Analysts in Bangladesh note that alleged inflammatory remarks against Bangladesh made during India’s West Bengal election campaign by Hindu‑nationalist politicians are sending mixed signals to Dhaka.
These incidents gained significant public attention and created dissatisfaction in Bangladesh, thereby influencing Dhaka’s decision‑making process, said former Bangladeshi diplomat Humayun Kabir.
He added that the Bangladeshi government had not yet addressed these matters or the positive indications.
In May, the Hindu‑nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) defeated the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal, ending its 16‑year rule in the state that shares a border with Bangladesh. West Bengal and Bangladesh share linguistic, cultural and ethnic ties.
Any Chinese involvement in managing the Teesta River is considered a sensitive security issue for India.
The Teesta is shared by India and Bangladesh, and attempts to reach a water‑sharing agreement have been stalled for years. During President Rahman’s visit to Beijing, Bangladesh announced that the two countries had agreed to conduct a joint technical feasibility study on the river’s management.
Experts say the river requires dredging, desilting and flow‑restoration measures to support agriculture.
Any Chinese involvement in a project close to our border will always be a matter of concern, and we would certainly not welcome it, Saran said.
India and China have a long‑standing border dispute, highlighted by the 1962 war in which India suffered a decisive defeat, and by recent deadly border clashes.
A Chinese role in the project would bring it nearer to the strategically vital Siliguri Corridor, also known as the “Chicken’s Neck”, a 22‑km (14‑mile) strip linking India’s mainland to its seven northeastern states.
Bangladeshi officials said previous governments had also invited India to join the Teesta project, but Delhi’s deliberations were too prolonged. They contend that China possesses the expertise and financial resources needed to deliver a project of this magnitude.
Beijing has moved to alleviate India’s concerns.
I would like to stress that China‑Bangladesh cooperation does not target any third party and should be free from third‑party influence, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters in Beijing during President Rahman’s recent visit.
China is already Bangladesh’s largest defence supplier, accounting for over 70% of its arms imports, and Dhaka owes Beijing more than $6 billion (£4.5 billion).
During the visit, China also offered to develop the China‑Myanmar‑Bangladesh Economic Corridor, linking Yunnan Province to the two nations.
India has long regarded South Asia as its sphere of influence, while China has steadily expanded its presence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.
India’s attempts to rebuild relations with Bangladesh’s new government are complicated by the continued presence in Delhi of deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose extradition Dhaka has sought.
Sheikh Hasina was convicted in absentia of crimes against humanity for a crackdown on student‑led protests that left hundreds dead. She denied the charges and was sentenced to death by a special tribunal last year.
As long as Hasina remains in Delhi, it may be somewhat difficult politically for President Rahman to visit India, Saran said.
However, some experts suggest that President Rahman may still visit Delhi, as India remains an economically and strategically vital neighbour that Dhaka cannot ignore.
India also recognises that stable relations with Bangladesh are crucial for security in its northeastern region, where several ethnic separatist groups are active.
For President Rahman, balancing Dhaka’s relationships with the two regional powers will be a delicate diplomatic balancing act.


