InSight Take: Criminal Networks Embrace Advanced Drone-IED Technology in Regional Conflicts

Organized crime organizations throughout Latin America are transforming commercial drones into weapons, attaching improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to target rival factions, law enforcement, and civilian populations. From the Jalisco New Generation Cartel’s (CJNG) specialized drone unit in Mexico to gang violence in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas and National Liberation Army (ELN) surveillance operations in Colombia, InSight Crime co-director Jeremy McDermott joins Deborah Bonello to examine whether regional governments can match the pace of this escalating threat.

Deborah: [00:00:00] On August 17th, the United States and Mexico signed a declaration of intent to deepen bilateral cooperation on drone and counter-drone technology. Under the agreement, Washington will provide Mexico’s Ministry of National Defense with access to the US Army’s digital marketplace, enabling the acquisition of unmanned aerial systems and counter-drone equipment. According to Mexican media reports, this marks the first time the Pentagon has authorized the sale of drone technology to Mexico specifically for use against organized crime.

Deborah: [00:00:33] This agreement emerges against a backdrop of escalating drone warfare in the region. The Jalisco cartel has developed a dedicated drone unit that has deployed IEDs against both rival organizations and security forces for several years. Nationwide, IED seizures in Mexico surged from just three devices in 2020 to over 1,300 in 2022. In Colombia, illegal drone attacks increased from 38 to 149 within a single year. The central question for today’s discussion: What objectives is transnational organized crime pursuing through its use of drones and IEDs, and what countermeasures are regional governments implementing?

Deborah: [00:01:16] I’m Deborah Bonello, joined by our co-director Jeremy McDermott for this week’s InSight Take. Jerry, thank you for participating.

Jeremy: [00:01:24] Thank you, Deb. When people discuss drones today, attention immediately turns to Ukraine and the waves of unmanned systems that have fundamentally altered conventional warfare. However, in Latin America, a quieter conflict is unfolding involving the application of drones and sophisticated explosive capabilities. Our task is to analyze and clarify these developments.

Is the Use of Drones and IEDs in Latin America’s Crime Wars New?

Deborah: [00:01:51] Your comparison to Ukraine is illuminating. Ukraine is engaged in an active war, while Latin America’s situation differs. Is the deployment of drones and IEDs a recent phenomenon in the region?

Jeremy: [00:02:08] Not at all, Deb. This represents the latest chapter in an ongoing narrative. To provide context, consider the technological and tactical evolution that has brought us to this point. During the era of Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel, the cartel recruited specialists from the Basque separatist organization ETA to instruct operatives in explosives manufacturing and deployment. Escobar weaponized this expertise to conduct acts of terrorism in their most elemental form—terrorizing the Colombian populace and coercing governmental concessions. His strategy succeeded in the short term: extradition was eliminated, he constructed a private prison, surrendered himself to that facility, and continued directing the Medellín cartel’s operations from within. While his sicarios and targeted assassinations of politicians, judges, and police officers are widely documented, the most potent instrument he employed to destabilize the Colombian government was explosive ordnance.

Jeremy: [00:03:21] Several attacks remain emblematic. The Avianca flight bombing resulted in the deaths of 110 passengers and three individuals on the ground. The assault on the DAS (Colombia’s secret police headquarters) involved a massive vehicle-borne explosive that devastated a high-rise structure, killing 63 and injuring hundreds. In Medellín itself, Escobar orchestrated hundreds of IED detonations.

Jeremy: [00:04:19] Advancing the timeline, I covered the trial of the “Colombia Three”—IRA operatives who traveled to Colombia to instruct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas in explosive techniques. This training enabled the construction of mortars, vehicle-borne explosives, and roadside IEDs that significantly altered Colombia’s civil conflict’s trajectory. The FARC simultaneously ranked among the world’s largest drug trafficking organizations.

