Burhan’s Dialogue Risks Entrenching Sudan’s Crisis, Not Solving It

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has revived dialogue as Sudan’s path to stability, but the rhetoric masks a consistent pattern of broken promises and military control. After years of coups, emergency rule, and war rhetoric, Burhan now claims to seek a civilian democratic transition, citing proposals to drop death-penalty charges against opposition leaders and establish a preparatory committee. Reports from Al Jazeera and Radio Dabanga suggest potential concessions, such as clemency for leaders of the Civil Democratic Alliance. Yet the credibility of these gestures is undermined by Burhan’s history: a military takeover in 2021, repeated failures to relinquish power, and a war in 2023–2024 between his Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. His 2022 pledge to withdraw from politics dissolved months later, and by 2023, he dismissed negotiations entirely.

The current “dialogue” is framed as an anomaly, but it aligns with a recurring script. Since 2019, Burhan has positioned himself as Sudan’s temporary guarantor of civilian rule, promising transitions of 18 months or less following Bashir’s overthrow. Each iteration of his narrative—denying military interference, vowing civilian governance—has collapsed within months. The military-led takeover in October 2021, which detained Prime Minister Hamdok, and his 2022 reversal on political neutrality, exemplify this pattern. By 2023, as war erupted, Burhan abandoned negotiations, declaring only a “decisive victory.”

Now, as the war concludes without victory for either side and basic services remain crippled, Burhan’s return to dialogue feels disingenuous. Control over Khartoum is tenuous, with only 30% restoration of prewar electricity, and drone strikes persist in key areas. Burhan’s militarized authority—deciding which actors are “national” or excluded—contradicts his claims of civilian inclusion. The proposed transitional process would occur under armies still armed, supported by regional rivalries, and reliant on networks that sustained instability. Democratic forces would be pressured to endorse a transition they did not design.

Burhan’s model of “dialogue” is a political tool, not a democratic mandate. Sudan’s crisis stems not from insufficient conferences but from armed factions exploiting civilian suffering for legitimacy. The proposed committee risks replicating past outcomes: power concentrated in military circles, with civilians reduced to spectators. Reforms like amnesty for Islamist-linked groups or inclusion of wartime actors ignore the need for accountability and institutional overhaul. Any settlement demands a unified national army under civilian oversight, exclusion of former-regime networks, and guarantees against backsliding—all incompatible with Burhan’s current position.

Structural weaknesses in Burhan’s approach are evident. In army-controlled zones, governance remains fragmented, with recoverable infrastructure failing to translate into political restoration. Security is illusory, marked by ongoing strikes and RSF incursions. The Red Sea’s strategic location amplifies risks: Burhan’s rule jeopardizes regional stability, empowering extremist regrouping and proxy conflicts. The U.S. sanctions against him in 2025 and prior designations of Islamist groups underscore the systemic flaws, not isolated actors.

Civilians require a legitimate political process—but only one unburdened by Burhan’s contradictory record. A true transition must start with his departure from sovereignty, not his continued mediation. Neutral oversight, military restructuring, and isolation of complicit networks are prerequisites. As Khartoum’s capital faces protracted instability and the war’s aftermath looms, the question is not whether Sudan needs dialogue but who holds the authority to shape it.

Ezzat Khairi is a Sudanese political analyst and writer focused on war, state collapse and democratic transition. His work has appeared internationally. He is the author of *Makashfi’s Candle*.

Source link