Assessing the Strategic Imperative of U.S. Land-Based Nuclear Deterrence

In 2019, Steve Fetter published “A Cheaper Nuclear Sponge,” arguing that developing a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was unnecessary for bolstering U.S. land-based deterrence. Years later, amid shifting defense budgets and strategic priorities, we invited Fetter to revisit his thesis.

Image: U.S. Air Force (John Ingle)

In your 2019 piece, you contended that building an entirely new ICBM was unnecessary and that the Pentagon could save tens of billions by extending the service life of the Minuteman III. Seven years on, how has that argument held up? What has the trajectory of the new ballistic missile program looked like compared to your expectations at the time?

The estimated acquisition cost of the new Sentinel missile has surged from $78 billion in 2020 to $141 billion in 2025. While a significant portion of this increase stems from the need to refurbish or replace silos and other ground infrastructure—requirements that would have existed regardless of whether Minuteman III was extended—there is little doubt that prolonging the Minuteman III would have been far less expensive than proceeding with Sentinel through the 2030s. These savings would have been especially critical during a period when the Department of Defense’s budget is strained by other nuclear modernization programs, including the Columbia-class SSBN, the B-21 strategic bomber, the long-range standoff weapon, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, and upgrades to nuclear command and control systems.

At the time, the primary objective of the land-based leg of the nuclear triad was deterring Russia, and you highlighted the targeting-inflexibility issue of overflying Russia to reach other adversaries. How do China’s nuclear buildup and the priorities of the second Trump administration reshape this argument? Do these developments strengthen the case for ICBMs, or does your original conclusion remain intact?

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