When Gustavo Petro assumed the presidency in August 2022, Colombia’s illegal armed groups collectively numbered just over 15,000 members. By the time he left office, that figure had nearly doubled to approximately 29,000. In this in-depth analysis, Managing Editor Deborah Bonello and Co-Founder Jeremy McDermott dissect the shortcomings of Petro’s Total Peace initiative and assess whether President Abelardo de la Espriella’s decisive turn toward militarization can deliver better results — when history suggests otherwise.
Deborah Bonello: The numbers tell a stark story. Colombia’s armed groups nearly doubled in size during Petro’s tenure, a statistic being deployed to argue that negotiation was naïve and that a militarized reset is the obvious correction. But are we reading these ledgers too quickly?
Jeremy McDermott: There is certainly no happy ending for Total Peace, and its failures no small part contributed to de la Espriella’s election. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from these failures that negotiation with armed groups is inherently futile. Colombia’s history contains successful negotiations that deserve recognition.
What Do the Numbers Really Show?
Deborah Bonello: How reliable is that membership figure? It is a daunting number.
Jeremy McDermott: It is fairly solid. The data originates from the Defense Ministry and has been analyzed by credible organizations, including Fundación para la Paz y los Estudios Sociales (Pares). The near-doubling is unprecedented, especially given that two prior peace processes had driven numbers sharply downward. It paints a harsh picture of Petro’s four years in office.
Deborah Bonello: The figures themselves are not in dispute, but their interpretation may be. To understand the present, we need to look further back — to 2016 and the signing of the peace accords.
Jeremy McDermott: The 2016 accords were signed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Under President Iván Duque — a conservative from the hardline Democratic Center Party — security policy bore a striking resemblance to what de la Espriella is pursuing today. The key issue was coca. Colombia had 169,000 hectares of coca when Duque took office in 2018; by the time he left, that figure had reached 230,000. But hectares alone do not tell the full story: coca bushes grow over time, increasing their yield, and the process of technification has improved the amount of alkaloid extracted from each leaf. Cocaine production rose from roughly 1,100 tons to over 1,700 tons during the Duque years.
Deborah Bonello: After the 2016 accords, what drove this explosion in coca production?
Jeremy McDermott: The accords were a sophisticated document — not merely a surrender agreement but one encompassing political, social, and economic dimensions. Among its provisions was a crop substitution policy, predicated on the fact that the FARC controlled vast coca-growing areas. Duque failed to fulfill that aspect of the agreement, yet he pursued the most unprecedented manual eradication campaign in scale: 130,000 hectares eradicated — the highest on record. And yet he handed Petro the highest levels of coca cultivation and cocaine production Colombia had ever seen.
The Starting Point for Total Peace
Deborah Bonello: What mindset were the armed groups in when Petro took office, given the unfulfilled promises of crop substitution and other commitments? Where did things stand?
Jeremy McDermott: Petro was elected largely on the promise of Total Peace — negotiating with all of Colombia’s armed actors to end a six-decade civil conflict. He is a former guerrilla himself, having demobilized in 1990, so many believed that if anyone could negotiate with former guerrilla groups and other armed actors, it would be him. The problem was that he did not learn from previous efforts. He went in unprepared and failed to fulfill the FARC peace agreement, which caused many to question whether any new agreement with him would be honored. His first critical mistake was attempting to negotiate with everyone simultaneously and entering those negotiations severely underprepared.
Deborah Bonello: He reportedly passed a law within his first hundred days, is that right?
Jeremy McDermott: He attempted to pass a legislative framework for negotiation, but his approach was flawed from the start. He divided negotiations into two categories: belligerent-status groups, primarily guerrillas such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), and criminal groups. The plan was that negotiations with the ELN would follow a FARC-style model — ratified by Congress with political, social, and economic components. For the criminal groups, a separate legislative framework would address issues such as protection from extradition and reduced prison terms — incentives designed to encourage surrender. He never got either framework through Congress. The ELN talks never progressed meaningfully, and the criminal groups never received their framework at all.
Deborah Bonello: Without a legal construct, what was he actually offering at those negotiation tables?
Jeremy McDermott: He offered something they all found attractive: a ceasefire. This was another critical error. In past successful negotiations — with the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in the early 2000s and with the FARC — ceasefires came only after genuine progress, concessions, and accelerating agreement. Petro initiated ceasefires with everyone from the outset. The armed groups reacted predictably: fighting between the state and illegal actors dropped dramatically. Security forces were no longer engaging them. They looked at each other and realized they could compete for coca crops, gold deposits, internal transport corridors, and cocaine departure points without fear of military reprisal. They began recruiting aggressively, and that is how we arrived at the figure you cited at the start.
