Fiscal and Strategic Costs of Withdrawing US Troops from Europe

The Pentagon is nearing the end of a six‑month review of its overseas military posture and is reportedly weighing significant reductions in forces stationed in Europe. Removing U.S. troops from the continent carries several strategic risks, including a potential weakening of the extended nuclear deterrent, an adverse signal to Moscow, and a broader erosion of stability and security in a region that remains essential to American prosperity.

Equally important, the move would generate substantial fiscal pressure. Accommodating tens of thousands of displaced service members and their families within the United States would be logistically complex, time‑consuming, and costly. Moreover, the loss of European basing would raise the expense of projecting U.S. power, as facilities would need to be rebuilt or rented abroad.

In short, even if the strategic calculus were set aside, the financial burden of such a withdrawal would be untenable.

The Department of Defense is reviewing its posture in Europe, where roughly 80,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed. About 65,000 serve on three‑year tours with families, while some 15,000 rotate on nine‑month deployments without dependents. These rotational units were introduced after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine to bolster forward‑stationed forces and guarantee a continuous U.S. presence in NATO’s eastern member states that face the greatest Russian threat.

Last year the Pentagon ended a rotational infantry brigade of roughly 4,000 troops in Romania and southeastern Europe. Because the unit rotated regularly and did not include family members, the withdrawal was relatively straightforward.

Earlier this year the Defense Department sought to cancel a rotational armored brigade normally deployed to Poland and northeastern Europe. After Poland’s president intervened directly with President Donald Trump, the cancellation was reversed.

Soon after, internal plans emerged to slash U.S. forces in Europe further without the congressionally mandated study required for any reduction below 76,000 troops. Following the Poland episode, the Pentagon launched a more formal review process—expected to conclude in early November—to satisfy at least one of Congress’s procedural requirements.

Coordinating with allies is another prerequisite; in August the administration distributed a questionnaire to NATO partners seeking their views on U.S. basing and broader foreign policy. Coupled with the Pentagon’s recent solicitation for U.S. states to compete for hosting new bases—necessary if thousands of troops and their families are relocated from Europe—this suggests that substantial reductions are not only possible but probable.

Cost Imposition

Removing forces from Europe would impose several direct costs on American taxpayers.

Geopolitically, a major drawdown at a time when Russia’s war in Ukraine continues and its hybrid aggression against the West intensifies would likely embolden Moscow to further destabilize Europe. A weakened Europe—still America’s most critical trade and investment partner—would ultimately harm the economic well‑being of ordinary Americans.

Beyond the geopolitical stakes, there are concrete financial outlays. Historical data from the Pentagon’s expansion of Fort Bliss between 2005 and 2011—built to house an extra 25,000 troops—suggest that constructing facilities for 15,000 to 25,000 additional service members and their families would cost at least $8 billion in today’s dollars.

Moreover, relinquishing European bases would deprive the United States of cost‑effective facilities that currently enable cheaper power projection.

Consider the recent strikes on Iran. A round‑trip mission from the United States takes roughly 36 hours, whereas launching from the United Kingdom cuts the flight time to about 15 hours. Operating a B‑1 bomber costs $97,600 per hour and a B‑52 $66,700 per hour, meaning each sortie from the UK saves $2.05 million (B‑1) or $1.4 million (B‑52). By early April, the U.S. had carried out 62 attacks on Iran; only 18 originated from North America. Assuming the remaining sorties launched from Europe, American taxpayers saved roughly $75 million in the war’s first five weeks alone thanks to European basing.

Shifting assets from Europe to the Pacific could be strategically rational, but doing so today would expose the alliance to heightened Russian risk and jeopardize a region that underpins U.S. prosperity. The fiscal trade‑off is equally stark; abandoning European bases would raise defense spending at a time when the national debt is already at historic levels.

John R. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a nonresident senior fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own.

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