China’s Expanding Paracel Footprint: Strategic Military Buildup Targets Vietnam and Vital Sea Lanes

China is rapidly developing two artificial islands in the contested Paracel Islands, with analysts warning that the new infrastructure could significantly extend Beijing’s military influence toward Vietnam and along critical South China Sea shipping corridors.

Over the past several months, China has converted two previously untouched sandbanks into artificial islands featuring characteristics typical of military installations. Following the construction of approximately 20 outposts throughout the South China Sea since 2013, Beijing has restarted development activities in waters claimed by multiple neighboring nations, most notably Vietnam.

Since major dredging and construction operations commenced in December 2025, a distinctive triangular concrete structure, a harbor, and an elongated strip of reclaimed land resembling an airstrip have appeared at the site.

Satellite imagery reviewed by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) documents the swift transformation of two sandbanks that Beijing had previously left untouched.

“We cannot say for certain yet, but all the evidence suggests that China is building a very large military base on Antelope Reef,” explained Harrison Prétat, deputy director and researcher at AMTI, a project supported by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Possible military base

Spanning approximately six square kilometers in the central South China Sea, sandy areas have been paved with concrete, and portions of coral reef appear to have been removed to facilitate continuous ship traffic.

Military analysts are monitoring the construction closely, though the exact function of these new facilities remains uncertain.

“On Yagong Island, 14 kilometers from Antelope Reef, it looks like support facilities for the military base,” Prétat noted. “The most likely scenario would be the construction of detection and radar equipment to support the base at Antelope.”

Much of the focus has centered on a large triangular concrete structure in the middle of the small island, which experts believe could ultimately house surveillance systems.

This assessment aligns with Beijing’s broader pattern of establishing strategic outposts along major commercial and military shipping lanes.

“It’s like a fortress in the desert,” remarked Hugo Tierny, a military historian at the École pratique des hautes études and researcher at France’s Institute for Strategic Research, Irsem.

“It provides a permanent location for monitoring movements, a harbor for ships, facilities for launching aircraft, and all of it monitored by radar.”

Between 2013 and 2017, Beijing aggressively expanded its network of outposts as it worked to solidify its territorial claims over the South China Sea, which it considers its own in more than 90 percent of its waters.

According to AMTI, China already maintains approximately 20 militarized outposts in the Paracels, which are also claimed by Vietnam, compared with seven in the Spratly Islands, located closer to the Philippines.

Until recently, most Chinese installations have followed a fairly consistent template.

“China has been carrying out a sort of ‘copy-and-paste’ of facilities across its various outposts,” Prétat observed. “But what we are seeing on Yagong Island does not exactly resemble any type of structure already seen in the South China Sea.”

Vietnam in view

If construction proceeds at its current rate, the purpose of these new structures may soon become more apparent. Their geographic placement, however, already hints at Beijing’s strategic objectives.

Located roughly 400 kilometers from the Vietnamese coastline and approximately midway between the Taiwan Strait and the Strait of Malacca—two of Asia’s most strategically significant maritime chokepoints—China is creating what would become the second-largest artificial island in the Paracel archipelago.

Vietnam, which asserts sovereignty over these islands, has called on Beijing to “immediately halt construction,” labeling the activities “illegal.”

While Hanoi has historically been less vocal than Manila in contesting China’s actions in the South China Sea, it has adopted a more assertive approach of its own while preserving diplomatic relations with Beijing.

The country has constructed around 20 artificial islands, boosted its defense budget, and broadened its military partnerships, including with Russia, the United States, and France.

“The main purpose of new detection equipment at this location is to have more sensors directed directly towards Vietnam,” Prétat stated.

“Nothing obstructs the equipment’s ability to scan the maritime area as far as the Vietnamese coast. This provides a clear line of sight that is slightly different from those they already have.”

The site could also enhance China’s capacity to support its coastguard operations in the region, resupply its vessels, and reinforce its sovereignty claims—particularly with respect to Vietnamese fishermen and sailors working in adjacent waters.

Wider regional strategy

The new installations also fit into a broader strategic framework involving Washington.

“The Chinese are continuing their policy of developing strategic depth to the south of their coastline,” Tierny explained. “In the event of regional escalation, they believe, in particular, that this will hinder the US Navy’s access from the south and strengthen their defensive perimeter.”

Each additional base also provides China with another potential logistical and military fallback position.

Although the Paracels sit more than 1,000 kilometers from Taiwan, a stronger Chinese presence in the area could prove valuable during a wider regional conflict—especially if Beijing were to pursue the “reunification” with Taiwan that Chinese President Xi Jinping has consistently championed through military means.

This article was adapted from the original version in French by RFI’s Nicolas Rocca

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