New U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Highlights Abraham Accords’ Positive Incentives

The United States is set to advance a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, following a New York Times report released on Tuesday.

The prospective agreement is drawing attention in Israel and across the region, as it appears Riyadh will not be required to join the Abraham Accords or normalize relations with Israel.

Specifics of the agreement remain unclear, and the U.S. Congress will likely seek more information before proceeding. Nonetheless, the report highlights a key question about the Abraham Accords: they should be regarded as a positive incentive rather than a negative trade‑off.

This dynamic underscores why the original Abraham Accords appealed to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain—they sought normalization with Israel. The Trump administration’s endorsement in 2020 was crucial, offering an American strategic umbrella that facilitated the agreements.

The United States maintains significant military installations in Bahrain and the UAE, providing a security guarantee that reassured both partners. Coupled with the pandemic’s global constraints and the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” vision for the Palestinians, the arrangement offered tangible benefits to the participating nations.

U.S. maintains bases throughout the region

In early 2020, Israel discussed the possible annexation of the West Bank. When Jerusalem scaled back those plans, the UAE and Bahrain proceeded with the Abraham Accords, interpreting the move as a sign that Israel had abandoned its annexation ambitions.

Consequently, each party felt it had secured something valuable. President Donald Trump’s bargaining style thrives on mutually beneficial outcomes, as exemplified by the 2025 Gaza ceasefire agreements in September and October. The administration’s effectiveness has waned when negotiations involve coercive threats.

Thus, the prospective nuclear partnership with Saudi Arabia should be evaluated on its own merits. Arguing that Riyadh must normalize relations with Israel to obtain civilian nuclear technology risks conveying that U.S. policy is exclusively tied to the Israel–Palestine issue.

As a leading voice in the Muslim and Arab world, Saudi Arabia has consistently pursued peace initiatives but seeks tangible progress on Jerusalem for the Palestinian cause. Riyadh will likely question why comparable pressure is not applied to Israel to advance Palestinian rights.

Historical experience shows that U.S. policies relying on negative trade‑offs with Israel or Arab states frequently falter. Former Secretary of State John Kerry famously asserted that normalization could not proceed without concrete movement on the Palestinian front.

Attempting to coerce Israel through punitive measures instead stiffened its stance, causing it to wait out the Obama administration. Past efforts that weaponized peace proved ineffective, whereas incentive‑based diplomacy that ensures all parties perceive gains has shown greater success.

Riyadh has clearly articulated its expectations concerning Jerusalem. Should Israel resist compromise, Saudi Arabia will signal to the United States that it should not be barred from acquiring nuclear cooperation merely because of Jerusalem’s inflexible policies.

This explains why linking Saudi nuclear assistance to normalization may prove ineffective. Israeli leaders have come to believe they can afford to wait for Riyadh to adjust its stance, echoing former Secretary of State Kerry’s message that Arab states could hold out while Israel would need to adapt to secure cooperation.

Riyadh clear on Jerusalem position, give‑and‑take

France24 reported that the Trump administration intends to present Congress with a nuclear technology cooperation pact with Saudi Arabia that excludes any normalization agreement with Israel and omits the robust safeguards the United States has long advocated to prevent diversion of materials to weapons programs, according to the Times.

Saudi Arabia has pursued this nuclear partnership for many years, demonstrating a willingness to diversify its strategic relationships, including with the United States. As a historic U.S. ally and a influential Muslim and Arab power, the Kingdom seeks to balance its diplomatic options.

Riyadh has engaged in discussions with China and is evaluating how Chinese economic policies might align with other groupings such as BRICS or the China‑linked Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with which it became a partner in 2023—a relationship that dates to pre‑2021 talks. While considering BRICS membership, the Kingdom has not yet joined the bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

In addition to its outreach to China, Saudi Arabia signed a defense agreement with Pakistan, a nation that maintains strong ties with the United States and the Trump administration.

Saudi Arabia’s deepening relationships with Turkey, Syria, and Egypt have sparked concern in Jerusalem. Some Israeli policymakers now perceive Riyadh as moving away from the Abraham Accords and no longer viewing them as essential.

A prevailing sentiment suggests that Riyadh is aligning more closely with a Sunni‑majority bloc that may adopt a more adversarial stance toward Israel.

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