China’s Zhuque-2E Y6 carrier rocket launched two new satellites, Spacesail DTC 01 and China Mobile 02, on June 9 2026. China and Russia are expanding anti‑satellite capabilities. (Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images)
VCG via Getty Images
Modern conflict increasingly highlights unmanned systems, with drones reshaping the battlefield into a domain that has only recently entered public awareness. Space now stands as arguably the most contested arena of contemporary warfare, serving as the critical layer for satellite‑based navigation, positioning, and communications.
These satellites represent vulnerable assets for drone operations and other military communications. Disrupting or denying a nation’s space assets can severely impair the effectiveness of ground‑based weaponry.
As countries expand drone inventories and develop counter‑drone defenses to safeguard their forces, major powers are intensifying efforts to project power in space, both to protect their own assets and to threaten adversaries.
Competition in Space
A U.S. Space Force Guardian monitors a workstation in December 2025 at Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. The unit provides space‑enabled effects such as GPS, missile warning, and electromagnetic interference detection.
U.S. Space Force
Competition in space is quickly spilling onto the terrestrial battlefield. In June 2025, two oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz collided in what is widely believed to be a GPS‑interference incident.
A notable rise in GPS signal distortion—known as spoofing—has been observed across European NATO members since 2023. The severity of these disruptions prompted the United Nations aviation agency’s assembly to censure Russia in October 2025 for satellite interference.
The Strait of Hormuz has become a hotspot for satellite‑system disruptions. Excessive GPS interference now blinds commercial vessels, hindering their navigation and maneuverability. In response, nations allied against Iran have created an “electronic fog” that can both detect and deter drone attacks, inadvertently impairing civilian traffic, as reported by CNN in March.
Creating Illusions Through Spoofing
A soldier assigned to the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne)’s Multidomain Operations Company employs a GPS system during a February 2026 exercise. State and non‑state actors are increasingly targeting GPS signals from space to disable drones and generate deceptive effects.
U.S. Army 3rd Special Forces Group
The emerging focus of electronic warfare is GPS spoofing. Unmanned platforms, especially aerial and maritime ones, conduct autonomous patrols for reconnaissance. Rendering these systems ineffective without direct engagement often involves disrupting their communications or feeding them false data.
GPS spoofing involves flooding a receiver with counterfeit signals. A January 2026 report from the British Royal Institute of Navigation notes that attackers—both state and non‑state—exploit space‑borne navigation signals, targeting those en route to ground receivers. The resulting disruptions force receivers to search for lost satellite locks and accept false measurements.
Beyond spoofing, adversaries also employ jamming to block signals entirely and practice “meaconing,” feeding GPS trackers with echoes of past positions. This can cause vessels to appear stationary or moving inland, endangering commercial maritime traffic. Such spoofing attacks frequently originate from ground‑based assets, a trend evident in Ukraine since 2023. Recent findings also indicate that space‑based platforms are now being used to conduct these activities.
A New Space Race
A still from a U.S. Space Force documentary depicts a satellite equipped with robotic arms that could potentially capture or reposition U.S. space assets.
U.S. Space Force
As reliance on space‑based navigation and communications grows, nations are hardening their satellites and exploring space‑based targeting capabilities that could impair or destroy adversary assets.
The U.S. Space Force released a 20‑minute documentary last year outlining current threats to U.S. space infrastructure, including orbiting “satellite killers” and robotic‑armed satellites designed to grapple and displace U.S. satellites.
“The existence of counterspace capabilities is not new, but the circumstances surrounding them have changed. Today there are heightened incentives for developing and potentially employing offensive counterspace measures,” according to an April report by the Secure World Foundation on space weapons.
The report highlights that North Korea has adopted new policies for military space use, while Russia and China are actively testing a range of anti‑satellite systems that could target U.S. and NATO assets.
Overcoming Denied Signals And Electronic Illusions
The U.S. Space Force’s Space Systems Command launched a GPS satellite into medium Earth orbit from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida in April 2026. The Force is deploying satellites equipped with M‑code technology to enhance resistance against jamming and interference.
U.S. Space Force
Continued GPS interference and drone incursions have prompted NATO members, including Germany, to bolster their space‑defense posture. Germany’s 2025 space strategy aims to improve monitoring and deterrence of malicious space activity, noting Russian and Chinese support for North Korean and Iranian military space programs.
While drones have revolutionized modern warfare on Earth, their effective deployment depends on reach from space. This drives both state and non‑state actors to apply historic principles of war to GPS systems, seeking to confuse and mislead opponents.
As the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu observed in The Art of War, “All warfare is based on deception…When able to attack, we must seem unable. When near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away.” Future conflict outcomes will likely hinge less on the sophistication of drone fleets and more on the ability to operate in GPS‑denied environments amid a flood of electronic deceptions.