Deborah Bonello: So the violence did not stop — it simply changed form.
Jeremy McDermott: It shifted from state-on-criminal violence to criminal-on-criminal violence.
Deborah Bonello: How did everyday Colombians experience this shift? What impact did it have on them?
Jeremy McDermott: In rural areas, the impact was immediate and severe, as this is where most of the fighting occurred — particularly in territories the FARC had vacated, which became a contested free-for-all. The ELN, the Gaitanistas or Clan del Golfo, and FARC dissident groups all moved in. For many Colombians, it felt like a return to chaos: fighting between rival factions, massacres, displacement, and a homicide rate that began climbing again after years of steady decline. Colombians looked at this and said: this was supposed to be history. We were supposed to be moving beyond this, not re-entering it.
Catatumbo, the Breaking Point
Deborah Bonello: Tell us about Catatumbo — it feels like the defining case study of this dynamic.
Jeremy McDermott: Catatumbo sits on the Venezuela border and is one of Colombia’s principal coca-growing regions. Historically, it was shared among different guerrilla groups: the FARC, the ELN, and a smaller group, the EPL, which has since disappeared. For the ELN, it was their primary revenue engine, and with a friendly government in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro — now a fugitive from US justice — the ELN controlled the border. They decided to seize the entire region and expand it into an even greater money-making operation. They attacked FARC dissidents with whom they had previously been allied, and hundreds of guerrillas gathered — some crossing from Venezuela — in a concentration not seen since the early 2000s. In just 72 hours, nearly 100 people were killed as the ELN went house to house targeting those they accused of supporting FARC dissidents. Approximately 50,000 people were displaced. Colombia reached a breaking point: this could not continue. Petro severed talks with the ELN, and that was the watershed moment for Total Peace.
Deborah Bonello: Were there any areas where Total Peace actually worked?
Jeremy McDermott: There were pockets where it came close. In the south, near the Ecuadorian border, when the ELN peace process collapsed, a unit broke away and chose to continue negotiating. They handed over weapons and prepared to move to a concentration zone. A FARC dissident group under Walter Mendoza — several hundred strong — also surrendered weapons and prepared for concentration. Trust was also being built in Medellín — the capital of cocaine trafficking — where gangs negotiated a significant reduction in extortion. The same occurred in Buenaventura. The problem was that none of it crossed the finish line. There was no legislative framework, and trust was still fragile. Then, just before we sat down for this conversation, de la Espriella axed all those agreements, dismantled the concentration zones, and put the leadership of those groups back up for extradition. Any hopes for peace are effectively over.
The Coca Boom and Criminal Economy
Deborah Bonello: Colombia’s criminal conflict has largely been framed around the drug trade. Is that still the case, or what is evolving?
Jeremy McDermott: Cocaine remains the principal earner and the infrastructure under which many other illicit activities operate. But gold is also a massive revenue source. Gold prices are at record highs, and Colombia is one of the world’s largest gold producers — yet roughly 70% of Colombia’s gold is extracted illegally or irregularly, passing through criminal hands. Extortion is another significant revenue stream: criminal groups control specific geographic spaces and demand a percentage of any business conducted within them. Historically rural, extortion has become increasingly urban — particularly in Medellín and parts of southern Bogotá, where criminal groups have established strong footholds.
The Limits of the Military Shift
Deborah Bonello: De la Espriella’s plan bears a striking resemblance to Duque’s and rests heavily on the security forces. What is the current state of Colombia’s military and police?
Jeremy McDermott: Colombia’s security forces are the best in the region, full stop. Six decades of combat experience produce superbly trained troops and police with excellent intelligence capacity and deep knowledge of the terrain. Where things falter is equipment and funding. There has been a prolonged budget deficit. Under Petro, the military was deprioritized — he favored social programs and dismissed numerous generals. The result is a severely underfunded military with serious morale problems. Consider this: Colombia has the largest helicopter fleet in the region, yet out of 53 Black Hawk helicopters, only 13 are battle-ready, and out of 19 Mi-17 transport helicopters, just 11 are operational. This became painfully clear during the Catatumbo crisis, which is deep in the Andes and extremely difficult to access by road. The security forces simply lacked the capacity to respond effectively while managing threats elsewhere.
Deborah Bonello: During Petro’s administration, we also saw volatile tensions with the Trump administration. Petro was personally sanctioned by the US Treasury, and Colombia was decertified on counter-narcotics — a significant blow for a country long regarded as a US proxy in the region. De la Espriella has now aligned with the Shield of the Americas alliance, and a $1 billion security package has been promised by the Trump administration. How transformative is that?
