Jung also pointed out the South Korean military’s personnel shortage, particularly among non‑commissioned officers and officers tasked with training new conscripts to operate drones.
Lessons from Ukraine
Ukraine, a model for many nations’ military reforms, does not have all its personnel trained as drone pilots, though it has expanded training to produce tens of thousands of drone operators.
Instead, Ukraine’s effective use of drones stems from widely deployed specialized operator teams that support front‑line infantry, the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces branch to develop doctrine and coordinate deep‑strike missions, a digital battle‑management system delivering real‑time battlefield data for rapid decision‑making, and a domestic drone industry capable of mass‑producing millions of units annually while quickly adapting to evolving battlefield conditions.
Meanwhile, North Korean soldiers who survived combat with Ukrainian drones while fighting alongside Russia have returned home to train their own military, though the specific lessons they are imparting remain unclear.
At the same time, South Korean forces face not only North Korean forces; the United States maintains about 28,500 troops in South Korea as a legacy of its intervention during the Korean War, which began with a North Korean invasion.
Taking cue from Ukraine’s drone innovations, the U.S. military is incorporating drone familiarization and counter‑drone measures into basic training for new recruits, while the Pentagon has requested $54 billion for new drone and counter‑drone systems in its fiscal year 2027 budget.