When Iran’s top officials and senior military commanders gathered for the week‑long funeral of the late supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which opened on Friday, they intended to project strength and unity after the recent conflict with the United States and Israel.

A military band performed the national anthem, and senior figures—President Masoud Pezeshkian, parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the head of the judiciary and leading Revolutionary Guards generals—walked side‑by‑side publicly for the first time since hostilities began months earlier.

Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father as the new supreme leader, did not appear, remaining out of public view since his appointment in March.

The brief unity provided a break from the intense public disputes over negotiations with the United States that have dominated recent weeks. Senior officials and political figures have exchanged harsh accusations, including claims of delusion, treason, coup plotting and attempts to manipulate the new supreme leader.

“I spit on this era where they kill our leader and then we speak of peace with the United States,” said Hassan Rahimpour‑Azghadi, a well‑known hard‑line strategist, at a rally in Tehran. He called for revenge rather than negotiations.

Ayatollah Khamenei attempted to calm the uproar with a carefully worded written statement, but the move only intensified anger. Hard‑line supporters have been chanting at nightly rallies that they will cease their protests only if the supreme leader appears in public or releases an audio message.

He has yet to show himself or issue an audio, and it is unclear whether Ayatollah Khamenei, aged 56, will appear at any of his father’s funeral events. He missed a memorial service in Tehran on Wednesday for his wife, their teenage son and other relatives, who were killed on the first day of the war when Israeli and U.S. forces struck the family compound.

Funeral organizers have framed the ceremonies as a farewell to the deceased leader and a pledge of loyalty to his son.

Two members of the Revolutionary Guards and a funeral‑planning official report that Ayatollah Khamenei has told officials he wishes to take part, including attending the burial at the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad on July 9 and reciting the death prayer. In his first public statement after assuming power in March, he said he had viewed his father’s body.

All the Iranians involved declined to be named, citing restrictions on discussing funeral details. They said security officials have so far blocked the plan, fearing Israel might attempt an assassination during the ceremony or trace his location to his hidden whereabouts.

Fractures Among Conservatives

Ayatollah Khamenei’s continued absence has sparked speculation about who truly governs the country and allowed previously hidden rifts to surface openly.

Last week, parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—who has been leading negotiations with the United States and become a central political figure—was abruptly cut off and removed from a live broadcast while detailing the cease‑fire agreement.

The incident triggered a firestorm, prompting calls for the dismissal of the state broadcasting director, who was appointed by the senior Khamenei and originates from the ultra‑hardline faction.

State television has for months amplified attacks on the negotiating team, and nightly rallies in Tehran’s squares have featured conservatives demanding the prosecution and even execution of the negotiators.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, also a participant in the talks, faced heckling by Iranian pilgrims chanting “death to appeasers” while visiting a Shia shrine in Iraq, where he was coordinating part of the funeral, according to video footage.

Foad Izadi, a prominent hard‑line analyst, described the government and Mr. Ghalibaf’s negotiating team as “stupid with no brains” and “deluded” during a recent state‑television appearance.

Iran’s political landscape has long featured fierce rivalries, traditionally between conservative and reformist factions. Conservatives cling to the Islamic revolution’s anti‑Western ideology, while reformists aim—often unsuccessfully—to introduce change.

With the death of the senior supreme leader, who previously held decisive authority, conservatives have divided. A pragmatic wing—comprising senior Revolutionary Guards generals, Speaker Ghalibaf, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council chief General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr—argues that survival demands ending the conflict with the United States and opening the economy. A smaller hard‑line faction, however, rejects any concessions—including on the nuclear program—and believes Iran can win by continuing the war.

According to four senior officials and two Revolutionary Guards members, the visible splits merely hint at deeper internal fractures. Both sides are engaged in a fierce struggle to claim the new ayatollah as an ally and to shape Iran’s political direction.

The pragmatic camp—comprising senior Revolutionary Guards generals, Speaker Ghalibaf, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council chief General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr—has so far held sway. They have set aside the hostile rhetoric to approve a cease‑fire, negotiate directly with U.S. Vice President JD Vance and finalize an agreement with President Trump.

Hard‑liners oppose the deal, Iranian officials say, because they view the negotiations as extending beyond the 2015 nuclear agreement and potentially enabling broader rapprochement after 47 years of hostility.

“We want a grand bargain that removes the threat of war and lets us prosper economically,” said Mehdi Rahmati, an analyst linked to the Iranian government. “People simply want to live.”

President Pezeshkian recently stated that Ayatollah Khamenei had endorsed the diplomatic outreach to the United States and that he refuses “to bend to the will of a minority.”

Analysts note that even a decisive declaration of victory remains elusive, as talks have stalled, President Trump has threatened a return to conflict and limited retaliatory strikes have occurred. Hard‑liners use these events to argue that trusting the United States is naïve and that the supreme leader, being no fool, could not have endorsed the outreach.

Mahmoud Nabavian, a hard‑line cleric and member of parliament, posted on social media asking, “Is a coup underway?” Meanwhile, fellow hard‑liner Kamran Ghazanfari claimed in a video that the government was closing Parliament and bribing citizens to stay home, preventing legislators from opposing what he called a “semi‑coup” against the supreme leader.

Since the war erupted, generals in the Revolutionary Guards have taken firm control, de facto governing the country. The shift from the father’s absolute authority to a more collective model is highlighted by Vice President Mohammad‑Jafar Ghaempanah, who recently observed that the new supreme leader no longer has sole decision‑making power.

He argued that the ayatollah’s views should be treated like those of other officials, subject to debate and deliberation. “If we are supposed to only implement the supreme leader’s opinions, then why do we have a Parliament and a national security council?” he asked during a speech to senior officials.

Such pronouncements would have been inconceivable under the previous supreme leader.

Ruling in absentia

Ayatollah Khamenei’s continued invisibility and inability to quell the fighting have sparked doubts among Iranian political circles about the long‑term viability of his rule while absent, senior officials say.

His most significant challenge to date has been managing the negotiations with the United States.

During the final stages of the talks, when Ayatollah Khamenei hesitated to endorse a preliminary cease‑fire, President Pezeshkian met with him, according to officials familiar with the meeting. The president warned that the economy was collapsing, the U.S. naval blockade was devastating Iran, and he would resign if the agreement was rejected.

Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemati wrote to Ayatollah Khamenei warning of a severe budget crisis and predicting that essential food and medical supplies would be depleted by the end of August if the naval blockade continued. Hemati’s letter noted that Iran could not sell its oil or establish alternative trade routes at the required scale.

According to the four officials, these messages were decisive in persuading Ayatollah Khamenei to support the agreement. In a terse public statement, he declared that although he opposed the deal “on principle,” he would let the president proceed if the Supreme National Security Council approved it. The Council voted 12‑1 in favor, President Pezeshkian noted.

Following the funeral, Ayatollah Khamenei will need to appoint key figures to lead the judiciary, state broadcasting, the Basij militia and serve as his chief of staff. Iranian officials say these appointments will reveal his political alignment. The Revolutionary Guards and Speaker Ghalibaf have been among his strongest supporters, whereas the hard‑line faction promoted a rival candidate.

“We are witnessing real, tense politics and a battle for the country’s future,” said Vali Nasr, an Iran specialist and professor at Johns Hopkins University. “If the pragmatists gain the upper hand, hard‑liners will be pushed to the margins, and they are resisting that.”



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