Colombia’s New President Inherits a Fragmented Criminal Landscape

Colombia’s newly inaugurated president, Abelardo de la Espriella, confronts one of the world’s most intricate criminal environments. In this analysis, InSight Crime Co-Director Jeremy McDermott and Senior Colombia Analyst Sara Garcia dissect the landscape he inherits: powerful armed groups such as the Gaitanistas and the ELN, record cocaine output, and a surging illegal gold mining sector. They assess the prospect of renewed U.S. backing, whether de la Espriella can replicate the security gains of the Uribe era, and the human rights risks inherent in a harder military posture.

De la Espriella, who took office on August 7, campaigned heavily on security. He rejects the framework of a traditional civil conflict, instead viewing the challenge as the state versus a series of criminal actors devoid of ideology. This shift coincides with booming criminal economies, led by cocaine but increasingly driven by illegal gold mining.

Garcia outlined the three principal armed factions. The Gaitanistas, or Gulf Clan, remain the dominant criminal organization with an estimated 10,000 members controlling much of the Caribbean coast and expanding toward the Pacific and Venezuelan border. The National Liberation Army (ELN) fields roughly 7,000 fighters, anchored along the lengthy Venezuelan frontier. Finally, dissident factions of the demobilized FARC account for another 7,000 combatants, concentrated in the south along the Pacific coast, the Amazon, and the Venezuelan border.

McDermott noted the geographical logic: the Gaitanistas form a “U” across the north; the ELN holds the eastern border; the FARC dissidents mirror that shape in the south. Yet the current landscape differs markedly from the past. The 2006 paramilitary demobilization spawned over 30 factions, and the 2016 FARC peace accord triggered further fragmentation. Today, ideology has largely evaporated; groups are motivated by economic gain and territorial control over drug trafficking and illegal mining. Colombia is producing record cocaine volumes—likely exceeding 3,000 metric tons annually—while criminal revenues are diversified through marijuana, extortion, kidnapping, and environmental crime. Groups are adopting drones and other technologies, often outpacing state responses.

While McDermott argued the ELN retains some ideological core, Garcia emphasized the economic drivers. The cocaine market has globalized aggressively. Traditional U.S. and European markets cannot absorb the surplus, pushing traffickers toward Australia, Asia, and a broadening array of European mafias—Dutch, French, British, Albanian, Balkan, and Scandinavian networks. No single Colombian group controls national supply, allowing foreign buyers to deal directly with smaller local factions.

Illegal gold mining now rivals cocaine in profitability. Surging global prices have expanded both legal and illegal extraction. Crucially, gold is easily laundered into legitimate supply chains, unlike cocaine which remains illicit at every stage. Armed groups extort legal and illegal miners alike, generating multi-million dollar revenues, and use gold to move wealth and pay operatives without trace.

De la Espriella has pledged a hardline “mano dura” strategy, ruling out peace talks in favor of military and law enforcement action. His inauguration speech vowed to defeat “narco-terrorists” and offered criminals only surrender or state force. He proposes resuming aerial coca eradication using drones and bioherbicides, though legal, logistical, and environmental hurdles loom large. Garcia noted these tactics are not new; decades of similar approaches have yielded mixed results, as criminal groups adapt and illegal economies persist.

The administration aligns closely with Washington. The Trump administration has signaled support, potentially including up to $1 billion in aid under a “Shield of the Americas” initiative. Colombia faces a fiscal crisis, limiting domestic funding for the ambitious security operations promised. McDermott expressed skepticism about the speed of U.S. disbursement given Congressional timelines and competing priorities. He warned that a purely military approach ignores the broader toolbox—judicial reform, community engagement, and state presence—needed to dismantle transnational crime.

Garcia acknowledged a potential opportunity: violence is increasingly concentrated in specific territories strategic to drug trafficking and mining. Just ten municipalities account for the vast majority of coca cultivation. Targeted, intelligence-led interventions in these zones could have outsized impact. However, history suggests eradication merely displaces crops—the “balloon effect”—while yields per hectare rise. The previous administration’s focus on high-value targets and supply chain disruption failed to curb production amid coordination failures and diplomatic friction.

Urban dynamics are equally critical. Criminal networks exploit cities for logistics, recruitment, money laundering, and consumer markets, driving extortion, homicide, and robbery. Understanding national security requires integrating these urban dimensions.

Armed groups have already signaled resistance. During the inauguration weekend, roughly 12 attacks occurred nationwide, primarily by the ELN and FARC dissidents, demonstrating operational capacity and a willingness to pressure the state and society. McDermott cautioned that the last hardline era under Álvaro Uribe, while demobilizing 30,000 paramilitaries, also saw systematic human rights abuses, including “false positive” killings and state-paramilitary collusion. Those structural vulnerabilities—weak state presence, institutional fragility, and political violence—remain unresolved.

Unlike Uribe and Santos, who paired force with negotiations that demobilized thousands, de la Espriella rejects dialogue. McDermott argued this forfeits a critical lever: so long as criminal economies persist, new actors will fill vacuums. Sustainable progress requires negotiating with major groups while replacing their governance with legitimate state institutions.

There is no silver bullet. Criminal revenues are rising, and the terrain is treacherous. InSight Crime will revisit this assessment after the administration’s first 100 days to evaluate the trajectory of Colombia’s latest security gamble.

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