Jeremy: [00:04:55] The pattern is consistent, Deb: across every conceivable domain, organized crime has leveraged its substantial resources to acquire any advantage—whether encrypted communications, sophisticated legal representation, accountants establishing shell companies, computer programming capabilities, or cryptocurrency. The current situation represents another dimension of this strategy. Transnational criminal organizations are deploying military-grade weaponry and technology to protect their operations and resist state intervention.

How Sophisticated is Organized Crime’s Drone Technology?

Deborah: [00:05:48] Returning to the Escobar era raises two questions. First, contemporary cartel conflicts don’t appear to employ the same scale of public terrorism. Am I mistaken? Second, when we reference “cartel drones,” the public likely imagines relatively unsophisticated devices. Does this characterization remain accurate for the region?

Jeremy: [00:06:18] That assessment no longer holds. Regarding the Jalisco cartel in Mexico, which has deployed drones with notable effectiveness, they are not manufacturing their own platforms. However, they are acquiring the most advanced commercial drone technology available and modifying it with remarkable efficiency and speed. The Jalisco Cartel has established a specialized drone unit, as you noted, which has operated across Michoacán, Guanajuato, Chihuahua, Jalisco, and Baja California. Their deployments have included bombing buildings, attacking police in fixed positions and vehicles, and even striking a military helicopter using combined gunfire and drone-delivered explosives. In April of the previous year, drone attacks in Michoacán employed chemical agents designed to induce respiratory distress in residents. This represents innovative—frighteningly innovative—application of open-source technology for criminal purposes. These are not crude devices.

Deborah: [00:07:58] Correct. The contrast with Escobar’s era involves scale: today’s approach involves sustained, gradual attrition against communities rather than spectacular attacks on commercial aviation. However, this phenomenon extends beyond Mexico.

Jeremy: [00:08:26] Colombia provides another critical example, with virtually all major armed groups utilizing drones. The National Liberation Army (ELN) employs drones most consistently and appears to have achieved another technological advancement: thermal imaging capabilities enabling nighttime operations. While primarily utilized for surveillance, this capability could facilitate nocturnal explosive delivery. The ELN’s approach reflects insurgent methodology supporting territorial control. We discussed this previously regarding President Abelardo de la Espriella, who assumed office in early August. The ELN’s drone utilization differs from Mexico’s approach, more closely resembling civil conflict dynamics—even as President de la Espriella disputes the characterization of Colombia as being in civil conflict. Mexico and Colombia illustrate fundamentally different applications, scales, and consistencies of drone and IED deployment.

Deborah: [00:10:08] What about Brazil? Beyond increased criminal utilization, there appears to be a more pronounced governmental response.

Jeremy: [00:10:21] Brazil’s two principal criminal organizations—the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Red Command—operate drones primarily over Rio de Janeiro’s favelas and São Paulo neighborhoods. Their utilization centers on intelligence gathering, functioning as early warning systems for police operations and mapping security force routines. Weaponization has also occurred: an explosive was dropped on a residence in Rio during a dispute between the Red Command and the Third Pure Command. Reports indicate drones were deployed against militia members and rivals in Rio as recently as July, in operations to expand or defend territorial control.

Jeremy: [00:11:40] While Brazilian criminal organizations primarily employ drones for intelligence, surveillance, and monitoring security force patterns, regional applications include drone operations around prisons to transport contraband and facilitate communication with incarcerated leadership. In Ecuador, criminal organizations have deployed fixed cameras alongside drones for territorial control and security force monitoring. The three principal nations—Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil—demonstrate distinct applications of this technology.

What Are Governments Doing to Address Drones and Explosive Use by Criminal Groups?

Deborah: [00:12:44] Given that organized crime typically maintains a technological advantage, what governmental responses are emerging? What is Colombia implementing to address this challenge?

