Assassinations of Russian Generals Reveal Deepening Rift Within Putin’s Security Apparatus

For the second time in just over a year, a blast tore through the Moscow suburb of Balashikha, resulting in the death of a senior Russian military officer.

On June 9, explosives planted beneath a BMW detonated as its driver was leaving the parking lot, according to the independent Russian outlet The Insider. The victim was identified as Lt. Gen. Damir Davydov, a Defense Ministry official responsible for supplying missiles and artillery ammunition to forces fighting in Ukraine.

The incident is notable for its proximity to a prior tragedy: the explosion that killed Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy chief of the Main Operations Directorate of Russia’s General Staff, on April 25 2025, occurred roughly 1,150 feet from the Balashikha site, according to French newspaper Le Monde.

A screen grab from a video shows the car in which senior Russian military officer Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik was killed, confirmed by Russia’s Investigative Committee on April 25 2025 in the Moscow region. (Russian Investigative Committee / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Earlier that month, another high‑ranking officer was killed in Moscow. Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, head of Russia’s nuclear, biological and chemical protection troops, was slain when a bomb hidden in an electric scooter exploded outside an apartment building. A source in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Reuters that the operation was carried out by the agency.

These attacks are part of a broader pattern of assassinations and attempted assassinations targeting senior Russian military figures—a campaign that a European intelligence source says is now exposing tensions within Putin’s own security system.

Since Russia launched its full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, senior military leaders have been lost to missile strikes, drone attacks, car bombings, crashes and front‑line combat. The toll, according to the same intelligence source, is fueling friction between the armed forces and the FSB, Russia’s powerful domestic security service, the successor to the Soviet KGB.

“There are internal frictions between Russian security institutions,” a European intelligence source told the outlet. “The military wants the FSB to guarantee physical protection for Russian generals, but the FSB is opposed to taking responsibility for the military.”

The dispute reflects a deeper rivalry within President Vladimir Putin’s system, where security services have long held a privileged position over the armed forces, according to multiple sources.

“This goes back to Soviet times,” the source said. “The security services do not like the military, and the military does not like the security services.”

According to the same source and Russian opposition figure Maxim Katz, the core tension lies inside Putin’s own apparatus: the war has increased the military’s importance on the battlefield, yet the political structure in Moscow still views generals as a potential threat.

In effect, the Kremlin now faces a paradox. It needs its military commanders to sustain the war, yet the security services that dominate Putin’s system appear reluctant to take responsibility for protecting them.

The damaged Kia Sorento lies at the scene where Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Russian General Staff’s army operational training directorate, was killed in a car bomb in Moscow on Dec. 22 2025. (Anastasia Barashkova/Reuters)

At least 15 Russian generals have been confirmed killed since the full‑scale invasion began, according to independent Russian outlet Mediazona. The toll includes five lieutenant generals, seven major generals and three former generals.

Some were lost far from Moscow, closer to the frontlines. Lt. Gen. Oleg Tsokov, deputy commander of Russia’s Southern Military District, was killed in July 2023 when a Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile struck the occupied city of Berdiansk. Maj. Gen. Sergei Goryachev, chief of staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army, was killed in June 2023 during Ukraine’s counter‑offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region. Maj. Gen. Vladimir Zavadsky, deputy commander of the 14th Army Corps, was killed near Krynky in southern Ukraine in November 2023.

Others were struck inside Russia or in Russian‑controlled territory. Lt. Gen. Alexander Otroshchenko, a senior Russian air force commander, died in a military transport plane crash over occupied Crimea in March 2026. Retired Maj. Gen. Kanamat Botashev, flying for the Wagner Group, was killed in May 2022 after his Su‑25 was shot down over Ukraine’s Luhansk region.

Igor Kirillov was killed on Dec. 17 2024 when an explosive device hidden in a scooter detonated outside a building in Moscow, officials said. (AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images)

The losses date back to the opening weeks of the invasion. Maj. Gen. Andrei Sukhovetsky, deputy commander of Russia’s 41st Combined Arms Army, and Maj. Gen. Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of the 8th Army, were among the first to be killed.

Katz notes that the military has long occupied a vulnerable position within the Russian power structure. “In Russia, the FSB is the largest and most powerful security organization, and Putin himself comes from that system,” he said. “The army, by contrast, has always been viewed by these people as a threat.”

He adds that the Kremlin historically fears popular military figures because the army is one of the few institutions capable of challenging political power. “You will not find Russian military men in senior government positions,” Katz notes. “Since Stalin, they have been afraid of the army. Whenever there is a relatively well‑known military figure with a name of his own, they deal with it—legally, or as with the case of Prigozhin, or with other generals. In Russia, there is no such thing as a popular general.”

Katz argues that even during wartime, when the military might be expected to gain status, Putin’s system keeps the army politically weak. “The army does not take part in decision‑making,” he says. “It is funded now, but everything goes to the war. The generals are rich, but not like ministers or FSB people. Among the elites, they are the most deprived.”

“For them, the FSB is a much bigger threat than the Ukrainian army,” Katz says. “The Ukrainian army kills a general once in a while. The FSB puts generals in prison much faster.”

The European intelligence source says the killings matter not only because of operational losses but also due to the psychological effect on the Russian army. “Putin understands that losing prominent Russian generals can affect morale within the Russian army, which is already low from the Russian perspective,” the source said.

The apparent compromise, according to the source, was to shift responsibility away from the FSB. “The FSB did not want to deal with military protection, so the security service of the Russian presidential administration would take care of those generals,” the source said.

Katz says the internal pressure on Putin may also collide with Russia’s parliamentary elections in September—a moment he believes Western observers largely ignore.

Fox News Digital reached out to the Russian and Ukrainian governments for comment but did not receive responses in time for publication.

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