Jeremy McDermott: Context matters. Plan Colombia, signed in 1990 and implemented in 2000, saw the US provide over $8 billion in aid over two decades. Even under Petro, some US aid flowed. When President Trump cut all foreign aid, Colombia was severely affected — helicopters ran out of fuel because the United States had been paying for it. You cannot rebuild a helicopter fleet overnight, and long-term deployment requires enormous operational budgets. Colombia’s current defense budget is almost entirely consumed by soldier salaries and retired military pensions, leaving a tiny percentage for actual operations — far short of what a nationwide offensive against armed groups would demand. And even when budgets were healthier, the military alone could not bring all armed groups to heel. Progress came only through the two peace processes that engaged the most powerful groups.
Between Rhetoric and Reality
Deborah Bonello: Much of what we are seeing today is a repackaging of strategies from the past 50 to 60 years. What is de la Espriella actually accomplishing so far?
Jeremy McDermott: There is a great deal of political theater: a presidential address featuring the bodies of those killed in recent operations, a slight uptick in the rhythm of operations, and markedly higher military morale under a president they trust. But the money issue remains unresolved. Colombia also recently suffered a serious earthquake, and the government has had to divert significant resources to debris clearance and rebuilding. There is a lot of talk without corresponding action, which leads me to believe something genuinely different may emerge — something with real impact.
Deborah Bonello: How have the armed groups responded to the administration’s tough rhetoric and the slight increase in military pressure?
Jeremy McDermott: We saw one smaller paramilitary leader give an interview over the weekend pleading for a way out — his number two had just been killed by security forces, so there is visible desperation even among those willing to surrender. The ELN, however, remains largely unfazed. At roughly 6,000 strong and fighting since the early 1960s, this is business as usual for them. Some of the larger drug trafficking groups are alarmed by their leaders being placed back on the extradition list. We have not seen significant military pushback, mainly because no serious offensive has yet forced a shift in criminal dynamics. Everyone is still gauging the gap between political rhetoric and conditions on the ground — and that gap remains substantial.
What History Teaches Us
Deborah Bonello: You have observed both approaches over decades. What does the record tell us about what is most effective at reducing violence and improving security? Setting aside the international cocaine trade, of course.
Jeremy McDermott: In the late 1990s, there was genuine fear Colombia would become a narco-state — the FARC was on the outskirts of Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali, right-wing paramilitaries were active, and the state was largely an observer. How did we get from there to relative stability and economic progress? Essentially through two peace processes combined with a combination of hard power and incentives. The big stick was US aid — billions of dollars, helicopter fleets, highly trained troops, and the capacity for sustained, intelligence-driven offensives. When the FARC realized they were not winning militarily, a serious political agreement began to look real. The paramilitaries reached a similar conclusion. Then came the carrot: a genuine peace agreement, protection from extradition, and the arrival not just of the military but of health services, education, and social security. That is what succeeded. When I arrived in 1997, the state was present in barely half of national territory; that changed because of the combination of force and negotiation.
A military-only approach is insufficient. The ELN, the Clan del Golfo, and FARC dissidents are not intimidated by force. They have survived everything the US-backed military can throw at them — and they are stronger than ever, even before Petro. We cannot bomb and shoot our way out of this. The evidence in Colombia suggests that a combination of hard power and meaningful negotiation produces results.
Deborah Bonello: Ecuador offers a neighboring case study — President Noboa’s militarization campaign has been running for years. What does de la Espriella make of that?
Jeremy McDermott: I am not sure he is studying it closely, because the one quantifiable outcome of nearly three years of Noboa’s militarization is that the homicide rate has gone up — now among the highest in South America, surpassing Colombia, which is still supposedly in the midst of a civil conflict. Ecuador is not a shining example of what can go right.
Deborah Bonello: In the interest of ending on something constructive, what is your verdict moving forward? What do you see — and hope — for Colombia?
Jeremy McDermott: What I would hope for is an improvement in the security forces’ effectiveness and the rule of law — things de la Espriella has not specifically promised but that are essential. We also need to see this improved law-and-order apparatus translate into better citizen security on the ground. De la Espriella is strikingly light on detail; all he has said is that he will hammer illegal actors. History tells us that if a real military offensive materializes, the guerrillas and armed factions will simply reduce their military exposure, embed themselves deeper in civilian populations, and use civilians as shields — nullifying the military’s operational capacity. They have done this before and will likely do it again. It will be deeply frustrating for the Colombian people.
Deborah Bonello: We will, of course, continue watching. Thank you for joining us, and thank you all for watching. You can find us on our website, YouTube, and Spotify, and we welcome story suggestions at flagship@insightcrime.org. We will be back next week. Goodbye for now.
