Oman’s Distinct Diplomatic Stance: Why It Stands Apart in Gulf Politics

The Sultanate of Oman has positioned itself outside the volatile petrodollar politics that dominate the Gulf, relying on a reputation for discretion and diplomacy to become a crucial regional mediator.

For decades Oman’s foreign policy has been guided by what it calls “positive neutrality,” allowing it to sidestep local conflicts—from the Iran‑Iraq war in the 1980s through the First Gulf War, the 2017 Qatar blockade, and the Syrian civil war.

This stance also meant Oman refused to join the anti‑Houthi coalition in Yemen in 2015, instead hosting Houthi officials and serving as a key negotiating channel between the group and Saudi Arabia. Muscat further facilitated the 2023 rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh.

“The sultanate has established itself as a platform for international mediation, capable of speaking to everyone without ever fully aligning itself with any side,” says Tigrane Yégavian, a lecturer in international relations at Paris’s Schiller International University.

An ‘Indispensable Mediator’

In pursuit of an Israeli‑Palestinian settlement, the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said received Israeli leaders Shimon Peres in 1994 and Benjamin Netanyahu in 2018, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Israel—a move that was unpopular among many Omani citizens. According to Foreign Policy magazine, Qaboos’s extensive personal network made him the Arab world’s longest‑serving ruler and a central figure in Oman’s mediating role, able to engage with Tehran and Washington alike.

Oman also played a decisive behind‑the‑scenes role in the early‑2000s talks that culminated in the 2015 Vienna nuclear agreement, even though Omani officials were not part of the public ceremony. After the United States’ withdrawal under President Trump in 2018, Oman continued to maintain ties with both Tehran and Washington, preserving its neutral stance.

Diplomatic Legacy

Since ascending to the throne in 2020, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq has carried forward his predecessor’s diplomatic approach. In 2025 Oman resumed shuttle diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear file, mediating between U.S. and Iranian delegations in Muscat until the June 2025 Iran‑Israel hostilities halted progress temporarily. Talks resumed in early 2026, but optimism was cut short when a coordinated U.S.‑Israeli offensive against Iran was launched on 28 February, shattering the negotiating momentum.

“At that moment, I felt the Omani government believed it had secured something,” said Abdullah Baabood, an Omani researcher specialising in Middle Eastern international relations and a lecturer at Waseda University in Tokyo. “But it seems the Israelis and the Americans had already planned the attack. All these negotiating efforts were in vain, and it was another slap in the face.”

Known for its extreme discretion, Oman openly expressed regret and called the strike an “illegal war.” Foreign Minister Badr al‑Busaidi broke his public silence, writing in The Economist that the U.S. had “lost control of its foreign policy.”

‘The Switzerland of the Gulf’

Oman’s distinctive diplomatic identity stems from two key factors. Religiously, Omani society follows the Ibadi branch of Islam, which emphasizes moderation and rejects sectarian violence, setting the country apart from the Sunni majority of Saudi Arabia and the Shia leadership of Iran. Geographically, Oman faces the Indian Ocean and only a brief stretch of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one‑fifth of the world’s oil passes. This limited exposure, together with its lack of a permanent U.S. military base—the only Gulf state in this position—underscores a security strategy that relies on careful diplomacy rather than large‑scale alliances.

Because its own hydrocarbon reserves are modest, Muscat views the Strait as a vital protective asset and works jointly with Tehran to manage the waterway, balancing Iranian demands with international maritime law and freedom of navigation.

“This has justified Oman’s cautious policy,” says Laurent Bonnefoy, a researcher with the French National Centre for Scientific Research at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Studies. “But at the same time, this desire to maintain a form of neutrality is entirely consistent with the foreign policy pursued for almost six decades. At the regional level, it also serves a purpose. It demonstrates the importance of keeping channels open with the Iranians. Almost everyone recognises how valuable that function is.”

This article has been partially adapted from the original version in French by Anne Bernas.

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