Afghanistan Emerges as New Hub for Al‑Qaeda Amid Middle East Turmoil

As the Middle East moves closer to another US‑Israeli confrontation with Iran, Afghanistan has become increasingly vital for transnational militant groups such as Al‑Qaeda. Even while exploiting regional wars to inspire lone‑actor attacks in the West, Al‑Qaeda is staying on the sidelines to regroup, rebuild, and conserve resources for the future. The group’s praise of Hamam Al‑Hammami, the flydubai pilot who attempted to hijack a Tel Aviv‑bound flight, exemplifies this dual strategy.

Al‑Qaeda’s regional affiliates—Al‑Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al‑Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)—glorified the pilot and called for more similar attacks. AQIS went further, featuring the failed hijacking on the cover of its Urdu‑language magazine Nawa‑i‑Ghazwa‑i‑Hind, quoting founder Osama bin Laden: “If our message does not reach you through words, we will send it through hijacked planes.”

The aftermath of the Middle East’s devastating conflicts will leave plenty of fault lines for Al‑Qaeda to exploit.

—Abdul Basit Khan

These parallel developments illustrate Al‑Qaeda’s current paradox. The group seeks to preserve its organizational capacity while rebuilding operational strength, investing in emerging technologies such as AI and commercial quadcopters, pursuing financial self‑sufficiency via decentralized digital currencies, and professionalizing training and propaganda. Simultaneously, it continues to exploit regional conflicts to incite lone‑actor attacks abroad, believing a series of such strikes can achieve strategic goals comparable to 9/11. Its opportunistic approach, however, has not translated into successful overseas attacks, and its rebuilding faces pressure from rivals like ISIS.

In any case, the volatile security environment in the Middle East has renewed Afghanistan’s importance as a sanctuary for Al‑Qaeda. Despite decades of war, the group has maintained a presence there for strategic and logistical reasons. Strategically, the Taliban’s victory bolsters Al‑Qaeda’s global militant brand, undermines ISIS’s claim to a caliphate, and enhances its ideological appeal. Logistically, by renewing its pledge of allegiance to Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, Al‑Qaeda secures its safe haven.

Rising tensions in the Middle East have already prompted small numbers of militants from Syria and Somalia to relocate to Afghanistan. Further escalation could widen the Iran‑Afghanistan border’s instability and draw the Iranian Revolutionary Guard into conflict with the US and Israel, potentially allowing more Al‑Qaeda fighters to enter.

UN Monitoring Team reports indicate that Al‑Qaeda maintains close ties with the Taliban government and advises it on strategic matters, including its rivalry with Pakistan. In April, breaking from its previous low‑profile stance, Al‑Qaeda publicly endorsed the Taliban against Pakistan. AQIS has trained Pakistani militant groups such as Ittehad‑ul‑Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), and Al‑Qaeda is regarded as the intellectual architect of IMP’s drone and suicide attack campaigns.

The Taliban and Al‑Qaeda continue to coordinate on key issues such as rivalry with ISIS‑Khorasan, leadership succession, and Al‑Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan. At the Taliban’s request, Al‑Qaeda has not officially acknowledged the 2022 US drone strike that killed Ayman al‑Zawahiri nor confirmed Saif al‑Adl as his successor, to avoid embarrassing the Taliban and creating diplomatic complications. The Taliban, however, still deny Al‑Qaeda’s presence on Afghan soil.

An influx of Al‑Qaeda militants from the Middle East would pose problems for the Taliban. It would refocus international attention on Afghanistan as a hub of terrorism under Taliban protection and test Taliban‑Al‑Qaeda ties, which, despite their strategic nature, are not free of friction. The Taliban has imposed restrictions on Al‑Qaeda’s operational freedom to prevent attacks abroad and to protect Al‑Qaeda’s fighters and leaders.

According to UN estimates, Al‑Qaeda has 100–150 militants and AQIS 450–500 fighters in Afghanistan. If these numbers grow, it will become harder for the Taliban to maintain plausible deniability and restrict the group’s activities. History offers a warning: the Taliban reportedly did not believe Al‑Qaeda could plan the 9/11 attacks from Kandahar, nor were they aware of Al‑Qaeda’s plot to assassinate Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. A larger Al‑Qaeda presence would also strain the Taliban’s internal cohesion, as hard‑liners support the alliance while more pragmatic elements view Al‑Qaeda as a liability that could hinder international recognition.

With global attention and resources focused on regional conflicts, ignoring Al‑Qaeda’s evolution in Afghanistan carries multiple risks. The group has remained under the radar of international security agencies while preserving its core objectives, changing only its operational strategy to maintain a low profile, buy time, and create a strategic buffer for recovery. The aftermath of the Middle East’s devastating conflicts will leave plenty of fault lines for Al‑Qaeda to exploit.

Abdul Basit Khan is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher

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