Kim Jong Un’s Calculus Shifts: Why North Korea Sees Limited Value in a US Deal

Last month, US President Donald Trump revived a charm offensive toward Pyongyang, significantly reducing joint US‑South Korean military drills and lavishing praise on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump remarked that the North Korean dictator “has always treated me with great respect.”

North Korea’s reaction to Trump’s overtures has been far less enthusiastic, encompassing missile launches and public denials of Trump’s assertions that Kim has responded “very positively” to a request for dialogue.

This week, as the United States, South Korea, and Japan began a five‑day military exercise, there was no indication from Washington of a further pullback, nor any visible diplomatic progress with Pyongyang.

Instead, Kim commissioned a naval destroyer on Monday, reiterating that North Korea must build a “powerful and reliable nuclear war deterrent” and bolster its “maritime defense.” He added that the country would soon unveil a “significant” naval advancement.

Why a new Russia-North Korea road bridge worries Ukraine

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video

No urgency for deal with US

Unlike the summit diplomacy of Trump’s first term, Kim’s dismissive stance comes at a time when North Korea possesses alternatives to a grand bargain with the United States.

“There is no longer the same sense of urgency in Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table with Washington,” said Joon Ha Park, a Seoul‑based correspondent for Korea Risk Group, speaking to DW.

“North Korea now enjoys a treaty‑based alliance with Moscow and is drawing closer to Beijing, while its military capabilities have expanded considerably. That’s why a single reduction in ROK‑US military exercises is not enough for Pyongyang to be swayed,” he added, referring to the joint security ties between South Korea and the United States.

Kim rides high

Park agrees that Kim is arguably in his strongest position since assuming power in 2011.

Six years ago, amid crippling sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic, an emotional Kim stood at the lectern marking the 75th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party and expressed regret for having failed the North Korean people.

Fast forward to today, and North Korea’s economy appears to be on a sturdier footing. Estimates released last year by South Korea’s central bank showed the economy grew by 3.7% in 2024, its fastest expansion in eight years.

South Korea proposes talks to officially end war with North

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video

Kim has drawn North Korea closer to Russia and China than at any point in recent history. This week, both Moscow and Beijing sent messages commemorating the country’s 78th founding anniversary and extolling the strategic importance of their deepening partnerships with Pyongyang.

Kim’s recent string of good fortune began in 2023 after a summit with Vladimir Putin in Russia’s Far East. The meeting paved the way for North Korea to supply arms to assist Russia in its war against Ukraine, with Moscow reciprocating by sending aid.

Since then, Pyongyang has dramatically accelerated industrial military production, buoyed by fresh financing that circumvents international sanctions.

Beijing responds to the Russia‑North Korea alliance

China, North Korea’s traditional benefactor, quickly took note of the growing alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang, but initially kept its distance.

“The war in Ukraine has opened a crucial lifeline for the North Korean regime, delivering weapons, ammunition and soldiers to Russia in exchange for cash, food, and ostensibly advanced military technology,” said Alexander Lipke, a policy fellow with the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), speaking to DW.

“These warming ties with Russia have also alarmed China, which is likewise seeking to cement its position as Pyongyang’s preeminent partner,” he added.

By 2025, Russia and North Korea’s increasingly close relationship compelled Beijing to pivot and showcase its leading role among the three nations. In September of that year, Kim was invited to Beijing’s “Victory Day” celebrations and, for the first time, stood publicly on stage alongside President Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

For a regime known for its international isolation, Kim standing shoulder‑to‑shoulder with the leaders of Russia and China was a major milestone. The same occurred in June 2026 when Xi Jinping made his first foreign trip of the year to Pyongyang.

Why North Korea is now Europe’s problem

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video

Denuclearization off the table?

Notably, any reference to “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was omitted from communiqués following these high‑level meetings, despite the phrase previously being standard diplomatic language from Beijing and Moscow.

This diplomatic softening comes as North Korea aggressively expands its nuclear program. In February 2026, Kim declared that North Korea’s status as a nuclear‑weapon state was “irreversible” and called for the country’s nuclear force to be enlarged. Recent satellite‑imagery analysis indicates heightened activity at known North Korean nuclear facilities.

Pyongyang has also insisted that the United States recognize it as a nuclear‑weapon state as a precondition for any talks with Washington, while emphasizing that any future summits must omit language on “denuclearization.”

North Korea is estimated to possess nearly 60 nuclear warheads, double the 20‑30 warheads Pyongyang is thought to have had during Trump’s last diplomatic episode with Kim in 2018‑2019.

“North Korea is no longer seeking talks centered on denuclearization or even traditional arms control. It increasingly wants recognition, implicitly or otherwise, as a nuclear‑weapon state,” said Park from the Korea Risk Group.

He added that any Trump summit that does not include denuclearization as part of the official agenda “could be portrayed by Pyongyang both domestically and internationally as an implicit US acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status.”

What lessons is North Korea learning from the Iran war?

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video

Sanctions don’t matter anymore?

Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has been subject to a stringent sanctions regime, with the United Nations Security Council adopting nine sanctions resolutions aimed at restricting exports and freezing assets.

The final package was adopted in 2017. At that time, it was coupled with pressure and fiery rhetoric from the first Trump administration, heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Kim was under severe economic pressure and sought sanctions relief in exchange for concessions on his nuclear program. That moment has now long passed.

“North Korea’s diplomatic situation has vastly improved, reducing the pressure to come to the table to cut a deal with the United States,” said Lipke, adding that “independent sanctions enforcement has largely collapsed,” as Russia and China no longer actively pursue their non‑proliferation stance of previous decades.

Lipke said North Korea no longer requires a bargain with the United States concerning sanctions relief in exchange for partial denuclearization.

“But the bargain now on the table could be far larger for North Korea: a freeze on nuclear development in exchange for U.S. recognition of the country as a de‑facto nuclear state before the world.”

Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru

Source link