UAE building ‘relationships of dependence’ through investment across Africa

Actually need to keep original speaker tag formatting. Let me re-write:

RFI: Why is the UAE investing so heavily in African ports?

Jean-Loup Samaan: At least 15–20 years ago, the focus was primarily commercial, driven by Dubai. The DP World subsidiary headquartered there runs among the world’s leading operators of port infrastructure, offering a gateway for the city-state to expand its global network—especially in Africa, where port facilities remained relatively underdeveloped.

In recent years, however, a distinct military dimension has appeared, most notably in the Horn of Africa. This developed during the Yemeni conflict that began in 2014. The Emirates linked their commercial interests in local port infrastructure—specifically in Eritrea and Somaliland—to a military orientation, enabling them to deploy troops to Yemen once their commercial footprint was established.

What started as a commercial strategy gradually evolved into a strategic, political, and military project.

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RFI: The Financial Times investigation refers to an imperialist push by the UAE in Africa. The Abu Dhabi Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the label. In your view, is it justifiable?

JLS: The term “imperialist” may be overly strong, since the relationship between the UAE and African nations cannot be characterised as one between an empire and its subordinate states.

Nevertheless, what is striking is how, over roughly a decade, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have built substantial economic networks—particularly in infrastructure—and solidified their strategic and geopolitical presence, making the UAE a dominant power on the continent far beyond traditional development aid.

This extends well beyond assistance programmes; it creates dependency dynamics. One might ask, echoing discussions about China or the United States, whether Abu Dhabi is pursuing a predatory economic model toward Africa.

RFI: The investigation also showed how the UAE is engaged in the Sudanese conflict and supports Hemedti, leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which clashes with the government.

JLS: For Abu Dhabi, this stems from backing military leaders who maintain ties to figures active in Yemen, as well as men they view as bulwarks against perceived threats from political Islam—a concern rooted in their own domestic experience.

This pattern reflects a consistent Emirati foreign policy across Africa and the Middle East: backing strongmen, frequently military figures, against regimes deemed too aligned with political Islam.

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RFI: There is also gold: Dubai serves as a hub for African golden ore. Approximately $30 billion (€25.72 billion) in undeclared artisanal gold is exported annually to the UAE.

JLS: This illustrates the convergence of geopolitical motivations—supporting military regimes such as the RSF in Sudan—with a clearly commercial calculus.

On the international stage, between 20 and 30 percent of global gold trade now transits through Dubai—far exceeding the production capacity of either Abu Dhabi or Oman. For Dubai specifically, this crossroads position bolsters the emirate’s international profile and supports economic diversification, especially given that Dubai relies less on oil revenues than its sister city.

All these factors combine to make Africa, and particularly Sudan, a focal point of Emirati strategic interest.

This article has been adapted from the original interview in French by Clothilde Hazard.

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