WASHINGTON and DAYTONA BEACH, FLA. — Pentagon leaders continue to face significant challenges in meeting weapons delivery schedules despite commitments to accelerate equipment deployment, as highlighted in a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.
The report states that the average timeline for delivering defense capabilities has risen to over 12 years, with multiple Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) either delaying key milestones or failing to establish new delivery dates entirely. Additionally, the GAO notes that program officials have not adjusted timelines to reflect these delays.
Rapid prototyping initiatives under the Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) framework—designed to develop or field weapons within a five-year window—are also underperforming. Many of these programs rely on “immature technologies,” which face persistent delays due to their experimental nature and lack of proven reliability for widespread use.
GAO’s annual assessment of defense programs recommends that the Pentagon prioritize projects based on mature technologies or isolate the development of immature systems to mitigate risks. The Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with this guidance.
Below are key programs experiencing extensive delays and cost overruns:
Air Force
GAO identified critical delays in the Air Force’s T-7 program, a new jet trainer, echoing findings from a prior Breaking Defense analysis. Despite entering production in April, most developmental testing is now scheduled for April 2028, with final software and system validations stretching even later, to May 2029.
These delays stem from insufficient aircraft availability due to maintenance personnel shortages, unavailable spare parts, and the need for additional engineering analysis. The program also experienced a “replan” to ensure a functional training capability for users.
For the VC-25B, nicknamed “Air Force One,” GAO noted progress, including finalizing the configuration design in October and resolving cabin pressure and crew training issues. However, lingering risks include interior design finalization, wiring fabrication, and structural defect corrections. Additionally, the program is transferring airworthiness certification responsibilities from the FAA to the Air Force, a change intended to accelerate problem resolution but now constrained by a tight testing schedule.
As of October, only seven of 80 required certification plans for the VC-25B have been approved, with no clear timeline for operational testing.
The Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program, targeting a first flight test in fiscal 2026 Q2, has no schedule margin, GAO warned. Even after reducing test flights from seven to five, a major failure could derail the five-test requirement critical for deciding on a rapid fielding effort by fiscal 2027.
Army
The Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) program, part of the MTA initiative, will delay the deployment of its second battery by at least six months. This setback is attributed to inconsistent production quality standards for missile manufacturing.
The LRHW system, known as Dark Eagle, is a ground-launched hypersonic missile intended for precision strikes in hostile environments. Initially planned for fiscal 2027 Q4 delivery, the second battery now targets fiscal 2028. Delays also threaten the third battery’s schedule, according to the report.
The Army’s Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Increment 3 program, aimed at replacing the Stinger missile, lacks mature critical technologies. GAO found discrepancies between contractor assessments and program requirements, though both sides have not clarified the cause.
M-SHORAD Increment 3 is scheduled to begin production in fiscal 2028 Q2, but delays in technology maturity could push this further back.
Navy
GAO found the first 13 follow-on DDG 51 Flight III destroyers are 55 months behind schedule—up from 41 months in the prior GAO review. Delays result from workforce shortages, supply chain disruptions, and frequent design changes.
Despite these setbacks, the program aims to achieve initial operational capability by fiscal 2027 Q4—three years later than originally planned. Similarly, integration of the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon onto DDG 1000 ships has been delayed by nine months, though a live-fire demonstration remains on track for fiscal 2026.
The Navy’s ORCA Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) program also faced delays. While the first prototype was delivered in September 2025 as planned, the remaining four units are now expected in January 2027—over a year later than previously reported.
Space Force
The Space Force leads MTA usage across the Pentagon, comprising half of all MTA-related costs. GAO’s report details 13 programs facing schedules and cost challenges. A primary issue is the ongoing strain on component supply chains, compounded by technology immaturity.
The Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared – Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (Next-Gen OPIR-GEO) missile warning system has seen $340 million in cost overruns due to software complexity and engineering obstacles. The first satellite, completed in January 2026, will launch no earlier than October 2026 due to a congested Space Launch manifest—a revision from its original 2025 Q4 target.
GAO also flagged concerns about the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, which faces workforce reductions and a surge in planned launches. With over 50 Phase 2 launches expected by fiscal 2028 and 85 Phase 3 launches through 2031—mostly for low-Earth orbit constellations—the program’s capacity to scale is under question. Staffing losses from deferred resignations and a hiring freeze further complicate the situation.