Jeremy: [00:13:09] Colombia has demonstrated the greatest ambition and resource commitment. Regardless of whether the civil conflict characterization is accepted, the country is essentially in a state of war. Colombia has adopted what might be termed a conventional military approach, announcing a nearly $1.7 billion program called the “Escudo Nacional Anti-Drones” (National Anti-Drone Shield), implemented through the military with specialized units. The strategy includes targeting bomb and drone manufacturers within illegal armed groups, while also addressing supply chains through customs enforcement, postal services, and airport security. This substantial investment reflects the integration of drones into Colombia’s regular battlefield environment, necessitating a permanent, systematic response.

Deborah: [00:14:52] The financial scale is difficult to conceptualize, but this represents a massive infrastructure investment for a threat that was relatively marginal just 18 months ago. Your assessment?

Jeremy: [00:15:13] The threat trajectory is unmistakably upward. According to ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), documented drone attacks increased from 12 to 41 in one year, following a previous increase from 38 to 149. Military forces are sustaining casualties, and they are responding accordingly. This represents a battlefield transformation requiring both defensive and offensive adaptation. Beyond defensive measures, Colombia is systematically employing drones for surveillance operations.

Deborah: [00:16:11] Colombia’s security force evolution over five decades has mirrored its civil conflict dynamics, whether officially acknowledged or not. Is Colombia better positioned than Mexico to address this challenge?

Jeremy: [00:16:33] Colombia has clearly prioritized this issue, integrating anti-drone measures into its national security strategy. This extends beyond counter-criminal operations to represent a permanent element of their military portfolio. Mexico faces a distinct threat profile. Following President Felipe Calderón’s deployment of military forces against cartels in 2006, a process often described as “criminal insurgency” emerged. The cartels responded with increasing militarization, and drones and IEDs represent another front in this ongoing conflict. While Mexican cartels, with Jalisco as a notable exception, generally avoid direct confrontation with security forces, they have access to substantial resources. As you noted, the recent US agreement demonstrates Mexico’s prioritization of this issue.

Deborah: [00:18:26] This arms race traces back to the arrival of the Zetas and the subsequent escalation in cartel-government confrontations. However, a consistent pattern emerges: the state develops countermeasures, and criminal actors develop workarounds. We’ve witnessed this with border security and militarization. Drones will follow the same trajectory.

Jeremy: [00:19:05] While Mexico isn’t adopting Colombia’s militarized anti-drone response, they’re pursuing legal countermeasures. New legislation imposes substantial prison sentences for individuals convicted of manufacturing or deploying explosives and drones, with enhanced penalties even for surveillance use, as it demonstrates premeditation in robberies or kidnappings. Whether this serves as an effective deterrent remains uncertain, but Mexico isn’t inactive.

Will Governments’ Anti-Drone Efforts Work?

Deborah: [00:19:59] We’re observing varied governmental approaches. Are these efforts proving effective, or is it premature to evaluate?

Jeremy: [00:20:16] The fundamental challenge, Deb, is that this represents a moving target. Drone technology continues advancing, commercial availability is expanding, and legitimate applications—Amazon’s delivery pilot programs, for instance—are proliferating. Like artificial intelligence, this technology has its own developmental momentum. Criminal organizations are monitoring this evolution and identifying applications for their operations.

Jeremy: [00:21:12] Financial resources pose minimal constraints for criminal organizations. Advanced, powerful drones are commercially available for approximately one thousand dollars. These platforms can be modified for diverse applications—thermal imaging for surveillance or explosive payloads for weaponization. Knowledge transfer has become remarkably accessible. Technical expertise no longer requires battlefield experience; YouTube provides sufficient instruction.

Deborah: [00:22:03] This represents the current operational environment. We’ve examined three governments implementing distinct approaches, all confronting adaptive criminal organizations. How optimistic are you regarding the future of this technological dimension in regional criminal conflicts?

