Saturday, November 21, 2026

A congressional review has found that the U.S. Navy’s commitment to the new Trump-class battleship program has added billions to the cost of its future fleet, even as the acting secretary of the Navy acknowledged this week that the war with Iran is “stretching” naval capacity.

The strain on the world’s largest naval force came into sharp focus this week when the USS George Washington returned from the Middle East on Wednesday, ending an unusual three-month stretch without a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Pacific. Deployments now routinely exceed 300 days, with ship maintenance and repairs postponed to keep vessels at sea longer.

While China outpaces the United States in shipbuilding, the U.S. Navy aims to grow its battle force from 286 ships to 381 over the next three decades.

However, the Congressional Budget Office’s analysis of the Navy’s 2027 shipbuilding plan concludes that cost projections have underestimated the new fleet by billions, citing unexpectedly complex ship designs and “estimated costs of some ships [that] were unrealistically low in earlier shipbuilding plans.”

The CBO found that total shipbuilding costs would average $54 billion annually in 2026 dollars over the next 30 years—roughly 18% above Navy estimates.

“Much of the added cost in the 2027 plan stems from the Navy’s decision to buy 15 large, heavily armed battleships,” the report notes. “That approach concentrates firepower in a few hulls, conflicting with the Navy’s stated goal of distributing it across a larger number of ships.”

The 15 vessels are the proposed “Trump-class” warships, which the president has described as 100 times more powerful than any previous warship in the U.S. fleet and capable of inspiring “fear in America’s enemies all over the world.” This week, Senate appropriators proposed reducing to zero the $1 billion the Navy requested in advanced procurement funding for the Trump-class ships for the current fiscal year.

On Wednesday, Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao told a Senate confirmation hearing that the Iran war is “stretching” the fleet’s capacity.

“This war, again, I know it’s a strain on our Navy,” he told senators.

Democratic senators criticized Cao’s tenure as acting secretary—he needs a special waiver for permanent appointment due to his recent active-duty service. “The world is less safe as a result of the Iran war,” Senator Richard Blumenthal told Cao.

“We have seen costs soar, lives lost, and casualties. Our relationships with allies are deteriorating because of this war. In fact, under your watch, the Navy has been stretched beyond sustainable limits, and the fleet is in worse condition than when you took office alongside this president,” Blumenthal said.

Senator Elissa Slotkin of Michigan told the committee that the Iran conflict has cost the United States an estimated $260 billion.

“Yet we do not enjoy the same freedom of navigation we had a year ago,” she said.

Despite the full weight of the world’s most powerful bluewater navy devoted to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, traffic through the contested waters remains at little more than one-third of pre-war levels.

According to the latest weekly report from the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, shipping traffic remains roughly 65% below the rate recorded before U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28.

Insuring a commercial vessel for a single transit through the Strait of Hormuz cost $54,000 a year ago, Cao told the Senate. “Today it’s $64 million just to get across,” he said.

Consumers worldwide bear the added cost of every passage through higher prices for fuel, fertilizer, and food.

U.S. Navy ships are also enduring increasingly long deployments. Since the Iran war began, vessels have been deployed for 10 to 11 months, well beyond the standard seven-month rotation, and sailors have been warned that extended deployments will likely remain the norm for years.

Several ships have exceeded 300 days deployed since the war started. The USS Abraham Lincoln remained at sea for 265 days—the longest a U.S. Navy ship has gone without a port call.

When pressed about a reported “mental health crisis” aboard the Lincoln, Cao said eight reported suicide attempts were instead “suicide mitigations.”

He dismissed concerns that sailors aboard U.S. ships were going hungry. Responding to Senate testimony that one sailor lost 45 pounds (20.4 kilograms) in six months “because of a lack of food,” Cao attributed it to pickiness, comparing it to “my kids opening the refrigerator door and saying there’s nothing to eat in here.”

For only the second time in twenty years, the U.S. Navy had no aircraft carrier strike group in the Pacific between August and November. The USS George Washington has returned to U.S. Pacific Fleet control, “conducting routine operations” in the Asia-Pacific region.

Professor Kevin Rowlands, journal editor at the Royal United Services Institute, told the Guardian that the “overstretch” facing the U.S. Navy is “critical but manageable—for now.”

“The real problems will emerge down the line if the war continues,” he said. “Every long deployment will have a knock-on effect on maintenance and personnel in the future.”

Naval planners follow a broad “rule of threes”: to keep one platform permanently deployed, a navy needs three ships.

“When one ship is deployed, another is preparing and training to replace it, and a third is in maintenance after returning. Effectively, you need at least three to maintain one on station permanently. So when something ‘new’ arises—such as the war against Iran—it disrupts planning and allocation everywhere else.”

For decades, the United States has enjoyed unrivaled naval preeminence, capable of projecting power worldwide. But China is catching up quickly. U.S. naval intelligence estimates China’s overall shipbuilding capacity is roughly 232 times greater than that of the United States. According to the World Defense Shipbuilding report, Chinese shipyards delivered more than twice the naval tonnage of U.S. yards across 2024 and 2025.

U.S. allies—including the nations of the first island chain off the Chinese mainland and Pacific partners such as Australia—“will always want U.S. ships available in their region,” Rowlands said.

“But in return, the United States expects its allies to share more of the burden it currently carries,” he continued. “The projection of naval power thus becomes a diplomatic negotiation, particularly when the United States views the world through a transactional lens.”

“With AUKUS, Indo-Pacific commitments, NATO obligations, and now the Middle East, the United States can just about manage—but there is zero spare capacity. That is why one thing going wrong has a negative impact everywhere. That, in essence, is the overstretch.”

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