What was meant to be a breakthrough year ended without the intended breakthrough. The Philippines had hoped to conclude a South China Sea code of conduct with China during its 2026 ASEAN chairmanship, but at the Manila summit in mid-November the parties abandoned that objective. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro said roughly 80% of the text had been negotiated, yet the central disputes remained unresolved.

Far more than diplomatic wording is at stake. The South China Sea is one of the world’s most important shipping routes, rich in fishing grounds and potentially significant oil and gas reserves. Above all, it is a zone of strategic competition: China claims a large portion of the sea through its so-called Nine-Dash Line, often drawn in red, overlapping with claims by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.

A code of conduct is meant to establish rules for how the parties deal with one another and to prevent incidents at sea from escalating. But views differ sharply, especially over whether the code should be legally binding and what geographic area it should cover.

“The basic problem with establishing such a code of conduct is that China is supremely powerful and has no real interest in a legally binding agreement,” said political scientist Andreas Ufen, a Southeast Asia expert at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA). Beijing had little incentive to impose restrictions on itself as long as it could pursue its interests in the region without such an agreement, Ufen told DW.

The 2026 ASEAN summit in Manila Image: Reuters

Recommendations or legally binding rules?

The Paracel Islands illustrate how difficult the unresolved issues are. China calls the group Xisha, while Vietnam calls it Hoang Sa. Hanoi apparently wants the islands included in the code’s geographic scope, but China rejects that. An agreement within the ASEAN framework could indirectly affect the territorial claims of the parties involved.

“A fundamental problem is that so far there’s no consensus on whether the code of conduct should be legally binding,” said Felix Heiduk, head of the Asia research division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). China and ASEAN nations have been negotiating an agreement for 12 years without major progress.

Reservations about such a treaty exist not only in China but also in other ASEAN countries, which would later have to ratify a legally binding agreement under international law at home. A non-binding code of conduct, by contrast, would amount to little more than a voluntary declaration of intent, Ufen told DW.

The definition of an “incident” is also contested. Do coast guard missions involving water cannons count? Do blockades of supply vessels? Or does the code apply only when military force is involved? The answer will determine which actions fall under the future regulations.

“These are by no means just technical details. Their clarification determines to a great extent whether the code of conduct will in fact be effective or will ultimately remain only a non-binding declaration of intent,” Heiduk said. An agreement without enforceable commitments would change little.

How a small, disputed island wards off China’s power claims

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video

Diverging interests

Ufen sees China’s stance as a strategic calculation. “I believe that China is interested in keeping the conflict simmering, so to speak, without having to commit itself to a truly binding legal regulation,” he said. That approach would allow Beijing to strengthen its position in the South China Sea without limiting its room for maneuver.

At the same time, interests within ASEAN diverge. The member states are far from united. The Philippines and Vietnam are particularly vocal in opposing China. Malaysia and Indonesia take a more restrained approach. Cambodia and Laos have close economic ties with Beijing and no territorial claims in the South China Sea.

“From the start of the negotiations, the lack of unity within ASEAN has been a problem. In a way, it’s a permanent obstacle,” Heiduk said. The group makes decisions by consensus, meaning in practice that every member state can block a unified position. Recurring confrontations between China and the Philippines have worsened the problem by undermining trust and making compromises harder to reach.

Ufen also believes diverging interests are a key impediment. “Reconciling them is extremely difficult,” he said. China could exploit the discord, preferring bilateral negotiations with individual countries to dealing with an entire, united bloc.

Fundamental conflicts remain unresolved

A study published by the Singapore-based Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) reaches similar conclusions. Not only China but also internal divisions within ASEAN have stalled negotiations. The authors warn against relying exclusively on a comprehensive, legally binding treaty. Partial agreements — for example, on crisis communication, rescue operations at sea or maritime environmental protection — could be a first step. Developing the 2002 non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea could also serve as an intermediate step.

A Chinese Coast Guard and a Philippine Navy vessel during an encounter in the South China Sea on July 20, 2026Image: Jay Tarriela via X/Handout/REUTERS

Ufen doubts whether Beijing is interested in a binding outcome. “For this reason, I can’t really imagine that China has a real interest in a code of conduct that includes legally binding regulations,” he said.

Heiduk warns against overestimating the significance of a potential agreement. “Even if the code of conduct was signed at some point, in whichever shape, that would in no way solve the conflict in the South China Sea,” he said. The code could regulate how incidents are handled, but it could not eliminate territorial disputes and competing claims to maritime areas.

Can ASEAN do more to stop the violence in Myanmar?

To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video

Hopes for future negotiations

That is also the dilemma for ASEAN nations, whose foreign policy oscillates between ties with China and the United States: An agreement that is as binding as possible could fail because China and individual member states have reservations. A weak, non-binding code, however, could create the impression of agreement while doing little to change conduct at sea.

The American Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) summed up the situation after the Manila summit: “Whatever progress was made this year, it is almost certain that the hardest sticking points remain unresolved.”

Negotiations will continue in 2027 under Singapore’s chairmanship. Whether that will amount to more than another diplomatic effort will depend on whether China is prepared to submit to regulations that limit its scope of action and whether ASEAN can reach a consensus.

Source link

Exit mobile version