The Perils of Persistence: Examining America’s Struggle to Withdraw from Foreign Conflicts

Throughout much of the conflict in Afghanistan, the United States found that exiting the war was often more difficult than achieving victory.

The nation’s longest military engagement concluded in chaos and defeat five years ago today. The withdrawal saw hundreds of thousands of desperate Afghans swarm the Kabul airport to escape Taliban insurgents, an event marked by a suicide bombing that claimed the lives of thirteen U.S. service members.

However, the subsequent years have shown that the fears cited by three successive presidents to justify staying in the fight were largely unfounded; Afghanistan has not transformed into a terrorist haven or a staging ground for attacks against the American mainland.

Presently, the U.S. military is entangled in a new conflict in Iran, where the prospects for a clear military triumph appear equally grim. Even President Trump has expressed a desire to end the engagement, only to later argue for its continuation.

“We don’t have to be there,” he stated during an Oval Office address this past spring. “We don’t need their oil. We don’t need anything they have. But we’re there to help our allies.”

The legacy of the Afghan war presents difficult questions for the military leaders and policymakers currently navigating the situation in Iran: Why was withdrawal from Afghanistan so elusive? And what does that protracted struggle to accept defeat reveal about the current administration’s difficulties in Iran?

Since emerging as a global superpower following World War II, the United States has repeatedly questioned the wisdom of withdrawing from its various conflicts. “Much of our involvement over the last several decades has essentially been the policing of an empire,” noted Andrew R. Hoehn, a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation.

In most cases, American troops were deployed to maintain regional order or uphold American values, rather than to fight existential threats, according to Mr. Hoehn.

The death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 presented a prime opportunity to exit Afghanistan. With the architect of the September 11 attacks dead and a decade of drone operations having significantly weakened Al Qaeda, the Taliban—who had harbored the group prior to the U.S. invasion—remained an incredibly difficult force to fully eliminate.

“If American officials had understood then what they know now, many of them—myself included—would have pushed much harder for an early withdrawal,” Carter Malkasian, a former advisor to U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, wrote in a recent essay for Foreign Affairs.

The decision to continue fighting was driven by the Pentagon and political leaders by concerns over national credibility, a sense of duty to Afghan allies, and the belief that a withdrawal would dishonor the sacrifices of fallen and wounded soldiers.

For many officers who had lost comrades in combat against the Taliban, the concept of retreating felt fundamentally at odds with their training and professional ethos.

“To put it simply, one reason the Americans stayed in Afghanistan was that the U.S. military is built to fight to win,” Mr. Malkasian observed.

Meanwhile, political leaders worried about America’s international standing and the potential electoral consequences of losing a war.

By 2011, as troop levels began to decline, the Taliban recognized a strategy of attrition: they simply had to outlast the American military presence and the patience of an exhausted American public.

As total victory became increasingly unlikely, U.S. leadership shifted their objectives toward minimizing casualties, reducing expenditures, and maintaining the stability of the unpopular and often corrupt Afghan government.

“It is like a doctor in an intensive care unit who knows the patient is terminal,” said Rosemary Kelanic, Middle East program director at Defense Priorities. “They are just hoping the patient passes away after their shift ends, so the responsibility doesn’t fall on them.”

The conflict persisted for a decade after bin Laden’s death, resulting in the deaths of 868 additional service members. Commanders during the final years of the war felt they were being positioned for failure. Gen. Austin S. Miller, the final commander in Afghanistan, recently shared on a podcast that when he accepted the role in 2018, he anticipated finishing his tour exhausted and with a damaged professional reputation.

He humorously characterized his predicament using Steely Dan lyrics: “I’m a fool to do your dirty work.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, a former Army National Guard officer who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has vowed that the current conflict in Iran will not repeat the mistakes of the past. He expressed deep frustration with what he described as the failures of previous administrations.

“Having been one of the hundreds of thousands who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, I watched politicians like Bush, Obama, and Biden squander American credibility,” Mr. Hegseth told reporters in March.

He characterized those previous conflicts as quagmires, promising that the campaign in Iran would be “laser-focused,” rapid, and decisive.

“This is not Iraq,” Mr. Hegseth insisted. “This is not endless.”

However, Iran has responded to military strikes by closing the Strait of Hormuz. Earlier this summer, Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted in Senate testimony that airstrikes alone might be insufficient to defeat Iran or restore commercial shipping to the waterway, noting the inherent limitations of air power.

The current administration is now banking on a combination of economic sanctions and a U.S. Navy blockade to achieve its goals.

While there have been slight increases in shipping and oil transit through the strait, U.S. military leaders have moved away from promises of a quick resolution. Instead, they are preparing for a campaign that could last months or longer.

When asked about the sustainability of the Navy blockade, Mr. Hegseth responded, “We can hold it as long as we need to — indefinitely.”

The operational challenges in Iran mirror those seen in Afghanistan, as Iranian leadership, much like the Taliban, is fighting for its survival.

For the United States, however, the strategic stakes and the cost of a withdrawal are significantly lower.

Thomas G. Mahnken, a former senior Pentagon official, noted that while reopening the Strait of Hormuz is a “doable task,” it would require significant ground efforts due to decades of Iranian fortifications.

Currently, the perceived cost in lives and resources seems to exceed the willingness of both President Trump and a public that largely opposes the war.

On Wednesday, Mr. Hegseth commemorated the five-year anniversary of the end of the Afghan war by presenting upgraded valor awards to three retired Marines. Two of these men were severely injured in the Kabul airport suicide bombing, yet they continued to assist the wounded despite their injuries.

In his tribute, Mr. Hegseth lauded their bravery, describing them as “lions at the gate” who remained unbreakable in their resolve.

The ceremony also functioned to reframe the inconclusive conclusion of the Afghanistan war as a victory for the individual soldiers who served.

“You are the vanguard of a lethal, proud and undefeated force,” Mr. Hegseth told the Marines as he presented their long-awaited medals.

Throughout the proceedings, there was no mention of the overall strategic defeat.

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