Jeremy: [00:22:33] I acknowledge I tend toward pessimism in these discussions. Optimism is challenging. The drone phenomenon extends beyond sophisticated organizations like CJNG and ELN—it’s becoming commonplace. Smaller Mexican groups, including Carteles Unidos and Los Ardillos, have demonstrated drone capabilities. The barrier to entry has降至 to possessing an Amazon account and internet access. This technology isn’t exclusively employed by groups with national strategies for confronting the state; smaller gangs utilize drones for territorial defense. This proliferation makes it increasingly difficult for Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico to maintain pace.

Jeremy: [00:23:59] The only comprehensive approach—banning all drone usage—remains impractical given legitimate commercial and industrial applications. Legal businesses continue exploring drone technology. Governments are essentially constrained from the outset. Containing this problem appears unrealistic, let alone dismantling the drone-IED infrastructure that sophisticated organizations are developing and deploying with increasing precision.

Deborah: [00:25:00] Expanding the perspective, we’ve discussed the Shield of the Americas strategy extensively this year—a broad but operationally vague initiative from the Trump administration that regional governments are increasingly aligning with, evidenced by SOUTHCOM vessel strikes, Ecuador’s bilateral agreements, and Colombia’s participation under President de la Espriella. Do programs like Colombia’s National Anti-Drone Shield or Mexico’s legal penalties represent local implementations of this broader strategy, or are these independent national initiatives with more specific objectives?

Jeremy: [00:26:11] Washington can effectively utilize the Shield of the Americas initiative to present a menu of options—primarily military in nature, reflecting available capabilities. This approach provides technology, expertise, and strategic frameworks for confronting the technological dimensions of organized crime. However, this shouldn’t be presented as the sole viable approach. Consider Colombia’s armed groups: the Gaitanistas (Clan del Golfo) field approximately 10,000 members, the ELN approximately 7,000, with similar numbers for FARC dissidents. These are paramilitary structures, particularly the ELN. Military engagement may prove effective against certain organizations. However, approximately 95% of Mexican criminal groups don’t operate in uniform or from military installations. These are civilians who emerge unexpectedly—often from motorcycles—deploy drones, and disappear. This phenomenon doesn’t lend itself to conventional military strategy, and militarization may prove counterproductive.

Jeremy: [00:28:27] It’s important to recognize that IEDs have historically targeted military and police forces. Increased military and police presence in sustained operations provides predictable targets for IED deployment. The collateral consequences of militarized responses are well-documented. My reservation isn’t that this approach is entirely incorrect—international cooperation, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer are valuable. However, this particular problem, like others we’ve examined, requires more comprehensive solutions. We need to address political, social, and economic dimensions, including social media platforms where these groups recruit operators and share technical knowledge. While we risk repetition, Deb, the military represents a blunt instrument that may achieve short-term tactical successes against transnational organized crime but cannot secure strategic victory—even on the drone dimension specifically.

Deborah: [00:30:05] There’s significant thematic repetition in our analysis, but it warrants emphasis. Even if Colombia’s anti-drone strategy achieves its objectives, Mexico prosecutes drone operators, and Brazil maintains localized responses, these represent merely one front in the broader organized crime-state conflict. Targeting drones doesn’t address the underlying conditions—financial resources and territorial control—that enable these drone programs to exist.

Jeremy: [00:30:44] First, we won’t secure victory in the drone dimension against transnational organized crime. Second, even if we did, would this meaningfully impact the broader struggle? Or would it merely neutralize one tool among many that criminal organizations employ to protect and facilitate their operations? The focus should remain on addressing root causes rather than assuming that tactical victories in isolated domains will fundamentally alter the strategic landscape.

Deborah: [00:31:23] This presents a sobering but accurate assessment.

Jeremy: [00:31:29] Indeed.

Deborah: [00:31:29] Thank you, Jerry, for your participation. You’ve watched The InSight Take, our weekly video analysis examining the region’s most significant organized crime developments. Content is available on our website’s multimedia section, YouTube, and Spotify. For topic suggestions, contact us at flagship@insightcrime.org. We’ll return next week with another InSight Take.

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