China Faces Reputational Risks Over Prabowo’s Controversial School Meal Initiative

For over ten years, China’s relationship with Indonesia has centered on railways, industrial parks, nickel processing facilities, and large‑scale infrastructure projects.

Recently, China has started to associate itself with a far more politically sensitive initiative: President Prabowo Subianto’s flagship Free Nutritious Meals program, locally called Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG).

In April, Chinese Embassy Counselor Zhen Wangda participated in the inauguration of a nutrition service center (SPPG) project jointly backed by the embassy and the Muhammadiyah community in Southeast Sulawesi.

During the same visit, Zhen met with South Sulawesi officials and promoted expanded China‑Indonesia cooperation. The embassy framed the effort as a contribution to social welfare and people‑to‑people ties.

On the surface, this cooperation seems harmless. Providing meals to children is politically sensitive. Indonesia continues to confront chronic nutritional challenges, and China brings expertise in poverty alleviation, food logistics, and public service delivery.

Nevertheless, Beijing should proceed cautiously. MBG is no longer just a social program; it has become one of Indonesia’s most politically controversial and institutionally vulnerable projects.

This week, Indonesian authorities arrested Dadan Hindayana, former head of the National Nutrition Agency, together with two former deputies, on corruption allegations concerning MBG program management.

Prosecutors allege that officials manipulated the selection of foundations overseeing meal distribution centers and directed contracts toward entities linked to agency insiders. Investigators are also probing claims of procurement markups and conflicts of interest.

The allegations are especially troubling given SPPG partners—the delivery mechanism for meals to schools and communities. Prosecutors say foundations linked to agency officials were allegedly permitted to participate despite not meeting requirements, raising governance concerns across the system.

The scandal hits the core of Prabowo’s signature policy amid rising economic vulnerability, reflected in a weakening currency and stock market.

For Beijing, the controversy creates a dilemma. China naturally seeks to cultivate goodwill among ordinary Indonesians. Supporting school nutrition projects—especially through respected bodies like Muhammadiyah—appeared to be an effective way to show that Chinese engagement extends beyond mines and industrial zones.

However, there is a distinction between supporting Indonesian development and becoming associated with a politically toxic state program. The risk is not that China will be accused of corruption; there is no evidence that Chinese entities were involved in the alleged wrongdoing.

Instead, reputational contagion is the danger. When foreign governments become publicly linked to domestic flagship programs, they inevitably share political risks. If the program succeeds, they may receive credit; if it fails, they may be blamed—even without any operational role.

This is a lesson China has learned elsewhere. Infrastructure projects initially portrayed as symbols of friendship have sometimes become targets of public frustration when local governance issues arise. The same dynamic could apply to MBG.

The risks extend beyond corruption allegations. The program has faced criticism over implementation problems, food‑quality concerns, and food‑poisoning incidents. Critics argue the nationwide rollout outpaced the government’s administrative capacity, and even supporters acknowledge that governance and oversight mechanisms remain strained.

This matters because China’s interests in Indonesia are long‑term. Beijing gains little from tying its image to the fortunes of a single political initiative or administration. Prabowo’s presidency will eventually end, but China‑Indonesia relations will endure.

A wiser approach would have China focus on institution‑building rather than program branding.

Instead of directly associating with MBG, Beijing could support nutrition research, agricultural productivity, food‑safety systems, supply‑chain modernization, and public‑health capacity. These areas allow Chinese expertise to generate tangible benefits while avoiding entanglement in Indonesia’s domestic political battles.

China should also demand transparency in any future cooperation. Projects should be structured through credible civil‑society organizations, local governments, and independently audited institutions, rather than through politically connected intermediaries.

Indonesia remains one of China’s most important partners in Southeast Asia. The relationship is too valuable to be jeopardized by a program currently mired in governance controversies.

The corruption allegations against Dadan Hindayana and other former officials will ultimately be proven or disproven in court. The broader lesson is already clear: the MBG scandal shows how quickly ambitious social programs can become vehicles for patronage when oversight is weak.

For China, the prudent course is not to retreat from cooperation with Indonesia, but to distinguish between supporting Indonesia’s development and investing in the political fortunes of Prabowo’s most ambitious—and increasingly controversial—policy experiment.

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