When António Guterres steps down as United Nations secretary-general at the end of 2026, he will pass on an organization facing an unusually demanding set of political, financial and humanitarian pressures.
His successor will inherit entrenched rivalry among member states and a host of unresolved crises, including ongoing wars, economic shocks and worsening climate impacts. The U.N. will also be financially constrained and operating under strain with its most powerful member, the United States. The second Trump administration has shown little appetite for multilateralism and views the organization as oversized and insufficiently responsive to U.S. priorities. Doubts about the U.N. are likewise growing in many other countries.
The stakes are high. Graça Machel, deputy chair of The Elders—the ethical advisory group founded by Nelson Mandela—has described the choice of the next secretary-general as “one of the most consequential decisions the international community will make this decade.”
The U.N. is both needed and worth saving. Having worked in the executive office of the secretary-general, however, I know that the selection process is not designed to uncover a savior, even under favorable conditions. In today’s geopolitical climate, the chances of such an outcome are especially slim. Any secretary-general must also operate within severe political and bureaucratic constraints.
Nevertheless, expecting one officeholder to restore the U.N.’s relevance on their own would set an unrealistic standard. A secretary-general who understands both the authority and the limitations of the role can still exert considerable influence.
How the Selection Works
The U.N. Charter states that the secretary-general “shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”
The General Assembly, comprising all member states, holds final authority. In practice, however, the Security Council chooses. Its five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—can veto any recommended candidate, meaning the so-called P5 effectively control the outcome. Before 2016, campaigns for the post were limited. Candidates were usually chosen through extensive bargaining among the P5, often with input from prospective nominees.
Pressure from civil society and the 188 U.N. members without permanent Council seats has made the process more transparent. Candidates are now expected to publish vision statements, take part in General Assembly–hosted interactive dialogues open to states and NGOs, and meet informally with Security Council members.
That broader process helped curb P5 dominance to some degree and was reflected in the selection of António Guterres, the former prime minister of Portugal who has led the U.N. since 2017. His record is mixed: he advanced the Pact for the Future and placed artificial-intelligence governance on the U.N. agenda, yet some diplomats and former officials consider him too restrained in mediating conflicts.
The openness of this year’s selection may be difficult to sustain. Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, two of the P5’s most powerful leaders, appear unconcerned with procedural norms and the reputational consequences of bypassing them.
They also appear largely indifferent to how their preferred outcome might affect the U.N.’s legitimacy.
As of early September, eight candidates remained in contention. Each had completed the more open stages of the process, while several rounds of confidential straw polls among the Security Council’s 15 members had narrowed the field.
Still, any one of the P5 could introduce an alternative candidate at the eleventh hour, reviving the kind of closed bargaining that the reforms were intended to displace.
What sort of secretary-general, then, is likely to emerge?
In broad terms, the P5—particularly the United States and Russia—prefer an administrator who can be kept within tight limits. Most other members favor someone independent, proactive and resistant to control by the permanent Council powers.
Given the P5’s decisive role, that second profile is unlikely. Washington and Moscow have both signaled a preference for a “secretary,” not a “general.” Even if they sought a more assertive global leader, the five permanent members would struggle to agree on where such leadership is most needed.
Governments outside the P5 are unlikely to accept a passive bureaucrat merely carrying out instructions. They believe the U.N.’s future demands more. And even if they preferred a compliant official, an organization of 193 countries could never issue consistently clear orders, making independent judgment unavoidable.
Whoever is chosen will not necessarily reveal how they govern. Some secretary-generals have defied expectations. My former boss, Kofi Annan, rose through the U.N. bureaucracy and was expected to be a compliant official. Instead, he became one of the world’s foremost diplomats and a powerful moral voice.
What the Role Entails
The Charter offers little detail about the secretary-general’s work, yet the position has evolved to include a broad range of responsibilities.
In my view, these responsibilities fall into three categories: global diplomacy, normative leadership and management of a vast bureaucracy.
The central challenge is determining what can realistically be achieved in each capacity.
As a global diplomat, the secretary-general cannot settle great-power disputes. They can, however, work around points of tension and identify political space for agreements, as the U.N. helped make possible with the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative. The agreement restored maritime exports from Ukrainian ports after Russia’s blockade.
As a normative leader, the secretary-general cannot impose legally binding duties on states. They can nevertheless advance influential norms, including the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities and the broader goal of human development.
As chief administrative officer, the secretary-general cannot reform the Security Council or eliminate institutional inefficiency. They can, however, define a reform agenda, as Guterres has done through the UN80 Initiative, and persuade coalitions of states to advance it.
Finding the Right Moment
A secretary-general’s greatest source of influence lies neither in formal authority nor personal charisma. It comes from reading political conditions, hearing key stakeholders and recognizing where meaningful action is possible.
On issues such as conflict resolution, those stakeholders may be the parties to a dispute, a small group of neighboring states and major global powers. Listening can mean countless hours on the telephone.
On issues such as climate change, the relevant voices include all 193 member governments and civil society organizations representing “we the peoples.” Listening can mean enduring a seemingly endless schedule of meetings.
Only after that process can a secretary-general identify opportunities and decide when and how to intervene: through quiet diplomacy or public censure, principled inflexibility or pragmatism, a new approach or a firm commitment to an existing path.
It is also mistaken to judge success solely by dramatic breakthroughs in which a secretary-general receives all the credit. The officeholder is usually one participant in a complex political process dominated by numerous actors, many of them more powerful.
If the secretary-general can alter the dynamics and nudge events toward peace, justice or prosperity, that is a meaningful achievement.
To adapt the words of former secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld, the office cannot take the U.N. to heaven, but its holder can help keep it from hell.
Ian Johnstone, professor of international law at The Fletcher School at Tufts University
