The New Multipolar Order: Strategic Flexibility at the Cost of Security Guarantees

During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received a show of political solidarity that fell short of his ultimate expectations. While the SCO strongly condemned the military strikes against Iran, labeling them as breaches of international law and the UN Charter, and reaffirmed Tehran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the organization stopped short of offering concrete defense mechanisms. The group instead urged for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the ongoing conflict.

The bloc did not, however, offer to actively defend Iran. This crucial distinction between political solidarity and collective defense sheds light on Tehran’s experience with the SCO, and more broadly, on the evolving dynamics of the emerging global order.

For years, discourse surrounding a multipolar world has centered on the gradual erosion of the US-led international system, potentially replaced by an alternative bloc anchored by China, Russia, and forums like BRICS and the SCO. For middle powers, participating in both Western and non-Western institutions appeared to be a seamless fit within this transition. The expectation was that integration into non-Western organizations would shield them from Western isolation and economic coercion.

The US-Israeli military actions against Iran have starkly demonstrated that alternative alignments cannot replicate the security guarantees of formal military alliances. This does not mean that multipolarity has failed middle powers; rather, it indicates that the emerging multipolar framework is functioning in ways many did not anticipate.

Instead of completely replacing one alliance system with another, this transition is fostering a dense, overlapping network of partnerships. In this landscape, nations gain expanded diplomatic and economic leverage, yet without automatically securing new defense guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be a defining characteristic of the new global order: greater strategic maneuverability, but diminished certainty regarding who will stand by their side when national security is threatened.

Türkiye offers a prime example of this shifting landscape. As a NATO member for over seven decades and a cornerstone of Western defense architecture, Ankara has increasingly shown that alliance membership does not dictate automatic political alignment with Washington. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, Türkiye has maintained open channels with Russia, deepened ties with China, and engaged as a dialogue partner within the SCO. Simultaneously, Ankara’s policy divergences with Washington and Jerusalem regarding the future structure of the Middle East have grown more pronounced.

This does not signal that Türkiye is abandoning NATO or aligning with a Chinese or Russian-led bloc. On the contrary, Ankara’s strategy hinges on avoiding this binary choice. While its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO cannot replicate, its diverse relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states, and other regional players expand its diplomatic and economic horizons.

Brazil presents another compelling case study. Unlike Türkiye, Brazil is not bound to the United States by a formal military alliance. However, it has historically operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected substantial political alignment from regional governments.

Brasília’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), alongside its stance on the Iran conflict and other recent global crises, reflects a firm reluctance to accept that geographic proximity should automatically translate into strategic alignment with Washington.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching allegiances. Its active participation in BRICS, its deep economic ties with China, and its advocacy for international institutional reform coexist alongside vital political and economic relations with the United States and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to trade dependency on Washington for dependency on Beijing, but rather to preserve the capacity to cooperate with both powers while maintaining the freedom to disagree with either.

This may be one of the most significant opportunities that multipolarity offers to middle powers. The rise of alternative centers of economic and political influence lowers the cost of dissent. For decades, smaller nations facing pressure from a dominant superpower were confronted with a difficult triad of choices: comply, resist at the risk of isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions has complicated this strategic calculation. Today, a government disagreeing with Washington can deepen its relations with Beijing without becoming a formal Chinese ally. Conversely, a state economically dependent on China can strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington’s foreign policy. Membership in BRICS does not preclude cooperation with Western institutions, just as participation in a US-led security framework does not bar engagement with China or Russia.

India has elevated this logic to an organizing principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi actively participates in the Quad alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, while simultaneously maintaining membership in both BRICS and the SCO. At the Bishkek summit, India backed the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty, while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also emphasized to Pezeshkian the critical importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are pursuing their own distinct versions of this strategic diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, for instance, continue to rely heavily on their security relationships with the US, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India, and other Asian powers, and participating in novel regional and international frameworks.

None of these nations appear eager to replace Washington with Beijing; rather, they seek robust relationships with both. This suggests that the most profound consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc for attachment, but rather the declining necessity to align exclusively with any single bloc.

However, this greater autonomy comes at a cost. The very flexible arrangements that enable states to avoid choosing sides also offer fewer guarantees when crises escalate into existential threats. BRICS lacks an Article 5 equivalent. Similarly, the SCO explicitly defines itself as a non-military organization and does not provide collective defense provisions.

Strategic partnerships can deliver armaments, investment, diplomatic backing, and political support without obligating partners to go to war on one another’s behalf.

Consequently, the emerging international system is unlikely to manifest as a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or as a stark confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is far from disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security partnerships remain indispensable throughout much of Asia and the Gulf. Emerging alongside this established structure is a secondary layer: a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships, and transactional relationships.

In other words, multipolarity may not require states to choose a new camp. This shift grants middle and smaller powers greater agency, but it also places a heavier burden of self-reliance on their security. While the emerging world order may offer more partners, greater bargaining power, and increased freedom to say no, it will less frequently offer certainty about who will stand ready to say yes when protection is sought.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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