In 1990, the idea that deployed commanders could access the latest intelligence from three‑letter agencies in the middle of nowhere was radical. But the Army was starting to make this idea real through a program called Trojan Spirit, so they could address a major strategic barrier: There were too many systems and databases for intelligence collection and analysis, some centralized and some forward deployed, and little access to practical insights. During Operation Desert Storm, the early Trojan system transitioned out of development and into operational deployment. Trojan Spirit’s first introduction to warfighters during the Gulf War fundamentally changed the battlefield. For the first time, commanders at the edge could access highly sensitive intelligence in near real time to create decision advantage.
The debut of the system was revolutionary, and over the years, it established the networked intelligence model the U.S. military still uses today. While the Army continues to modernize this program of record, incremental upgrades collide with a complicated reality: Modern warfare does not resemble what it was 40 years ago, when Trojan came to life.
In Trojan’s early days, the fights were more geographically contained, allowing troops to set up operations in discrete locations and turn the system on with a set‑it‑and‑forget‑it approach. Given the discrete nature of conflicts at that time, it was to be expected that Trojan Spirit was physically big and operationally fixed: the hardware, the generator, the gas, the trucks that hauled it in, and the soldiers to protect it all.
Of course, commanders and operators no longer have the “luxury” of contained war plans. Time and space do not border active threats from China and Russia in the same manner as in battles of the past. Today, Trojan faces sophisticated cyber adversaries, missions at the disconnected and contested edge, and fights that move and change course at machine speed.
Meanwhile, the Department of Defense is executing its AI Acceleration Strategy. After decades of software and hardware improvements, the Trojan system is at a juncture: It can evolve as a modern, distributed intelligence architecture, or it can remain anchored to assumptions that adversaries already know how to target.
With decades of combined experience leading Army intelligence, modernization, and electronic warfare initiatives, we have spent much of our careers watching how systems like Trojan Spirit survive or fail under real operational pressures. That experience guides the argument we are making about the next generation of Trojan: Piecemeal improvements are no longer sustainable to keep up with America’s vision for decision dominance, adversaries’ evolving tactics, or the very nature of modern warfare.
We work at Booz Allen, which has invested in building capabilities that address the challenges we discuss here. Our argument, however, is not for our company’s solution specifically, but for any architecture that delivers efficient, secure, mobile, and survivable cloud‑to‑edge intelligence.
The Argument for a New Approach Versus Incremental Modernization
From the beginning, Trojan’s mission was to bridge tactical signals intelligence units with strategic intelligence networks. Since then, the system has significantly evolved from bulky satellite terminals to a more integrated, encrypted network for global warfighter intelligence, from the garrison to the field.
This has not been easy. The program has had to navigate fundamental disruptions over the years — and by “fundamental,” we are talking about tectonic shifts like the adoption of cloud computing. The next set of modernization priorities for current‑state Trojan includes upgrading the existing tactical intelligence nodes with flexible, software‑defined architectures that can more rapidly integrate advanced analytics and AI capabilities.
Indeed, a new generation of signals intelligence can help deliver lifesaving intelligence to warfighters around the world. But with hundreds of complex systems and units that now make up this longstanding program, it is becoming more technically challenging and increasingly expensive to keep it aligned with multi‑domain defense priorities. These include priorities such as distributed sensing and analytics, edge‑native operability, zero trust, and rapid development cycles.
Practically speaking, incremental modernization will address some — but not all — priorities that matter for modern warfare. We do not take this position lightly, because of the immense impact and history of the Trojan system. There are compelling arguments to make on the side of incremental progress that include a range of institutional, fiscal, and technical realities. Yet we must also acknowledge that piecemeal upgrades will not solve the following structural challenges, which are architecturally inherent to today’s program.
Reliance on the Continental United States
Trojan’s architecture is still fundamentally tied to predictable connectivity. It was built for a world in which soldiers could collect intelligence, transport it back for central analysis, and then access rich insights. In practice, a commander who is offline for hours or days at a time cannot rely on the traditional Trojan system that depends on eventual reach‑back. To compensate, the Army is plugging architectural gaps with a patchwork of edge compute nodes, sensors, and other distributed intelligence tools.
