Manchester United’s Decline: Ranking the Primary Culprits Behind the Crisis

Once again, Manchester United finds itself in crisis. The boos echoing around Old Trafford have replaced the seasonal chill as the truest harbinger of winter, with supporters directing their frustration at the familiar targets—owners, executives, and players—fully aware that the manager will once again be the sacrificial lamb.

Sunday’s 3-0 loss to Bournemouth was striking only in its predictability. In the 74 years since the sides first met in the 1949 FA Cup, Bournemouth had mustered just three victories over United; they have now matched that tally in two seasons, all at Old Trafford and all by the same 3-0 scoreline. The Theatre of Dreams has become a house of horrors.

The Freddy Krueger analogy falls short, however; a nightmare usually ends upon waking. United’s supporters have no such relief. Few now believe that dismissing Michael Carrick would resolve the club’s deep-seated issues. The carousel has spun through a Premier League stalwart in the Eddie Howe mold, a serial winner like Antonio Conte, and a high-pressing acolyte of Ralf Rangnick in Julian Nagelsmann. Only a former Ajax coach remains to complete the set of post-Ferguson missteps—Fred Grim, perhaps? At this stage, it would feel par for the course.

The club is mired in profound mismanagement that no single figure could orchestrate alone. Blame is widely distributed, so let us apportion it in reverse order—building suspense, as it were. The top culprit is scarcely a mystery, but the journey to that inevitable conclusion reveals the full scope of the rot.

5. Michael Carrick

Michael Carrick is not without fault; Bruno Fernandes pointedly highlighted tactical shortcomings after the 4-1 defeat in Como. Odd technical decisions have persisted, and a coach with greater authority might have curbed the team’s reliance on long-range efforts. Yet did anyone at United truly believe they had uncovered the next elite manager when they handed him the reins after Ruben Amorim’s departure?

Carrick exceeded those modest expectations, steering United to a third-place finish and Champions League qualification by simplifying the approach. He preserved his predecessor’s effective elements, streamlined tactical complexities, and maximized Bruno Fernandes’ player-of-the-season form. The subsequent stagnation is not his doing. What in his three years at Middlesbrough suggested he would transcend the typical manager’s ceiling—getting a team to perform at its talent level?

Given a settled squad and a manageable schedule, he might yet exceed expectations, but extrapolating from a spring purple patch is as misguided as dismissing his credentials due to his first real test—a confluence of injuries, poor results, and player indiscipline.

Old Trafford’s mood on Sunday was telling. Chants of “It’s Carrick, you know” rang out until he departed the tunnel; thereafter, the ire shifted squarely to everyone else.

4. The Unbearable Weight of Being Manchester United

No one connected with Manchester United should apologize for demanding excellence. A competently run club would align every decision with short- or medium-term title ambitions; there should be no scenic route back to the summit.

Yet it takes remarkably little to plunge United into a doom spiral of nostalgia and despair. When Lisandro Martínez publicly challenged Jason Wilcox and the hierarchy, United had just performed creditably in a narrow Champions League loss to Atlético Madrid—a result few could begrudge. Form had dipped, but only a contentious Erling Haaland goal separated them from Manchester City, and their previous two league outings were disappointing draws, not disasters.

In short, the struggles were explicable. Before the Metropolitano defeat, United’s underlying metrics told a different story: they had underperformed their expected goals (xG) for and over-conceded relative to opponents’ xG. Their actual goal difference was -1; their expected goal difference approached +4. Heavy victories over Ipswich and Sabah inflate that figure, but such thrashings are typical of a good team, alongside occasional stalemates against sides like Fulham.

Just as last season’s rise to third flattered a defense that deteriorated sharply in the spring, the current 16th-place position—one point above the drop zone—flatters to deceive. A clear-eyed appraisal suggests a talented squad prone to wobbles. The prescription: stay the course, maintain dressing-room calm, and ignore the noise.

But this is Manchester United.

3. The INEOS Sporting Hierarchy

Sir Jim Ratcliffe struck the right notes upon assuming control of football operations in February 2024, his $1.6 billion investment for a 25% stake granting INEOS sporting authority. The club would no longer be beholden to the head coach; the Ferguson-era centralized power would yield to a brain trust comprising the sporting director, recruitment staff, and—for reasons never fully explained—the chief executive and Ratcliffe himself. “In modern football, you need to decide what’s your path and stick to your path,” the new minority owner declared.

