The third India‑Australia Annual Summit held in Melbourne on July 9 yielded results in defence, energy, critical minerals, technology and education — eighteen initiatives in total. The standout achievement was the agreement enabling Australian uranium exports to India.
After more than a decade of a civil‑nuclear accord existing only on paper, the two nations completed the administrative steps required to launch commercial uranium shipments. They also refreshed the 2009 defence and security declaration and added pledges on shipbuilding, maritime security and cyber cooperation.
The summit, however, failed to deliver a trade agreement. The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), first launched in May 2011, suspended in 2016, revived in 2021 and repeatedly pledged for swift conclusion at later summits, remains unsigned.
This trend has become structural. Since the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was formed in 2020 — accompanied by the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement signed at that summit — the security side of the relationship has produced tangible results at each major gathering.
Examples include Australia hosting Exercise Malabar for the first time in 2023, the updated defence declaration, and the operationalisation of uranium exports in 2026. The Critical Minerals Corridor, unveiled at the Melbourne summit to safeguard lithium, cobalt and rare‑earth supply chains, was presented as a strategic security initiative rather than a conventional trade tool, although it is still at the framework stage.
On the economic front, the only interim agreement is the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), signed in April 2022. It addressed goods tariffs and included modest services and mobility provisions, while deferring the more challenging topics — investment, government procurement and broader labour mobility — to the CECA.
Trade figures highlight the disparity. Bilateral trade has more than doubled since 2020, reaching roughly US$33 billion in 2025, which positions India as Australia’s fifth‑largest trading partner.
Nevertheless, these volumes are modest compared with Australia’s four larger partners, with whom comprehensive trade deals have already been completed. The Korea agreement took five years, Japan seven, China ten, Indonesia nine and the EU eight. India, now approaching fifteen years without a deal, stands out as the outlier.
ECTA has fueled much of that growth, pushing agricultural exports more than double since its entry into force. However, the benefits stem primarily from goods liberalisation; the services, investment and mobility provisions that would add economic depth remain unsettled.
The uranium agreement signals a strategic shift. While Australia supplies uranium to over 40 nations under existing frameworks, India’s status as a nuclear‑armed state outside the Non‑Proliferation Treaty necessitated more intricate safeguards.
The civil‑nuclear agreement lay dormant for almost twelve years as the parties could not settle on a system for tracking and reporting uranium transfers. India’s foreign secretary noted that breaking the deadlock demanded “very intense discussions” over two years; prior to 2026, only a single test shipment in 2017 had moved between the two countries.
Similar to the Critical Minerals Corridor, the uranium deal moved forward once both sides regarded it as a security imperative. India aims to grow its nuclear capacity from about 8 GW to 100 GW by 2047, while Australia seeks to prove its reliability as an Indo‑Pacific partner and broaden its export base. When the strategic interests aligned, the procedural hurdles were overcome.
The trade agreement encounters a distinct obstacle. As the world’s top milk producer, India’s dairy lobby wields sufficient influence to have helped exclude the country from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2019.
The Gujarat Milk Marketing Federation, based in Prime Minister Modi’s home state, was among the first to applaud that exit. Those same forces are now impeding the CECA. By 2025, dairy and wine tariffs emerged as the principal sticking points, with a senior Indian official ruling out additional concessions on either product.
On Australia’s side, the services and mobility measures India seeks — especially easier entry for IT workers and recognition of professional qualifications — collide with politically sensitive workforce and migration discussions.
The interim agreement was intended as a stepping stone, yet by postponing the toughest issues it left the fundamental obstacles unresolved. CECA talks have proceeded through more than ten formal rounds, but neither party has indicated a timeline for finalising the deal.
The core issue is that neither government incurs a tangible political cost for leaving the CECA unsettled. Although the trade relationship is important, it is not large enough to compel action. By contrast, Australia‑China two‑way trade of roughly US$212 billion generates pressure to manage the relationship even during periods of tension.
India’s overall trade stance has resembled sustained disengagement, with domestic protectionist interests consistently prevailing over outward‑looking economic aspirations.
When political conditions align, India can act swiftly: the UAE trade agreement was finalised in 88 days, and the comprehensive deal with the UK was signed in July 2025, three and a half years after negotiations began, encompassing services, mobility and government procurement.
India also wrapped up negotiations with the EU in January 2026, securing the largest trade agreement either side has undertaken after over three years of intensive talks, which involved tough agricultural and services concessions. The CECA’s fifteen‑year timeline contrasts sharply with this record.
This is significant because a partnership founded chiefly on a shared perception of regional threats is only as durable as that perception. The Quad has not convened at the leaders’ level for almost two years.
India’s ties with China, though competitive, have steadied since the 2020 border clash, with both sides managing rather than escalating tensions. Even if the strategic rationale persists, its intensity may wax and wane, leaving a partnership lacking economic depth more vulnerable to such shifts.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership label itself serves a political function in both capitals, signalling to domestic audiences and third parties that the relationship is deeper than its actual substance. This framing can diminish, rather than heighten, the pressure to bridge the gap between the security framework and the economic foundation it is meant to support.
The Melbourne Summit demonstrated that when both governments treat an outcome as a strategic necessity, procedural obstacles fall away. When an issue remains in the commercial sphere, domestic constituencies resist change.
The uranium agreement progressed because it was deemed a security imperative. The CECA has stalled because the domestic political costs of conceding on dairy, wine and migration continue to outweigh the perceived price of delay. Until that calculation changes, the partnership will remain structurally unbalanced.
Lam Duc Vu is a risk analyst specialising in Indo‑Pacific security and regional affairs.