Rhetoric emanating from the governments in Ankara and Jerusalem might suggest that Turkish and Israeli forces stand on the brink of military conflict.
Although analysts warn that the escalating regional rivalry and clash of strategic interests between the two nations—particularly in Syria—are genuine, and that the risk of an unintended confrontation remains, they maintain that neither country desires a war.
An Israeli strike on a Syrian military air base on August 18, which Israel stated was aimed at preventing Turkey from establishing a military presence, brought the risk of a clash into sharp focus. The following day, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack remarked that the strike carried a “real risk of rapid escalation into a direct military confrontation” involving Israel, Turkey, and Syria.
Why We Wrote This
Could the growing regional rivalry between Turkey and Israel lead to a military clash? A recent Israeli strike on an air base in northern Syria highlighted the two countries’ conflicting strategic interests, though analysts say neither seeks war.
Analysts note that the tensions reflect a broader strategic rivalry that has emerged as the war in Gaza reshaped the region, former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was deposed, and Iran—Mr. Assad’s benefactor—was weakened.
As a NATO member, Turkey seeks a stable, unified Syria where it can expand its influence and contain Kurdish armed groups it considers hostile. Meanwhile, Israel remains determined to preserve its freedom of operation in Syrian airspace and prevent a formidable Turkish military presence along its northern frontier.
“There is no love lost between the current Turkish and Israeli governments, and relations have deteriorated dramatically since the start of the Gaza war,” says Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, director of The Turkey Project at the Brookings Institution. “Turkey increasingly views itself as a guarantor of Palestinian rights, and the events in Gaza have deeply offended Turkish sensibilities across the political spectrum.”
Turkish Foreign Ministry/Reuters
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (at right) meets with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shaibani, in Ankara, Turkey, on Aug. 6, 2026.
The Israeli strike on the Abu al-Duhur air base in northern Syria “was a direct warning to Ankara that Israel intends to set boundaries around Turkey’s military presence in Syria,” Ms. Aydıntaşbaş says by email. “Israel does not appear to want Turkey to expand its bases or repair Syria’s existing military facilities.” She adds that this is part of Israel’s broader policy to keep its neighbors weak.
Turkey’s concerns “are almost the mirror image of that,” she notes. “Turkey desires a stable, territorially intact Syria capable of controlling its borders, integrating or containing Kurdish armed groups, and allowing refugees who fled during Syria’s civil war to return.”
“Ankara believes the Israeli government,” leveraging its relationships with minority groups such as the Druze, “is keen to keep Syria divided and decentralized” to ensure it remains weak.
Yet according to Professor Miri Shefer-Mossensohn, head of the Program in Ottoman and Turkish Studies at Tel Aviv University, Israel’s security concerns in Syria are not directed at Syria’s own armed forces.
“Although Syria is formally an enemy of Israel, its military power is virtually nonexistent,” she says. “There is no threat from Syria toward Israel. However, Turkey might pose a threat.”
Israel is also monitoring Turkey’s growing involvement in Palestinian affairs, Professor Shefer-Mossensohn says, fearing that Ankara is attempting to surround Israel as Iran did through its regional proxies. She explains that Turkey holds an official presence on U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza, which oversees reconstruction and maintains diplomatic, cultural, and humanitarian ties with Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem.
Syria’s Abu al-Duhur air base is shown following the Israeli attack in northwestern Syria on Aug. 18, 2026. An American envoy said the attack carried a “real risk of rapid escalation.”
The current Israeli-Turkish tensions are striking given how close the two countries once were.
Israel and Turkey have maintained a stormy relationship of love and hate over the years, explains Alon Liel, an international relations scholar and former chargé d’affaires at the Israeli Embassy in Ankara.
Diplomatic relations founded in March 1949 “were never broken,” he says. “For over 77 years,” he notes, “the ups and downs occurred entirely within the framework of diplomatic relations.”
Between 1992 and 2002, Turkey was one of Israel’s closest allies, with booming trade, culture, tourism, and military cooperation, Mr. Liel says. Relations deteriorated after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—who rose through the ranks of an Islamist party and was elected prime minister in 2002—and collapsed further when the war in Gaza began in October 2023. Turkey banned all trade with Israel in May 2024, sharply reducing economic ties and tourism.
The narrative regarding Turkey has since shifted, he says.
“The Israeli leadership is casting [now President] Erdoğan and Turkey as the new Iran, fostering a feeling inside Israel that the Turkish presence in Syria is at least as dangerous as the Iranian presence,” says Mr. Liel.
The current tensions between the two countries could “really bring about a military clash between the Turkish and Israeli armies,” he says.
Meanwhile, the lead-up to Israel’s October 27 election could prove to be a particularly sensitive period.
“[Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu has an incentive to project military strength—particularly since the Iran war is going nowhere and is viewed as unfinished business by the Israeli government,” says Ms. Aydıntaşbaş.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu votes in his Likud party primary elections ahead of Israel’s general election in October, in Jerusalem, on Aug. 17, 2026. The political season has exacerbated tensions with Turkey.
Ambassador Barrack has also suggested that some of the rhetoric between Mr. Netanyahu and President Erdoğan may be driven by domestic political calculations.
Nevertheless, neither country appears to want a direct confrontation, and outside powers have an interest in preventing one.
“The U.S. and potentially other NATO members, who do not want to see a NATO member clash with Israel, will help the two sides ease the tension between them. But effort is needed,” says Gallia Lindenstrauss, a senior research fellow at The Institute for National Security Studies who specializes in Turkish foreign policy.
Progress on the Palestinian issue could also help ease tensions, she adds.
“The Palestinian issue is a highly detrimental element in the Turkish attitude toward Israel. Therefore, any movement toward what Turkey perceives as the right direction will have a trickling effect on the bilateral relationship as well.”
For now, however, the fundamental dispute over Syria remains unresolved, says Ms. Aydıntaşbaş.
“The greatest danger is miscalculation rather than a deliberate decision to open another front,” she says. “If an Israeli strike were to kill Turkish soldiers, or if Turkish air defenses were to target an Israeli aircraft, both governments would face intense domestic pressure to respond.”
