Gulf Arab States Diversify Security Alliances Away from U.S. Amid Growing Doubts

The land and skies over the Persian Gulf have become international: British and French warplanes overhead; Pakistani, Turkish, and Italian troops on the ground; Ukrainian interceptor drones and South Korean air-defense batteries at the ready.

As the United States reportedly warns its regional allies it might escalate its war against Iran shortly after midterm elections – for the Gulf Arab states, a “nightmare scenario” dragging them back into conflict – those allies are turning to an alternative for their defense: middle powers. A growing network of such powers from the Middle East, Europe, and Asia is coming to the Persian Gulf to bolster regional defenses and intensify diplomacy with Tehran.

The development coincides with a longer-term U.S. military withdrawal from the Gulf, damage to U.S. bases from Iranian missiles, and diminished interceptor stockpiles that have left U.S. allies questioning America’s reliability.

The Iran war has exposed Gulf states’ vulnerabilities through their reliance on expensive defenses to counter cheap Iranian drones, lack of domestic production of interceptors or munitions, and dependence on a U.S. whose priorities are diverging from their own.

“The conflict has made diversification more urgent by demonstrating the risks of depending too heavily on any single security partner,” says Abdulaziz Sager, political analyst and chairman of the Gulf Research Center in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

These new security partners might not be able to replace America yet. But Gulf officials and observers say Arab states are turning to these non-U.S. allies to weather war today and pave the way to take care of their own defenses tomorrow, offering a glimpse of what a future Middle East might look like.

Mutual defense

For some Gulf states, reaching out to diverse allies since the start of the war has paid off.

In the wake of Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, ports, and residential areas in October, British and French warplanes have come to the aid of Saudi Arabia. The Mecca Pact, a mutual defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed in August, which considers an attack on one party an attack on all, was also triggered.

This month, Turkey and Pakistan dispatched troops, advisers, and anti-drone defense systems to Saudi Arabia and to Aden in Yemen, and Egypt’s Parliament approved sending troops to the kingdom.

SPA/AP

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman greets French President Emmanuel Macron in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Oct. 21, 2026.

South Korea sent emergency missile resupplies to the United Arab Emirates for its Cheongung-II batteries deployed there to knock down Iranian missiles and drones this past spring. French, British, and Italian forces have been deployed to Bahrain and Qatar.

The middle powers have become an obvious solution, observers say.

“They offer cheaper weapons, faster innovation, technology transfer, and local production,” says Hesham Alghannam, a Saudi political analyst and Carnegie Middle East scholar based in Riyadh. “Diversification makes Gulf security more sustainable and less dependent on Washington’s decisions.”

The U.S. is meanwhile viewed in Gulf capitals increasingly as ineffective, both militarily and diplomatically.

America is sending an additional Patriot system to Israel to beef up its defenses ahead of returning to war, The Wall Street Journal reported this week. Yet observers and multiple Gulf officials tell the Monitor that, to their knowledge, no similar enhancing of U.S. missile-defense systems has been provided to Gulf allies, who have absorbed the brunt of the Iranian military response since the conflict began Feb. 28.

“There is a deep-seated frustration with the U.S. not only for failing to heed Gulf advice, but de-prioritizing the defense and readiness of Gulf states compared to the American commitment to the defense and strategic depth of Israel,” says Hasan Alhasan, senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Manama, Bahrain.

For Gulf states, the smaller middle powers have also been more credible security partners than China, the world’s largest military and greatest single buyer of their oil, because of “military compatibility, strategic trust, and their relationship with Iran,” Dr. Alghannam says.

Russia, meanwhile, is viewed as bogged down in its war with Ukraine and having outdated military hardware, Saudi and Emirati officials have told the Monitor. Russia’s support for Iran has also deepened Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s unwillingness to partner with Moscow.

Gulf-made armaments

The emerging alliances are about more than just defense.

After spending several hundred billion dollars collectively on U.S. arms and defense systems since 2000, the goal is to have interceptors, missiles, and munitions made by Gulf states for Gulf states.

The Mecca Pact is built around the transfer of Turkish and Pakistani defense technology to Saudi Arabia, with Turkish firm Baykar planning to open factories to build unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, in the kingdom. Last week, Qatar signed a defense industry agreement with Indonesia, Turkey, and Pakistan.

Under the agreement, Turkey would provide technological expertise – including on radar systems, electronic warfare suites, rockets, and anti-drone UAVs. Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capability, while Qatar would provide investment and purchase production, with an eye to opening a defense industry hub in Doha.

In all these arrangements, Gulf states bring financing.

It is a move, observers say, toward greater Gulf independence that, in the long term, would replace the American security umbrella.

“The goal is to make American protection valuable but increasingly less indispensable,” says Dr. Alghannam, phasing out dependence on the U.S. military “without replacing one foreign dependency with another.”

“Saudi Arabia’s interest is in widening its options without creating another exclusive dependency,” Dr. Sager of the Gulf Research Center adds.

Range of alliances

Decision-makers in Riyadh and elsewhere in the Gulf view these defense alliances with similarly sized and vulnerable middle powers as partnerships of equals, a more mutual dynamic than the hegemon-junior-partner relationship that has dominated the region since World War II.

Chris Jung/NurPhoto/AP

Vehicles carrying an L-SAM (long-range, surface-to-air missile) launcher and a Cheongung-II medium-range surface-to-air missile launcher are displayed at an Armed Forces Day event in Gyeryong, South Korea, Sept. 29, 2026. Cheongung-II batteries were deployed this year to the United Arab Emirates to knock down Iranian missiles and drones.

“Shared exposure to disrupted trade, energy insecurity, and military escalation can encourage more practical cooperation,” notes Dr. Sager. However, the true test is whether these allies “consult seriously, respond during a crisis, and support de-escalation.”

The U.S. withdrawal, however, is leaving each Gulf state to pursue its own network of alliances: Saudi Arabia is strengthening ties with Turkey, while the UAE cements ties with Israel and South Korea.

“The Gulf states are not coming together to enhance collective deterrence,” Dr. Alhasan says. “We are seeing a range of alliances and strategies play out,” further dividing Gulf neighbors.

Observers and officials agree that these patchwork alliances cannot replace superior U.S. firepower, intelligence, and presence – for now.

“I think a further round of hostilities will most certainly be a very strong test of these new relationships,” Dr. Alhasan says, and “what they can actually bring to the table.”

And the race against time continues for Gulf states to bring these alliances’ effectiveness as close as possible to that of the deteriorating U.S. security umbrella.

“No partnership can fully insulate the Gulf from the consequences of another major escalation,” Dr. Sager warns.

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