It is true that continued incremental modernization would improve the intelligence system. However, Trojan’s underlying architecture would still assume data can eventually “get home,” rather than shift to a fully edge‑native model engineered specifically for disruption, flexibility, and worst‑case network scenarios.
Excessive Size, Weight, Power
Beyond Trojan, the technology industry at large surpasses the old model: Instead of large platforms, warfighters can theoretically carry suitcase‑sized edge compute and networking devices paired with commercial satellite communications terminals no larger than a library book. But the Trojan system remains constrained by legacy requirements — a generator, a vehicle‑mounted shelter filled with mission and satellite communications equipment, and a trailer‑borne 10‑meter dish.
The Army is making it clear they want faster commercial capabilities, modular architectures, and extended range — and actively reforming its approach to procurement and sustainment of electronic warfare and signals intelligence equipment. Incremental efficiency updates will certainly improve the status quo, but Trojan will still heavily depend on large hardware that is difficult to acquire, enhance, and maintain. These physical requirements will continue to limit the system’s mobility, range, and survivability as the mission evolves.
Vulnerability To Cyber Actors
From cyber‑attacks in the Middle East to signal jamming in Ukraine, the lines between kinetic and non‑kinetic campaigns have rapidly disintegrated, and mission success is increasingly at the mercy of electronic interference. We are watching this play out in real time. In March, Iran attacked three Amazon Web Services data centers “to identify the role of these centers in supporting the enemy’s military and intelligence activities,” as confirmed by Iran’s Fars News Agency.
Electronic attacks and disruptions are inevitable and constant. Trojan’s large monolithic transport system is not just complex and expensive to maintain — it creates a distinctive electronic signature that adversaries can detect, geolocate, and target. Even with incremental security updates, the larger problem goes back to the outdated assumption of connectivity we discussed earlier: Warfighters today need to access sensitive information on the go, which sometimes means plugging into untrusted local networks in heavily contested environments. To do this safely requires a low‑signature system, automated for zero‑trust defense, that is built precisely to hide in plain sight.
Limited Network Pathways
Because communications can be contested, jammed, or degraded, survivability requires multiple network pathways so that the system can quickly adapt to changing environments and leverage all available communications. A modern intelligence system can then automatically change pathways or aggregate bandwidth across 5G, satellite, and radios to maintain data access based on primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans.
Trojan, as we know it, is pre‑orchestrated and built for fixed network operations. It will take more than incremental modernization to get to the next level of survivability as a self‑optimizing network.
Meeting Today’s Architectural Standard
The battlespace has changed in the last 40 years. So has the available technology. It is unsustainable to constantly upgrade a major system that is older than most of the soldiers operating it.
The argument we are making for a more wholesale update of Trojan’s architecture is not for a Booz Allen solution specifically. However, we are generally in favor of a more efficient, secure, mobile, and survivable solution that can effectively and affordably meet the demands of multi‑domain warfare at the edge. We take this position because piecemeal modernization will not address current structural gaps. Even with incremental updates such as replacing terminals and digitizing the signals intelligence pipeline, Trojan would still be an Army‑centric system with limited modularity across domains and limited performance and reliability at the disconnected edge.
Our argument does not hinge on future innovation. The cloud‑to‑edge intelligence system we are discussing for Trojan already exists at the tactical edge and has been well‑demonstrated to extend mission continuity in extreme environments.
We are confident that the next chapter for Trojan Spirit is within reach, so the Army can more effectively scale the program’s massive, enduring value: connecting troops with data around the world. But meeting the future fight will require more than upgrading the existing parts and pieces. It will require new thinking to reimagine what Trojan Spirit can be as a secure, survivable, and flexible intelligence transport system that works all the way to the furthest tactical edge, so warfighters are never left in the dark.
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