Post-UNGA Diplomacy: Is the Broken Tehran-Washington Memorandum Salvageable?

For a brief moment this week, the diplomatic freeze between Washington and Tehran appeared ready to thaw. On September 23, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in New York—the most senior direct engagement between the two nations since the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding collapsed two months prior. Three days later, Araghchi told the New York Times and The Guardian that the Strait of Hormuz could reopen within a week, contingent upon Washington meeting Tehran’s conditions.

That single conditional statement reveals the current state of affairs with striking clarity. This is not a resolution, nor is it a return to full-scale conflict. Instead, the situation remains suspended in a precarious middle ground, where both sides already understand the contours of a potential agreement but neither is willing to make the first concession.

A memorandum that didn’t survive its own deadline

It is essential to acknowledge what actually unraveled here. The Islamabad Memorandum, signed on June 17 following Pakistan-brokered talks—reportedly involving Army Chief Asim Munir directly—granted Washington and Tehran a 60-day window to transform a fragile ceasefire into a lasting settlement. That window closed in mid-August with no tangible results. In a September 8 call with Japan’s foreign minister, Araghchi argued that the region’s current tensions stem from Washington’s “regrettable violation” of its Islamabad commitments, asserting that the US returning to those obligations is the prerequisite for normalizing the Strait. Washington has not accepted this narrative. Meanwhile, the conflict persisted; both militaries exchanged strikes through early-to-mid September, and Iran seized a US underwater drone operating in contested waters. This is the reality UNGA confronted: not a manageable lull, but an active and costly war still searching for an exit.

Why this round might be different

Two factors distinguish this month’s diplomatic overtures from the summer’s failed negotiations. First, the format has shifted—replacing formal, mediated summits like Islamabad or Bürgenstock with direct, informal contact between Iranian and American officials on the sidelines of the UN. This approach allows both sides to gauge each other’s positions without the political fallout of another public, formal round collapsing. Second, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian explicitly praised Pakistan’s “constructive efforts as a mediator,” indicating Tehran still desires Islamabad’s involvement despite the memorandum’s failure. This represents leverage Pakistan could wield if it chooses to.

However, President Trump’s signals this week remained contradictory. He praised the indirect talks, only to deliver what Al Jazeera’s Tehran correspondent described as a “pugnacious” address to the same Assembly.

Analysts in New York—including the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Adel Abdel Ghafar—characterize the situation as “genuine” movement mixed with “a fair amount of posturing.” This assessment accurately captures a negotiation where both governments must project strength domestically while quietly communicating with one another.

What a real deal would actually require

If Araghchi’s offer holds, reopening the Strait of Hormuz within seven days would merely be a symptom of an agreement, not the agreement itself. Achieving something durable still requires resolving three issues the Islamabad Memorandum never truly settled: verification mechanisms for Iran’s nuclear program that both sides can genuinely trust; a regional security architecture that does not rely entirely on U.S. military guarantees, which Gulf states have grown wary of; and the unfreezing of Iranian assets, a condition Araghchi has specifically identified that Washington has yet to meet.

Bypassing these fundamental issues in favor of a quick reopening of the Hormuz would simply repeat the exact mistake made by the June memorandum—a deadline-driven document that projected resolution without addressing the root causes of the conflict.

Pakistan’s narrowing window

For Islamabad, this extends well beyond diplomatic prestige. Pakistan brokered the ceasefire that ended the initial war, hosted the failed Islamabad Talks, and endorsed the memorandum that expired precisely on schedule in August. Pezeshkian’s public gratitude this week suggests this credibility survived the memorandum’s collapse—but it will not endure indefinitely if Pakistan continues to be associated with frameworks that quietly run out the clock.

If the Araghchi-Witkoff-Kushner contact in New York develops into something substantial, Pakistan has an opening to return to the table as a convener rather than a spectator. If it does not, the next phase of escalation will occur with Islamabad relegated to the sidelines of a process it once led.

The real test

The true measure of this UNGA round is not whether Araghchi’s seven-day Hormuz offer actually holds—such offers have been made and missed before. The real test is whether Washington and Tehran can construct an agreement that survives contact with an actual deadline, precisely what the Islamabad Memorandum failed to do the first time. Statements made by Pezeshkian, Araghchi, and Trump in New York this week suggest neither side wishes to be blamed for a breakdown. Whether that mutual desire translates into an agreement that actually holds remains the only question worth watching now.

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