Assessing the Viability of a Europe‑Based Nuclear Deterrent Independent of the United States

In 2025 James Cameron published “Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo‑French Nuclear Force,” urging the United Kingdom and France to jointly create a nuclear deterrent for Europe that operates without U.S. involvement. Following French President Emmanuel Macron’s landmark nuclear address a year later, we revisited Cameron’s thesis. Cameron had argued that Europe’s doubts about Washington’s security commitment warranted a UK‑France nuclear umbrella independent of the United States. In July 2025 London and Paris signed the Northwood Declaration, and in March 2026 Macron unveiled new French nuclear doctrine, introducing a “forward deterrence” concept.

We asked whether these steps align with the Anglo‑French framework Cameron proposed or represent a distinct model. Macron’s forward‑deterrence approach is a welcome development; it constitutes the most detailed European response to growing uncertainty over the U.S. extended‑deterrent pledge to the continent. To embody the “European dimension” of French vital interests, Macron outlined measures such as bilateral nuclear dialogues, partner participation in French nuclear exercises, an increase in French nuclear warheads, and the possible temporary forward deployment of French nuclear‑capable aircraft. Although the Northwood Declaration predates Macron’s speech, it dovetails with his vision by referencing shared UK‑France vital interests, joint exercises, and the creation of a bilateral nuclear steering group.

Nevertheless, Macron stressed that France does not intend to supplant U.S. extended deterrence, indicating a fundamental divergence from Cameron’s original aim. The forward‑deterrence concept remains centered on French vital interests, whose precise scope is left to the president’s discretion. Likewise, the Northwood Declaration does not clearly delineate the joint vital interests of the United Kingdom and France.

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