare.