The U.S. Space Force must clarify its policies on space conflict and enhance training across a range of scenarios, a new research paper argues.
The study, developed after a January workshop at the Mitchell Institute, brought together roughly 50 space experts to examine how satellites and spacecraft could be used in gray‑zone and wartime contexts. Participants discussed issues such as Russian cyberattacks on European networks, jamming of U.S. satellites, the mysterious destruction of infrastructure near Cape Canaveral, covert repositioning of a commercially failed European satellite, deactivation of power grids in the Midwest, and even an unspecified nuclear detonation in low Earth orbit.
Determining the perpetrator of a space‑focused strike and formulating an appropriate U.S. military response proved challenging, the Mitchell Institute’s findings indicate.
“Space presents a uniquely complex warfighting environment. The global and technical nature of the domain complicates understanding of and responding to hostile acts,” the researchers wrote. “Thus, attribution, escalation management, and credible response selection are daunting. Moreover, actions in space rarely produce isolated or localized effects; instead, they cascade across geographic combatant commands, civilian infrastructure, and global equities.”
The U.S. Space Force is building a warfighting identity and is allocating its largest budget in the service’s six‑year history. Yet the growth of the force coincides with a dearth of norms and laws governing how the military should respond to a variety of potential attacks.
Ambiguity and the difficulty of attribution inhibit decisive action, the report states. “Workshop discussions highlighted the inherent complexity of space as a domain that defies traditional geographic and legal constructs, complicating attribution and enabling adversaries to normalize coercive behavior below clear thresholds of armed conflict,” the report added. “Participants emphasized that this ambiguity favors competitors by slowing decision‑making and conditioning acceptance of increasingly hostile actions.”
Potential attacks could target any theater, from Asia to Europe to the Middle East. Participants explored scenarios such as regional GPS jamming disrupting airlines in U.S. Central Command, an anti‑satellite strike by China in the Indo‑Pacific producing debris that could damage the International Space Station and threaten a U.S. astronaut, or a submarine launching a volley of 20 conventional ballistic and cruise missiles at key West Coast installations, including California’s Vandenberg Space Force Base.
Space is “a decision environment characterized by uncertainty and delay.” Determining the cause of certain space‑based attacks and calculating a potential military response is complex, but the Mitchell researchers deem it a necessary exercise to inform Space Force policy.
“None of this can remain theoretical. Guardians, joint force leaders, allies, and partners all need to train and exercise against these scenarios,” said Jennifer Reeves, a retired Air Force colonel and Mitchell Institute resident fellow, during a roundtable on Tuesday. “Repeated exercises build familiarity, improve decision‑making, and help translate concepts into executable options.”
U.S. space operations often rely on cyber attacks or satellite jamming, which tend to fall within gray‑zone activities that dodge the laws of armed conflict. Participants argued that “U.S.‑China interactions in space are firmly within the gray zone, characterized by coercive, often deniable actions deliberately calibrated to avoid triggering a decisive response.”
While the Mitchell researchers urged the U.S. to “build combat credibility by reducing ambiguity through clearer norms and frameworks,” they also acknowledged that some benefits arise from not having fully defined rules for space conflict.
“While clearer expectations could help guide behavior and improve decision speed, establishing explicit thresholds presents trade‑offs,” the researchers wrote. “Clearly defined red lines risk constraining U.S. decision space while incentivizing adversaries to operate just below those thresholds, achieving meaningful effects without triggering a response.”
Charles Galbreath, a retired Space Force colonel and Mitchell’s senior resident, stated at the roundtable that “there really isn’t a lot legally prohibiting us from pursuing effective counter‑space operations,” adding that “we need to understand our policies and their rationale, and also not limit ourselves in terms of response options.”
The Mitchell Institute’s latest report advocates for the Space Force to adopt more aggressive strategies and policies. In May, researchers argued for deploying troops to the Moon to prepare for a possible in‑person conflict with China, and last year they pitched the idea of stationing guardians aboard critical assets in orbit.