In the two-and-a-half years since, that path has led to: openly courting replacements for Erik ten Hag before triggering a contract extension when none materialized; spending over $400 million on players for the Dutchman only to dismiss him within four months; hiring Ruben Amorim, whose rigid 3-4-3 system had cost him other opportunities; finishing 15th; sacking Amorim just as analytical metrics improved, following a fallout with his employers; installing Carrick temporarily then permanently; concentrating nearly the entire budget on midfield; and suffering a very public dressing-down from Martínez.

Those are merely the condensed lowlights. Project 150—the ambitious plan to celebrate the club’s 150th anniversary with a 21st league title—has vanished from discourse. Perhaps by 2028, sporting director Wilcox will address a defense neglected after the 2025 summer budget was lavished on attack, only for nearly $200 million to be spent on midfield reinforcements—Youri Tielemans, Andrey Santos, and Carlos Baleba—while the left-back position remained unaddressed.

It would epitomize the cataclysmic mismanagement if Wilcox—another executive thrust into a role beyond his top-level experience—appoints his reported preference, Eddie Howe, as Carrick’s successor.

The same Eddie Howe who thrived alongside Dan Ashworth at Newcastle. The same Dan Ashworth whom United paid £4.1 million to acquire, only to dismiss five months later. Under INEOS, United rank ninth for points and tenth for expected goal difference in the Premier League. Yet costs have been cut and staff sacked—surely no one imagined that as a remedy for a football club’s ailments?

2. The Players

Harry Maguire did not mince words after the Bournemouth defeat: “At the moment it’s nowhere near good enough and something needs to change.” He is correct. Yet the only constants at the club occupy the top two spots in this ranking. Recall the 4-0 humiliation at Brentford in August 2022—Ten Hag’s second game and the first of countless crises. The back four that day: Diogo Dalot, Harry Maguire, Lisandro Martínez, Luke Shaw. The back four in recent draws with Fulham and Everton, over four years later: Dalot, Maguire, Martínez, Shaw.

Several players have outlasted half a dozen permanent managers. Those who fell out of favor were frozen out or put up for sale, yet few have faced genuine accountability for inconsistent performances. Why respect a manager’s authority when you have watched a parade of coaches come and go without the playing staff bearing consequences? Notably, Cristiano Ronaldo’s expulsion by Ten Hag precipitated one of the most impressive runs in recent years—players realized actions had consequences and responded accordingly.

Now they speak with impunity. Imagine Martin Ødegaard publicly criticizing Mikel Arteta’s tactics—would he play for Arsenal again? Mesut Özil and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang know the answer. At Manchester City, underperformers are swiftly moved on. United’s squad, by contrast, is preserved in aspic; their defense moves as if set in amber.

This is not a talent-deficient group. United’s first-choice attack rivals any outside Manchester City and Liverpool. The midfield requires careful structuring to offset a lack of pace, but quality abounds. When motivated, Maguire, Martínez, and Shaw are reliable defenders. As the graphic indicates, this team is capable of extreme competence—hence the third-place finish months ago. Was that due to tactical acumen or recruitment? Largely not. Yet these highly paid professionals are not innocent bystanders, powerless to halt the decline.

1. The Glazers

More than two decades after Malcolm Glazer leveraged the club to fund his takeover, what has been achieved beyond the steady degradation of an English cultural institution? Glazer ownership—characterized by zero equity investment since 2005—is estimated to have cost the club at least $1.5 billion, largely in debt servicing. Fifteen major trophies have been won in their tenure, but ten arrived during the period when Sir Alex Ferguson’s sheer force of will held the structure together.

Commercial revenue has indeed skyrocketed under their watch; United pioneered regional sponsorship deals and jersey monetization. Yet brands flocked to Old Trafford not because of Glazer acumen, but because United were the dominant force in English football precisely when the Premier League transitioned from a national pastime to a global obsession.

Far from custodians, the Glazers are extractive landlords, extracting management fees, dividends, and loan repayments—plus the windfall from Ratcliffe’s stake—while providing minimal reinvestment. Those funds could have preserved United’s preeminence or mitigated the owners’ indifference. Symbolically, Old Trafford has decayed on their watch to the point where a $1.6 billion renovation bill strengthens the case for a new stadium that few supporters desire.

A club that consistently ranks among football’s top ten revenue generators finds itself on a cost-cutting drive fronted by Ratcliffe—necessitated by Glazer debt acting as a competitive drag and an ownership devoid of interest or aptitude for improving the on-field product. If the players embody an accountability-free culture, ownership enables it. The prediction that nothing will change after Carrick rests on a simple truth: the decline will persist until those who tolerate it are stripped of power.

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