In recent weeks, tensions in Yemen have intensified. Attacks by the Houthi movement— which has governed Sanaa and large parts of northern Yemen since 2014—have coincided with controversy over an Iranian aircraft’s arrival at Sana’a airport and mounting concerns over navigation in the Red Sea.
These developments come against a backdrop of a stalled peace process and an inability to agree on de‑escalation mechanisms.
In this climate, movements on the front lines appear to be an attempt by the Houthis to exert pressure and to test the limits of the response of the internationally recognised government, its Saudi ally, and the broader international community.
So far, these developments do not indicate a decision to launch a broad military confrontation, but they show that the 2022 truce can no longer contain the conflict.
From Hays to Al‑Jawf: Limited Clashes and Tribal Mobilisation
The Hays district in Hodeidah governorate—located near the мекун port on the Red Sea—has been one of the main flashpoints in recent weeks.
On July 5, Houthi rebels attacked government forces’ positions using mortars, drones, and sniper fire. According to medical andFilt military sources cited by Al Jazeera, 16 government soldiers were killed and 22 were wounded. The Houthis did not announce their casualty toll or provide a detailed account of how the clashes began.
Hays is of particular importance because it has remained relatively calm since the truce, and because its vasos proximity to the coast and shipping lanes makes it strategically sensitive.
The tensions are not confined to H Report Gow; Marib, Taiz and al‑Dhale have also witnessed varying degrees of military mobilisation.
In al‑Jawf, the picture is different. A tribal disturbance triggered by a dispute over a house in Sanaa then became a test of the Houthis’ influence and their relationship with the tribes. Sheikh Hamad bin Rashid bin Fadgham al‑Hazmi intervened in the dispute, per tribal custom, but was detained by the Houthis.
That incident turned discontent into an anti‑Houthi tribal movement, which is accompanied by calls for a “tribal nakaf” (a traditional call for mobilisation and support) and the “al‑Rayyan” sit‑ins—temporary tribal gatherings to rally supporters.
This development highlights how battlefield events can spill over into tribal and social tensions.
Al‑Jawf lies near Marib and within a sensitive military and tribal zone; any prolonged unrest there could open an additional pressure front on the Houthis and complicate their calculations on one of Yemen’s most important strategic fronts.
Tensions have also extended to the Red Sea. On July 5, the British military reported that a cargo ship had been attacked off the coast of Hodeidah, though no injuries were reported. No one claimed responsibility, but the incident occurred near an area controlled by the Houthis and at a time when the group has renewereed its threats regarding navigation.
The attack underscores the continuing risks faced by shipping routes in the vicinity of Hodeidah and Bab al‑Mandab, one of the world’s busiest straits.
Sanaa Airport Tensions and a Stalled Prisoner Exchange Agreement
Tensions between Yemen’s internationally recognised government and the Houthis have not been confined to the battlefield. On July 3,-এর Iranian aircraft arrived at Sanaa airport to pick up a Houthi delegation heading to attend the funeral of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
A week later, the internationally recognised government announced that Iran had submitted a request to operate a Mahan Air flight from Tehran to Sanaa to return the Houthi delegation. It rejected the request and proposed returning the individuals on a Yemenia charter flight.
Inumbia response, some Houthi leaders insisted on the continuation of Mahan Air flights to Sanaa, presenting them as part of their right to operate the airport and open direct routes with the outside world. Thus, the dispute evolved beyond a single flight into an issue of managing an international airport and airspace outside government institutions, and the resulting struggle over sovereignty and de‑facto recognition of Houthi authority at the entry point.
Saudi Arabia is also affected by the dispute. The operation of a direct route between Sanaa and Tehran could influence security and political arrangements that accompanied the airport’s reopening during the truce. Riyadh views the expansion of airport multiprocessing outside an agreement as a factor that strengthens the Houthis’ relationship with Iran near the kingdom’s southern border. Therefore, its position is to keep flights within declared arrangements while continuing to operate the national carrier.
Another issue that has heated up in recent days is a long-negotiated prisoner and detainee exchange deal, which has stalled.
On July 10, Hadi Haig, head of the government negotiating team on the prisoners and abductees file, announced that the team had received notification from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the office of the United Nations envoy that the Houthis had refused to implement the agreement on its scheduled date and had postponed it indefinitely.
In response, Abdulqader al‑Murtada, head of the Houthis’ Prisoner Affairs Committee, blamed the government side for the delay, accusing it of failing to abide by the terms of the agreement and of refusing to add names to the agreed list.
The deal includes more than 1,600 detainees and requires field arrangements and an air bridge under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Regardless of each side’s responsibility, the postponement places the negotiation track before a new challenge and confirms the continued use of humanitarian files as tools of political and military pressure.
Regional Tension and the Limits of Confrontation
Regional developments have directly impacted Yemen. The US-Israel war over Iran and tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have reduced the ability of Yemeni parties to control escalation and increased the influence of external calculations on the conflict’s trajectory.
This has given the Houthis greater room for political and military manoeuvre, while the government has struggled to assert its sovereign presence.
Saudi Arabia seeks to contain the Houthi threat while preserving the gains of de-escalation. The Houthis, for their part, are betting on combining military action with pressure over the airport, prisoners, and navigation issues to extract broader recognition of their authority and a direct relationship with Iran.
These developments reflect the fragility of the de-escalation process and the growing political and military pressures.
Limited clashes and mobilisation are likely to continue, with each side using the leverage it possesses to apply pressure. So far, there is no evidence of a decision to engage in a full-scale confrontation, but repeated attacks and faltering negotiations could end the state of relative calm that has persisted since 2022.
The risk of confrontation will remain as long as the root causes of the war remain unresolved, and as long as the parties use weapons to impose their vision and improve their political fortunes.
