Rabat, Morocco – Morocco’s parliamentary election campaign opened on September 10, with 27 political parties vying for 395 seats in the House of Representatives. More than 15.8 million voters are registered for the September 23 election, which will determine the makeup of Parliament and play a pivotal role in forming the next government.
Yet the contest extends beyond party rivalry. At stake is a more fundamental question: whether citizens believe the political system can address the problems affecting their daily lives.
That issue is especially significant for younger Moroccans. An Afrobarometer survey published in March found that roughly one in three Moroccans aged 18 to 35 trusted Parliament, the head of government and political parties. Young people were nevertheless more likely than older citizens to share political content on social media and take part in demonstrations.
This combination of limited institutional trust and active public expression does not necessarily indicate disengagement. The central question is whether young Moroccans view electoral politics as an effective means of confronting the challenges they face.
A vote shaped by Morocco’s political model
Morocco’s electoral process operates within the constitutional order established in 2011. The constitution describes the country as a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social monarchy, creating a separation and balance of powers while preserving the monarchy’s central institutional role.
Under Article 47, the king appoints the head of government from the political party that finishes first in elections to the House of Representatives. The king also chairs the Council of Ministers, while the government exercises executive authority and Parliament carries out legislative and oversight functions.
Winning the most seats is therefore important to government formation, but the parliamentary outcome does not by itself determine the complete distribution of political power.
Young voters confront an entrenched political system
The electorate’s age profile makes political engagement an especially consequential issue.
Official figures show that voters aged 18 to 24 make up 4 percent of the registered electorate, while those aged 60 and older account for 29 percent. Although these statistics describe registration rather than turnout, they underscore how heavily the electoral roll is weighted toward older citizens.
Morocco is also grappling with a severe youth employment challenge. The IMF estimates that unemployment reached 13 percent in 2025, including 37.3 percent among people aged 15 to 24. It also estimates that 25.2 percent of young people were neither employed nor in education or training during the third quarter of 2025. The IMF cites skills mismatches, weak private-sector dynamism and pronounced gender disparities in labour-market participation.
For young Moroccans trying to enter the job market, campaign pledges on growth, employment and purchasing power are not abstract promises. They represent a test of whether the political system can create opportunities people can see in their everyday lives.
Economic strain spills into politics
These pressures have also emerged outside formal electoral politics.
In late July, around 60,000 people crossed from Morocco into the autonomous Spanish city of Ceuta, Reuters reported, in the largest such influx in recent history. The news agency linked the crossings to economic hardship, social unrest and misinformation on social media, as well as migration aspirations and misconceptions about Spanish court rulings.
Although the episode was not a direct measure of electoral opinion or proof of a single political cause, it showed how economic expectations, hopes of migration and perceptions of opportunity can converge.
It also provides wider context for the election’s economic debate: whether Morocco’s recent growth and major development projects are generating opportunities that younger citizens can recognise in their own lives.
The economy has posted strong growth. The IMF estimates that real GDP expanded by 4.9 percent in 2025 and projects growth of 4.4 percent in 2026. However, persistently high unemployment, particularly among young people, remains a major challenge.
Despite solid economic expansion, job creation has not been sufficient.
Jobs and living costs dominate party platforms
Employment and purchasing power feature prominently in the programmes of the three parties that have governed in coalition since 2021: the National Rally of Independents (RNI), the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) and Istiqlal.
The RNI’s 2026–2031 programme pledges to create one million jobs and gradually raise the minimum wage to 5,000 dirhams—about $530—a month. PAM has promised at least one million jobs and estimated that its five-year programme would cost 350 billion dirhams ($37.1 billion). Istiqlal has made purchasing power and public services central to its campaign, alongside proposals covering healthcare, housing, employment, water management and food security.
The parties’ platforms differ in emphasis, but their shared priorities are revealing: jobs, household purchasing power and public services have become key measures of political credibility.
The next government will face the difficult task of turning investment and economic growth into more productive employment and higher living standards.
PJD seeks an electoral comeback
The Justice and Development Party (PJD), led by former head of government Abdelilah Benkirane, is seeking to rebuild its support after suffering sweeping losses in 2021.
The PJD’s parliamentary representation fell from 125 seats to 13. In the September 2021 election, the RNI won 102 seats, followed by PAM with 87 and Istiqlal with 81. The three parties subsequently formed the governing coalition.
The PJD has unveiled a programme organised around five priorities and 467 measures spanning institutional, economic, social and foreign policy. Rather than relying heavily on numerical targets, it emphasises specific reforms in areas including public services, employment, purchasing power and governance.
Its return adds another dimension to the contest as the governing parties seek to defend their record since 2021 and the PJD attempts to recover its electoral base.
The credibility of reform on trial
The election will test whether Morocco’s political system can maintain a credible link between an ambitious development agenda and citizens’ expectations of tangible improvements in their daily lives.
For younger Moroccans, low trust in political institutions combined with very high youth unemployment means conventional electoral politics faces competition from other forms of political expression at a time when jobs and living standards carry increasing weight.
With employment and economic conditions central to party platforms, economic researcher Nouh El Harmouzi says the challenge goes beyond what parties can pledge during a campaign.
“Morocco’s economic problems are fundamentally structural and cannot be resolved through short-term electoral promises.”
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