Leaders of China, the United States, and Russia are scheduled to hold their first trilateral meeting on the sidelines of this week’s Asia‑Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.
In addition, U.S. President Donald Trump is set to discuss matters with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the November 18‑19 gathering in Shenzhen, China.
DW’s expert interviews suggest that a breakthrough on trade, technology, or other issues is unlikely. The more realistic goal for the two sides appears to be preserving the current trade truce and preventing further deterioration of bilateral ties.
Patricia M. Kim, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, notes that neither leader intends to expand the bilateral agenda substantially, as both have a vested interest in keeping the present trade truce intact.
Looking ahead, Kim anticipates that the next two years will likely see neither a sharp escalation of tensions nor a dramatic thaw in relations, but rather a continuation of the current transactional détente.
Zhang Lun, a professor at CY Cergy Paris University, argues that President Trump is facing pressure both domestically and internationally.
“Domestically, Trump faces the prospect of becoming a lame‑duck president following the Republicans’ heavy losses in the midterm elections,” Zhang told DW.
“Internationally, damage to relations with allies, the weakening of the US‑led international order, indifference toward democratic values and freedoms, and the difficulties encountered in the Iran war have all reduced America’s leverage, resources and influence.”
According to Zhang, strained alliances and the Iran conflict have weakened Trump’s leverage with Beijing, prompting him to seek diplomatic wins and Xi’s cooperation on priority issues.
Contentious issues may be left for later
Jia Hui Tee, a senior trade‑policy analyst at the Hinrich Foundation, expects Trump and Xi to concentrate on stabilizing their fragile trade relationship.
She notes that the two leaders could advance reciprocal tariff reductions covering roughly $30 billion of goods on each side. “While the product list is already published, a concrete timetable remains absent; an indicative implementation schedule would constitute an easy win for both governments,” she added.
Washington is pushing Beijing to boost purchases of U.S. agricultural products and expand exports of rare earths and other critical minerals. Tee, however, believes China will likely exercise caution in delivering on its commitments, especially given Trump’s weakened domestic position after the mid‑term elections and Democratic opposition to his tariff policies.
She also observes that neither side is willing to surrender key bargaining chips such as rare‑earth exports and technology‑export controls.
With a further summit slated for December at the G20 meeting in Miami, Jia says there is “room to defer more contentious matters to a later date and to extend the trade truce further at the next encounter.”
China, the US and Russia: three leaders, three agendas
Russia hopes that discussions with the U.S. and Chinese leaders will bolster its diplomatic standing and help broker a settlement to the Ukraine war on terms favorable to Moscow.
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Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, told DW that Moscow seeks to project an image that Washington is prepared to negotiate directly with Russia, a move she argues could erode confidence among European and Ukrainian partners.
“Trump wants trilateral nuclear talks,” she said, while Beijing “wants the optics of China hosting the unprecedented historical meeting among the three.”
Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, says Beijing aims to showcase its capacity to bring major powers together and foster international dialogue.
“Russia wants recognition, the US wants arms control, and China wants status without strings attached,” she said. “I expect each leader to restate their own positions rather than produce real solutions.”
Ukraine: why Beijing is reluctant to mediate
Michael Kimmage, director of the Kennan Institute in the United States, told DW last month that China’s primary concern appears to be the survival of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime rather than actively ending the Ukraine war.
He noted that Russia remains a crucial energy supplier and diplomatic partner for Beijing.
He observed that “an outright Russian victory is not necessarily Beijing’s goal; more important is the political survival of Vladimir Putin.” Consequently, Kimmage does not anticipate China pressuring Putin to end the war if he is unwilling.
Zhang Lun maintains that the current situation is “most aligned with Beijing’s interests.”
Zhang argues that the Trump administration’s pro‑Putin stance has made it more difficult for Ukraine to resist Russia, while Europe has shouldered greater costs and been weakened as a result.
He added that the United States has also “lost moral authority,” and that the post‑war international order and Washington‑centered alliances have been further eroded, enhancing China’s position and influence.
He believes Beijing seeks to prevent Russia from collapsing without providing such overt or extensive support that would alienate Europe and other Western nations.
He told DW, “At the same time, China does not want Ukraine to be defeated, as that would diminish Russia’s reliance on Beijing.”
He added that for now China is unlikely to intervene directly; instead, it will wait for a more favorable moment before possibly stepping in as a neutral mediator to maximize its gains.
Iran: little sign of substantive cooperation
W.A. Figueroa, an assistant professor of history and international relations at the University of Groningen, told DW that there is little evidence of genuine cooperation between China and the United States on Iran.
Figueroa noted that the two countries share certain interests, “including opposition to a toll system in the Strait of Hormuz and to nuclear proliferation,” but added that “China has consistently called for negotiations and denounced both sanctions and military force as means to achieve these or any other objectives.”
Figueroa says China has no desire to see further escalation or prolonged instability in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Beijing has managed the current situation with relative ease, leaving it with little pressure to alter its stance.
He observed that “China continues to provide Iran with crucial financial support through its purchases of Iranian oil,” adding that Beijing’s diplomatic backing has yielded no substantial change, largely because China holds limited leverage over either Iran or the United States in the region.
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