Putin Denies a Draft Is Coming, but Some Russian Men Are Taking No Chances

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Moscow Holds Firm Despite Growing Fear of New Mobile Mobilization

As anxiety over rumors of a forced military mobilization began to sweep through Moscow, Eradzh, a 36‑year‑old entrepreneur, turned to his artificial intelligence assistant to parse the news and calculate the likelihood of a draft.

Eventually, the probability climbed high enough that he asked the program to arrange a cheap flight out of the country. Within a week, Eradzh would travel to Cyprus and spend at least two months away from Moscow.

Counting off his priorities, Eradzh explained his logic: Russia had mobilised tens of thousands of volunteers drawn to the Ukrainian front through generous payouts while suffering only marginal territorial gains.

“Have contract soldiers run out? They appear to have been depleted.” He continued, “Haven we taken meaningful territory? We haven’t. Did diplomatic negotiations yield results? They did not. Will President Putin double down and persist?”

“Is a new mobilisation imminent? Most likely, yes,” he said briefly earlier in a café in central Moscow. Fellow interviewees were willing to speak on condition that his surname remain unpublished.

Over the past months, fears of a possible second wave following the September 2022 mobilisation have become part of daily Russian life.

Rumours that Moscow might compel additional combatants after the September 20 parliamentary election have dominated online feeds and were discussed in cafés, on trains, and near office smoking areas.

The Kremlin has vehemently denied any preparations for mobilisation. On Wednesday, President Vladimir V. Putin labelled the reports “complete nonsense” and an “information attack against Russia.” On Thursday, he reiterated his denial, asserting that Russia possessed sufficient troops and that “as of today, there is no scenario requiring mobilisation.”

Throughout the rumour cycle, Moscow has endeavoured to present a calm façade. The capital remains meticulously ordered, with boulevard pavilions offering free medical checks under the slogan, “Your choice is to live longer!”

Nevertheless, many citizens remain unconvinced by governmental assurances. Public memory recalls prior Kremlin denials—first in 2022—that later proved inaccurate, notably the promises of avoiding invasion or a mobile draft that autumn.

Observers point to isolated, hard‑line recruitment episodes in the Penza region, southwest of Moscow. They also remind us that the 2022 decree ordering a draft remains legally active, opening avenues for a covert mobilisation.

International media have intensified the pressure, citing Western intel officials who claim Russia is losing more personnel than it recruits and drawing parallels to Ukraine’s presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky, who predicted in August and April 2024 that Ukraine would need to draft 300,000 workers post‑election.

Recall the 2022 campaign, when hundreds of thousands fled the country. The draft jarred Russian society so profoundly that authorities scrammed to freeze it within weeks.

That first forced mobilisation exposed the Russian Army as precarious; outnumbered, Moscow’s forces retreated from vast stretches of eastern and southern Ukraine, abandoning equipment along the way.

Current front‑line conditions are modest compared to late‑2022, according to military analyst Dmitri Kuznets, who argues that Russia continues to recruit faster than losses are recorded in budgetary and obituary records. Moreover, the economic strain limited financial resources for paying conscripts in a renewed draft surge.

“Theoretically, a new draft could create new units, but the social risk of mass public outrage would likely outweigh any marginal advantage.”

Kuznets cautions that while raw personnel numbers may look adequate now, specific skill sets—such as skilled drone operators—could prove critical shortfalls, compelling presidential decisions beyond purely rational calculus.

Even without evidence of an acute personnel shortage, Russia may be vulnerable to particular operational gaps that could hinder ongoing operations.

Ultimately, only President Putin possesses definitive knowledge of any impending mobilisation, leaving ordinary citizens adrift on uncertainty.

Alexandr, 36, a fitness coach in Moscow, summed the stress best: “I’m simply tired of losing sleep and constantly wondering whether something will finally go wrong.”

Earlier in August, he flew to Thailand with his wife, who wept upon learning she had perished in Russia. As a former combatant in a special unit, he judged the risk of service too great.

Ivan, 24, a civil engineer, noted that his friends deliberately timed their vacations abroad to bracket the legislative period, anticipating heightened scrutiny afterward. They will continue monitoring developments during hikes in Georgia.

Ilya, 26, another engineer, declared he had exited Moscow after Yabloko—the sole anti‑war political party—was barred from the ballot. Additional drivers include gasoline shortages sparked by Ukrainian strike activity and reports of increased border harboring.

He warned, “You cannot predict how the authorities might restrict your movements and undermine your attempts to live normally and safely.”

Those wishing to emigrate lack both capital and formal paths. Several attempted to obtain Moscow residency permits, which many expect protected from draft legislation. Others withdrew retirement savings, fearing accounts might be frozen after receiving a notice and failing to appear for enlistment.

Mikhail, 40, a film professional, sought psychiatric assistance after absorbing countless reports about potential mobilisation. “I need to shift from speculation to concrete knowledge, but I honestly know nothing.”

Ilya, 31, employed in logistics, expressed less alarm about conscription itself but more concern over the broader economic impact. “A wave could cripple growth and force businesses to shutter due to staff shortages, leading to mass layoffs.”

Many caution that the next draft would be harder to dodge thanks to digitised conscription procedures. Summonses arrive electronically, and non‑compliance can trigger automatic bans on departing the realm, suspension of driver licences, and halting of property transactions.

“The automated penalty regime is still flawed mainly due to inter‑agency miscommunication and technical glitches,” says Grigory Sverdlin, founder of Idite Lesom (“get lost in”) – a NGO assisting Russians to evade military duty.

Another commenter, Konstantin, a yachting instructor in St. Peterburg, has opted to wait rather than act this time. “During the first draft, many friends spent heavily attempting residency abroad; ultimately they returned.”

1. 

   Ivan Nechepurenko

   Reporter

2. 

   Ivan Nechepurenko

   Reporter

   When I arrived in Russia in early August, it quickly became clear that fear of possible mobilisation was the dominant source of societal anxiety. My tenants left the country, and acquaintances appeared in distant locations.

3. 

   Ivan Nechepurenko

   Reporter

   Expert analysis indicates that a new mobilisation remains unresolved. Yet consensus among impartial observers is that the Kremlin holds no urgent impetus to conscript additional young adults, given political exposure risks. Nonetheless, the pervasive dread underscores deep fatigue with Russia’s protracted and largely futile conflict.

4. 

   Ivan Nechepurenko

   Reporter

   Beyond straightforward concerns about conscription, reports highlight how the war undermines personal prospects—long queues at fuel stations, fire damage at retail warehouses—and fuels the perception that the emergency is permanent.

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